EXHIBIT 1

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DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – WESTERN DIVISION

DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST, a Mauritius Charitable Trust

Plaintiff,

v.

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, a California Corporation; ZA Central Registry, a South African non-profit company; DOES 1 through 50, inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-0062-RGK-JC

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR:

1) BREACH OF CONTRACT
2) INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION;
3) NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION;
4) FRAUD;
5) UNFAIR COMPETITION (VIOLATION OF CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17200);
6) NEGLIGENCE
7) CONFIRMATION OF IRP AWARD
8) DECLARATORY RELIEF
9) DECLARATORY RELIEF
10) DECLARATORY RELIEF
11) VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST (hereinafter "Plaintiff") alleges as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff was formed for the purpose of applying to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") for the right to operate the generic top-level domain ("gTLD") .Africa. Plaintiff spent years and countless resources aimed at achieving that goal. At each stage of the process, Plaintiff has worked diligently to follow the rules and procedures promulgated by ICANN.

2. However, although ICANN put in place rules that ostensibly regulate the delegation of new gTLDs in order to ensure that rights to new gTLDs are awarded transparently through fair competition among applicants, ICANN not only disregarded and acted in contravention of these rules with respect to Plaintiff's application, but actively picked sides and worked to ensure that a different applicant, UniForum SA, now known as ZA Central Registry ("ZACR"), would obtain the rights to .Africa despite ZACR's defective application. ICANN even went so far as to draft an endorsement for the AUC to submit in support of ZACR.

3. Instead of functioning as a disinterested regulator of a fair and transparent gTLD application process, ICANN used its authority and oversight over that process to unfairly assist ZACR and to wrongfully eliminate its only competitor, Plaintiff, from the process to the great detriment of Plaintiff.

4. As a result, ICANN and ZACR deprived Plaintiff of the right to compete for .Africa in accordance with the rules ICANN has established for the new gTLD program, in breach of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws as previously determined by ICANN's own Independent Review Process after an extensive arbitration.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1332(a).

6. This Court has personal jurisdiction of Defendants and venue is proper, under 28 U.S.C. §§1965(a); 1391. Defendant ICANN is a California non-profit which is headquartered in California. Defendant ZACR contracted with ICANN and directed the wrongful conduct alleged herein to California.

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST was at all times relevant to this matter a non-profit organization established under the laws of the Republic of Mauritius with its Internet registry operation - DCA Registry Services (Kenya) Limited - as its principal place of business in Nairobi, Kenya.

8. Defendant INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS ("ICANN") was at all times relevant to this matter a non-profit corporation under the laws of the State of California and headquartered in Los Angeles County, California.

9. Defendant ZA Central Registry ("ZACR")[1] is a South African non-profit corporation. It was formed as a not-for-profit organization for the purpose of applying to ICANN for the right to operate the generic top-level domain ("gTLD") .Africa. ZACR has applied for the gTLD, .Africa, in this District and specifically engaged in the wrongful conduct discussed herein in this District.

10. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of the Defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 50 inclusive, and therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained.

11. At all times herein mentioned each of the Defendants was the agent, employee, partner, principal, representative, alter ego, and/or affiliate of each of the

[1] DCA has removed all claims against ZACR from the First Amended Complaint pursuant to the Court's order on ZACR's Motion to Dismiss. However, DCA reserves the right to appeal the Court's order on the Motion to Dismiss.

remaining Defendants and, was at all times herein mentioned, acting within the course and scope of such relationship. Moreover, at all times herein mentioned, each of the Defendants did confirm, conspire to, consent to, affirm, direct, authorize, acknowledge, and ratify the acts of each and every of the Defendants herein as to each of the acts hereinafter alleged.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

ICANN And Generic Top-Level Domains

12. ICANN was established on September 30, 1998 for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole and is tasked with carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of California law, international law, international conventions, and through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open-entry in Internet-related markets.

13. ICANN is the sole organization worldwide that assigns rights to Generic Top-level Domains. It therefore yields monopolistic power and can and does force participants in the market for gTLDs to play by its onerous and sometimes self-serving rules.

14. ICANN is not an ordinary California non-profit organization. Rather, ICANN's purpose is to operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole.

15. In ICANN's own words, it "coordinates the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, which are key technical services critical to the continued operations of the Internet's underlying address book, the Domain Name System (DNS)... The IANA functions include: (1) the coordination of the assignment of technical protocol parameters including the management of the address and routing parameter area (ARPA) top-level domain; (2) the administration of certain responsibilities associated with Internet DNS root zone management such as generic (gTLD) and country code (ccTLD) Top-Level Domains; (3) the allocation of Internet numbering resources; and (4) other services. ICANN performs the IANA

functions under a U.S. Government contract."

16. A true and correct copy of ICANN's contract with the U.S. Government - Contract SA1301-12-CN-0035 - is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

17. As the contract notes in section C.1.2., the IANA functions "were performed on behalf of the Government under a contract between the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the University of Southern California (USC), as part of a research project known as the Tera-node Network Technology (TNT). As the TNT project neared completion and the DARPA/USC contract neared expiration in 1999, the Government recognized the need for the continued performance of the IANA functions as vital to the stability and correct functioning of the internet."

18. The following core principles guide the decisions and actions of ICANN: (a) Preserve and enhance the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet; (b) Employ open and transparent policy development mechanisms that promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice and ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process; (c) Make decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively with integrity and fairness; and (d) Remain accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness.

19. Additionally, ICANN's own Bylaws state that it shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment.

20. ICANN is accountable to the Internet community for operating in a manner that is consistent with the above stated policies and with ICANN's Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation as a whole.

21. In or about 2011 ICANN approved the expansion of the number of Generic Top Level Domains (hereinafter "gTLD") available to eligible applicants as part of its 2012 Generic Top-Level Domains Internet Expansion Program. Examples

of gTLDs are .Africa and .Asia

DCA and The Top-Level Domain Application

22. As part of this expansion, eligible parties were invited to submit applications to obtain the rights to operate various new gTLDs including, but not limited to: .Lat (Latin America), .Wales, .Africa, .Swiss.

23. In return, ICANN promised to conduct the bid process in a transparent manner, ensure competition, and abide by its own Bylaws and the rules set forth in the gTLD Applicant's Guidebook.

24. In or about March 2012 Plaintiff submitted an application to ICANN for the delegation rights of the .Africa gTLD as part of the 2012 new gTLD Internet Expansion Program.

25. In consideration of ICANN's promises to abide by its own Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation and the rules and procedures set forth in the gTLD Applicant's Guidebook, and in conformity with the laws of fair competition, Plaintiff paid ICANN the sum of $185,000.00 - the mandatory application fee.

26. According to the Guidebook, a geographic name application for a gTLD such as .Africa would be evaluated by a Geographic Names Evaluation Panel. The evaluation criteria for geographic names requiring government support are stipulated in Section 2.2.1.4.2 of the Guidebook. ICANN required that applicants for the rights to a geographic name such as .Africa obtain endorsements from 60% of the national governments in the region, and no more than one written statement of objection to the application from relevant governments in the region and/or public authorities associated with the continent or the region.

27. As part of its bid to apply for the delegation rights of the .Africa gTLD, Plaintiff obtained the endorsements of the African Union Commission (hereinafter the "AUC") in August 2009 and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (hereinafter the "UNECA") in August 2008. Plaintiff was the first to request and obtain official endorsements/letters of support for the .Africa Internet domain

name from these organizations. In April 2010, nearly a year later, AUC wrote DCA and informed DCA that it had "reconsidered its approach in implementing the subject Internet Domain Name (.Africa) and no longer endorses individual initiatives in this matter related to continental resource." However, the letter did not withdraw its endorsement of DCA.

28. Further, the Section 2.2.1.4.3 of the Guidebook states that a government may only withdraw its endorsement if the conditions of its endorsement have not been satisfied: "It is also possible that a government may withdraw its support for an application at a later time, including after the new gTLD has been delegated, *if the registry operator has deviated from the conditions of original support or non objection*." (emphasis added). There were no conditions on the AUC or UNECA endorsements to DCA.

ZACR and the AUC's Top Level Domain Application

29. AUC itself attempted in 2011 in Dakar, Senegal, to obtain the rights to .Africa by requesting from ICANN to include .Africa in the List of Top-Level Reserved Names. This would mean that the .Africa name and its equivalent in other languages would be unavailable for delegation under the ICANN new gTLD Program, which would enable the AUC benefit from a special legislative protection that would allow the AUC to delegate .Africa new gTLD itself.

30. When ICANN denied AUC's request to reserve .Africa at the immediate insistence of DCA and in compliance with the gTLD guidebook rules, the AUC and ZACR conspired to improperly obtain the rights to .Africa through a third-party company, Uniforum ZA Central Registry (ZACR) for their own benefit, in violation of the new gTLD program guidelines.

31. ZACR wrongfully campaigned against DCA's application both to ICANN and the AUC. ZACR also represented to AUC that DCA should not have AUC's endorsement because it was not a community organization, even though an application by an individual organization is perfectly acceptable under ICANN's

rules. ZACR also invited the ICANN Independent Objector ("IO") to object to DCA even though DCA was not subject to the IO's review because DCA's application was not a community application.

32. ICANN then breached its agreement with Plaintiff to review Plaintiff's .Africa application in accordance with its Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and the new gTLD rules and procedures by improperly advising and conspiring with the AUC on how to defeat any applications for .Africa other than its own (via its improper proxy, ZACR).

33. In exchange for AUC's endorsement, ZACR signed a contract with AUC allowing AUC to "retain all rights relating to dotAfrica gTLD," in contravention of the gTLD Guidebook." The AUC also had other motives for favoring ZACR. The members of the AUC committee formed to choose who to endorse for the .Africa gTLD were individuals who were also members of various organizations affiliated with ZACR.

34. ZACR represented that it was applying for the .Africa gTLD on behalf of the African "community." However, it failed to submit the required type of application for organizations applying on behalf of a "community," which is a term of designation and differentiation for gTLDs. Nevertheless, ICANN processed ZACR's "standard" application. A "standard" application does not require an applicant to show that it represents a community.

35. ZACR also made multiple misrepresentations to ICANN in an effort to edge DCA out including (1) that it had a large number of qualifying endorsements from African governments sufficient to meet the 60% threshold under ICANN rules, and (2) that it had the requisite financial capability to operate as a gTLD operator.

The Geographic Names Panel and InterConnect Communications

36. ICANN'S Geographic Names Panel independently evaluates and determines which governments or organizations can give endorsements to gTLD applicants.

37. InterConnect Communications ("ICC") is the organization that ICANN contracted with to perform string similarity and geographic review during the initial evaluation stage of the gLTD application process

38. For each application, the Geographic Names Panel will determine which governments are relevant based on the inputs of the applicant, governments, and its own research and analysis. ICC's staffer Mark McFadden explained to ICANN staff that if the endorsements of regional organizations like the AUC and UNECA were not applied towards the 60% requirement, then neither DCA nor Defendant ZACR would have sufficient geographic support.

39. Therefore, the ICC recommended that ICANN take endorsement letters from regional authorities like the AUC and UNECA for both applicants, Plaintiff and Defendant ZACR.

40. After some back and forth between ICANN and the ICC, and after both entities changed their positions on the endorsements, ICANN decided to accept endorsements from the AUC. Mr. McFadden emphasized in an email that its position was that criteria that included the AUC would also require accepting UNECA. In 2014 and 2015 during an independent review process, explained more fully below, ICANN asserted that it had accepted UNECA as an endorser.

41. Thus, ICANN and not ICC determined that only the AUC endorsements (and not the UNECA endorsements) would be taken into account for the geographic evaluation for both applications.

42. Had ICANN treated DCA's and ZACR's endorsements equally, both DCA and ZACR should have either passed or failed the endorsement requirement. Rather, as shown below, ICANN conspired to accept ZACR's regional endorsements as sufficient while disregarding Plaintiff's endorsements, although the plaintiff received the endorsement earlier than ZACR from AUC.

43. Additionally, the ICC did not inform DCA of any problems with their endorsements during the initial evaluation, as the ICC was required to do. DCA's

application should have completed the process first. Although filed after DCA's application, ZACR's application was initially placed ahead of DCA by virtue of a lottery system employed by ICANN. However, ICANN put off completing the initial evaluation on ZACR's application because ZACR did not have the required endorsements and would have failed if ICANN had completed its initial valuation when it came up for evaluation. ICANN thus delayed ZACR to give it more time to submit qualifying endorsements.

44. The Guidebook states that the evaluation panels are required to act impartially and transparently; however, the communications and engagements during the evaluation of .Africa applications deviated substantially from the expected code of conduct.

The GAC

45. ICANN has a Governmental Advisory Committee ("GAC") whose purpose, according to the bylaws, is to "consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments." Membership on the GAC is open to all representatives of all national governments and, at the invitation through its chair "[e]conomies as recognized in the international fora, and multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations."

46. The AUC became a member of the GAC in June 2012, apparently on the advice of ICANN. However, its status as a voting member is improper because, unlike the European Union (EU), it has no regulatory authority over its member states.

47. Having encouraged the AUC's membership, ICANN then allowed the GAC to be used as a vehicle for the issuance of advice against DCA's application by DCA's only competitor for .Africa, the AUC through ZACR, effectively ensuring that the rights to .Africa would be delegated to AUC's chosen proxy ZACR. Specifically, ICANN allowed the GAC to issue a "consensus advice"

that DCA's application should not proceed due to issues with the regional endorsements. Under ICANN's rules, the GAC can recommend that ICANN cease reviewing an application if *all* of the GAC members agree that an application should not proceed because an applicant is sensitive or problematic. However, not all of the members of the GAC agreed that DCA's application should be stopped and the GAC did not issue any statement that DCA was problematic or sensitive.

48. For example, Kenya's representative was not even present at the GAC meeting when the advice was issued, but was informed that at a meeting of the GAC and ICANN Board on 9 April 2013, Alice Munyua, Kenya's former GAC advisor and a member of the ZACR Steering Committee as well as a GAC representative for the AUC, made a statement purportedly on behalf of Kenya denouncing DCA's application for .Africa. The current Kenya GAC advisor wrote to the GAC Chairperson later that evening to inform her that Ms. Munyua no longer represented Kenya and that Kenya did not share her viewpoints on .Africa but ICANN Board nonetheless accepted the GAC advice rendered without a consensus.

49. In June 2013, the New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC") accepted the GAC's advice even though DCA informed them that several members of the committee had conflicts of interest with DCA and even though ZACR's application should also have been halted if the GAC's rationale about regional endorsements were to be applied equally. Nevertheless, ICANN rejected DCA's application on the basis of the improper GAC advice while ZACR's continued.

50. ICANN therefore waited to inform DCA of the status of its Initial Evaluation (IE) until after the wrongful GAC Advice was procured on the Plaintiff's application to stop it from processing further.

51. Although ICANN under its rules could have reconsidered this decision, it refused to do so. Meanwhile, ZACR passed the initial evaluation and

entered into the contracting phase with ICANN. ZACR did not have sufficient country specific endorsements to meet the ICANN requirements for geographic gTLDs. Only five of the purported endorsement letters submitted by ZACR from African governments actually referenced ZACR by name. Presumably, ZACR passed on the basis of the same regional endorsements that ICANN and GAC had used to derail Plaintiff's application. ZACR filed purported support letters where African governments were endorsing the AUC's "Reserved Names" initiative, along with declarations made by the AUC regarding its intention to reserve .Africa for its own use along with its appointment letter from the AUC as evidence of such support. Had ICANN used fair and even-handed criteria, DCA's application would have passed.

The Independent Review Process

52. ICANN provides applicants with an independent review process ("IRP"), as a means to challenge ICANN's actions with respect to a gTLD application. The IRP is a binding arbitration, operated by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution, comprised of an independent panel of arbitrators. Nonetheless, once its wrongful conduct came to light ICANN took the position that the IRP was not in fact binding.

53. Mr. McFadden, an ICC employee, stated in an email to ICANN that he was monitoring the press "on the .dotafrica application," and added "so far, so good, I think. The ball is now in Sophia's court – if she wants to invoke Independent Review, then good luck to her."

54. In October 2013, DCA successfully sought an IRP to review ICANN's processing of its application, including ICANN's handling of the GAC opinion.

55. DCA's panel was comprised of the Honorable William J. Cahill (Ret.) (who replaced the Honorable Richard C. Neal (Ret.) after his passing), Babak

Barin, and Professor Catherine Kessedjian. The Honorable William J. Cahill is a JAMS arbitrator who spent nearly ten years as a judge in San Francisco County Superior Court. Mr. Barin is an experienced attorney, professor, and author on international arbitration. Ms. Kessedjian is a professor of law at the University Pantheon-Assas Paris II and a deputy director of the European College of Paris – she has also acts as an arbitrator for ICSID, ICC, LCIA and AAA.

56. Despite the initiation of the IRP, ICANN continued to review ZACR's application and went so far as to sign a contract for the operation of .Africa with ZACR.

57. The IRP panel issued a final and thorough 63-page declaration in the matter in July 2015, finding against ICANN. The panel found, *inter alia*, that:

a. The IRP arbitration was binding, despite ICANN's protests to the contrary.

b. ICANN's actions and inactions with respect to DCA's application were inconsistent with ICANN's bylaws and articles of incorporation.

c. ICANN should "continue to refrain from delegating the .Africa gTLD and permit DCA Trust's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process."

The IRP Panel did not conclude that there were any deficiencies with DCA's application. Rather, the arbitration panel concluded that "both the actions and inactions of the Board [of ICANN] with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN."

58. This was the first time in its history of the new gTLDs that ICANN was not the prevailing party in an IRP arbitration.

59. A true and correct copy of the IRP panel's declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

ICANN's Processing of DCA's Application After the IRP Declaration

60. Despite the IRP's express ruling against ICANN, ICANN did not act in accordance with the IRP's Declaration.

61. Instead of allowing DCA's application to proceed through the remainder of the application process – referred to as the delegation phase -- ICANN restarted ICANN's application and re-reviewed its endorsements.

62. ICANN intended to deny DCA's application on any pretext. For example, in September 2015 ICANN Geographic Name Evaluators issued DCA clarifying questions regarding its endorsements, which it intentionally did not send during the initial evaluation, more than two years after the IRP Panel declared ICANN's wrongful suspension of its application, and then indicated that DCA's responses to those questions were inadequate.

63. Hoping to gain insight into what exactly was allegedly wrong with its application, DCA agreed to an extended evaluation. But, ICANN merely asked the exact same questions without further guidance or clarification - clearly a pretext to deny DCA's application. After all, ICANN had already entered into a registry agreement with ZACR, as ICANN's general counsel had made public after the IRP Declaration issuance. In short, the process ICANN put Plaintiff through was a sham with a predetermined ending – ICANN's denial of Plaintiff's application so that ICANN could steer the gTLD to ZACR.

64. In February 2016, ICANN rejected DCA's application after the extended evaluation.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Contract—Against Defendant ICANN)

65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 64 as though set forth in full herein.

66. In or about March 2012 Plaintiff submitted an application to ICANN for the delegation rights of the .Africa gTLD as part of the 2012 new gTLD Internet Expansion Program.

67. In consideration of ICANN's promises to abide by its own Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation and the rules and procedures set forth in the gTLD Applicant's Guidebook, and in conformity with the laws of fair competition, Plaintiff paid ICANN the sum of $185,000.00 - the mandatory application fee.

68. Plaintiff additionally agreed to abide by all rules and regulations as those rules and regulations pertained to what constituted proper paperwork for applying for the .Africa gTLD.

69. In consideration of Plaintiff paying the sum of $185,000.00, ICANN promised to conduct the bid process for the .Africa gTLD in a manner consistent with its own Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, the rules and procedures set forth in the gTLD Applicant's Guidebook, and in conformity with the laws of fair competition.

70. Plaintiff would not have paid the sum of $185,000 absent the mutual consideration and promises. Plaintiff performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on its part to be performed in accordance with the agreed upon terms of participating in the new gTLD Program.

71. ICANN breached its agreement with Plaintiff to review Plaintiff's .Africa application in accordance with ICANN's Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and the new gTLD rules as evidenced by the IRP Declaration. For example,

ICANN improperly advised the AUC on how to defeat any application for .Africa other than its own (via its improper proxy, ZARC).

72. In a letter dated 8 March 2012, ICANN Board Chairman Stephen Crocker explained to the AUC that although ICANN could not reserve .Africa for AUC's use because the Reserved Names list was already closed, the AUC could "play a prominent role in determining the outcome of any application" for .Africa: first, as a "public authorit[y] associated with the continent ," the AUC could block a competing application by filing "one written statement of objection;" second, the AUC could file a Community Objection (a type of formal objection recognized by ICANN and decided by an independent evaluator); or finally, the AUC could utilize the GAC to combat a competing application for .Africa.

a. ICANN prevented DCA's application from proceeding through the new gTLD review process and by coordinating with the AUC and the ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee (hereinafter the "GAC") and others, to ensure that the AUC obtained the rights to .Africa, in a manner that violated Defendant's obligations of independence, transparency, and due process contained in ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws and the gTLD Guidebook.

b. ICANN has also failed to abide by the results of its own IRP process in contravention of its agreement with DCA.

c. ICANN further breached its agreement with Plaintiff by failing to permit competition for .Africa and by abusing its regulatory authority in its differential treatment of ZACR.

d. ICANN breached its agreement with Plaintiff by working with InterConnect Communications (ICC), an independent evaluator of the applications for ICANN, to ensure that ZACR, but not

Plaintiff, would be able to pass a crucial evaluation process.

e. ICANN breached the agreement by drafting a letter supporting ZACR for the AUC to submit back to ICANN.

f. ICANN breached their agreement with Plaintiff by failing to conduct the necessary due diligence into recommendations and decision by Defendant's advisory councils.

g. In violation of the new gTLD Program rules of transparency and fair competition, the GAC sent steady messages to ICANN's Board that it must ensure that nothing interferes with the delegation of .Africa to ZACR. During ICANN's 50th International Conference in London, UK, the AUC GAC members threatened that ICANN would not get the African Union's support, which ICANN was seeking for its Internet transition plans away from National Telecommunications and Information Administration oversight, if Plaintiff's application was approved.

73. A representative of ICANN, who was also called to testify on behalf of the ICANN during the IRP, Ms. Heather Dryden, admitted under questioning and cross examination that ICANN breached its agreement with Plaintiff. Specifically, Ms. Dryden admitted that the GAC did not act with transparency or in a manner designed to ensure fairness. See Exhibit A, International Centre for Dispute Resolution, Independent Review Panel, Case # 50 2013 001083, Final Declaration, pgs. 43-45.

74. The Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that ICANN willfully committed wrongful actions in a manner that was detrimental to the Plaintiff's application for the .Africa new gTLD, and refused to take corrective actions to

redress such evident wrongdoing satisfactorily even after the conclusion of the IRP Proceeding.

75. As a direct, foreseeable, and proximate result of ICANN's breach of the Agreement, Plaintiff has suffered damages, and been damaged and continues to be damaged in an amount to be determined at trial but not less than nine-million United States of America dollars ($9,000,000.00), plus interest. Additionally, as a result of the breach by ICANN of the Agreement, Plaintiff has incurred legal fees and costs. Plaintiff reserve the right to amend this Complaint to state the true nature and extent of its damages when ascertained or at time of trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Intentional Misrepresentation—Against ICANN)

76. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 75 as though set forth in full herein.

77. ICANN made the following intentional misrepresentations on its website and in the Guidebook to Plaintiff or to Plaintiff's agents or representatives and on which Plaintiff relied to its detriment in, among other things, applying for .Africa and paying the $185,000 fee to do so:

a. ICANN represented to Plaintiff that Plaintiff's application for .Africa would be reviewed in accordance with, ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, and the new gTLD Applicant Guidebook; all of which promise a fair and transparent bid process, fair competition, and non-interference with an applicant's application by a competitor or third-party.

b. ICANN represented that it had in place an Accountability Mechanism including an Independent Review Panel (IRP) process to ensure that Plaintiff would be provided proper due process in the event of a dispute regarding any decisions by

ICANN regarding Plaintiff's application under the new gTLD Program.

c. ICANN represented that it would participate in good-faith with any applicant who desired to initiate an IRP process in order to ensure that applicants received proper due process.

d. ICANN represented that all applicants for the .Africa gTLD would be subject to the same agreement, rules, and procedures.

78. However, ICANN:

a. Had no intention of following its Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, or the rules outlined in the gTLD Applicant Guidebook. ICANN's rules state that three criteria are used to object to a specific applicant by the GAC: problematic, potentially violating national law, and raises sensitivities. However, ICANN's Board representative testified on behalf of ICANN during the IRP hearing that the GAC and ICANN's Board did not in fact follow the published rules for issuing a GAC objection. See Exhibit A, IRP Declaration, pgs. 43-52.

b. ICANN had no intention of ever participating in an IRP process in good-faith and at all times believed it would do whatever it wanted. And when forced to participate in IRP proceedings, ICANN argued that the IRP was not binding. After the IRP Declaration, ICANN followed through with its intention to act according to its own wishes and desires regardless of the IRP ruling and procedure. For example, ICANN's CEO, Mr. Fadi Chehade, wrote to the AUC's Infrastructure and Energy Commissioner on or about June 15, 2014 and said that ICANN not only did not approve of the IRP proceedings but also that ICANN promised to proceed expeditiously with delegating

.Africa to the AUC's improper proxy ZACR.

79. ICANN never had any intention of treating applicants the same or making them follow the same rules. Instead, ICANN simply chose applicants based on its own wishes and in exchange for political favors. As an example, ICANN allowed ZACR to break its rules and procedures by not requiring ZACR to submit a Community Top Level Domain application for .Africa even though the AUC had claimed that it had endorsed ZACR to apply on behalf of the African community.

80. When ICANN made these representations they knew them to be false and made these representations with the intention to induce Plaintiff to act in reliance on these representations.

81. In doing the acts herein alleged, ICANN acted with oppression, fraud, and malice, and Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Negligent Misrepresentations—Against ICANN)

82. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 81 as though set forth in full herein.

83. ICANN made the following misrepresentations through its website and the Guidebook to Plaintiff or to Plaintiff's agents or representatives and on which Plaintiff relied to its detriment:

a. ICANN represented to Plaintiff that Plaintiff's application for .Africa would be reviewed in accordance with, ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, and the new gTLD Applicant Guidebook; all of which promise a fair and transparent bid process, fair competition, and non-interference with an applicant's application by a competitor or third-party.

b. ICANN represented that it had in place an Accountability Mechanism including an Independent Review Panel (IRP)

process to ensure that Plaintiff would be provided proper due process in the event of a dispute regarding any decisions by ICANN regarding Plaintiff's application under the new gTLD Program.

c. ICANN represented that it would participate in good-faith with any applicant who desired to initiate an IRP process in order to ensure that applicants received proper due process.

d. ICANN represented that all applicants for the .Africa gTLD would be subject to the same agreement, rules, and procedures.

84. However, ICANN:

a. Had no intention of following its Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, or the rules outlined in the gTLD Applicant Guidebook. ICANN's rules state that three criteria are used to object to a specific applicant by the GAC: problematic, potentially violating national law, and raises sensitivities. However, ICANN's Board representative testified on behalf of ICANN during the IRP hearing that the GAC and ICANN's Board did not in fact follow the published rules for issuing a GAC objection. See Exhibit A, IRP Declaration, pgs. 43-52.

b. ICANN had no intention of ever participating in an IRP process in good-faith and at all times believed it would do whatever it wanted. And when forced to participate in IRP proceedings, ICANN argued that the IRP was not binding. After the IRP Declaration, ICANN followed through with its intention to act according to its own wishes and desires regardless of the IRP ruling and procedure. For example, ICANN's CEO, Mr. Fadi Chehade, wrote to the AUC's Infrastructure and Energy Commissioner on or about June 15, 2014 and said that ICANN

not only did not approve of the IRP proceedings but also that ICANN promised to proceed expeditiously with delegating .Africa to the AUC's improper proxy ZACR.

85. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages, legal fees, and costs.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Fraud—Against ICANN)

86. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 85 as though fully set forth herein.

87. Plaintiff had complained to ICANN that its competitor ZACR had submitted a fraudulent application, but the ICANN did not take any action against ZACR. Plaintiff believes that by not taking any action to investigate the obvious deficiencies in ZACR's application, as described herein, Defendants were complicit in this act of accepting and approving a fraudulent application.

88. No provision in the gTLD Applicant's Guidebook allows for a third-party organization such as the AUC, a non-applicant, and an organization that is not a registry operator, to have all rights to a Top Level Domain and other rights over registry databases and the right to re-designate the registry function.

89. In contravention of the established rules, Plaintiff is informed and believes that ICANN allowed the AUC and its proxy company ZACR to violate the rules and procedures for acquiring the delegation rights of a new gTLD in exchange for the AUC's political support in favor of Defendant's efforts to become a non-regulated organization that would have overall stewardship of the Internet domain technical management functions.

90. ICANN improperly allowed ZACR's application, which admitted that ZACR had agreed to assign any .Africa rights to AUC, because there is no provision in the Guidebook that allows a third party organization like AUC, a non-

applicant, and an organization that is not a registry operator, to have all rights to a TLD and other rights over registry databases.

91. Plaintiff is informed and believes that ICANN allowed the AUC to unilaterally appoint its proxy applicant as the chosen registry operator for .Africa in contravention of new gTLD Program guidelines and ICANN's agreement with Plaintiff.

92. As per Article 1 (Delegation and Operation of Top-Level Domain: Representation and Warranties) of the new gTLD Registry Agreement, only ICANN can designate a registry operator for any Top Level Domain.

93. ZACR's improper relationship with the AUC is evident in the signed contract in which ZACR signed over all its rights to .Africa to the AUC. Specifically, that "the AUC shall retain all the rights relating to the dotAfrica TLD [Top Level Domain], including in particular, intellectual property and other rights to the registry databases required to ensure the implementation of the agreement between the AUC and the ZACR, and the right to re-designate the registry function."

94. ICANN allowed ZACR to break its rules and procedures by not requiring ZACR to submit a Community Top Level Domain application for .Africa even though the AUC had claimed that it had endorsed ZACR to apply on behalf of the African community.

95. These fraudulent acts in violation of Plaintiff's agreement with ICANN prevented the only proper application [Plaintiff's] from proceeding through the new gTLD process and prevented Plaintiff from acquiring the delegation rights of the .Africa new gTLD.

96. In doing the acts herein alleged, ICANN acted with oppression, fraud, and malice, and Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages.

97. Furthermore, the registry agreement ICANN signed with ZACR should be declared null and void as that contract was the result of a fraudulent application that was accepted and approved by ICANN in violation of due process and while Plaintiff was in the IRP

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Unfair Competition (Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200—Against ICANN)

98. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 97 as though fully set forth herein.

99. Defendant's conduct as alleged herein constitutes unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.

100. Unless ICANN is restrained from continuing these unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts or practices Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harms and injuries.

101. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing conduct, ICANN has been unjustly enriched. Plaintiff is entitled to full disgorgement of all profits obtained by ICANN as a result of their unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent acts as alleged herein.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Negligence – Against ICANN)

102. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 101 as though fully set forth herein.

103. ICANN owed Plaintiff a duty to act with proper care in processing Plaintiff's application in accordance with its own Bylaws, Articles of Incorporation, and rules and procedures as stated in the gTLD Applicant's guidebook.

104. ICANN owed Plaintiff a duty to refrain from anticompetitive and unfair business practices under California and Federal law.

105. ICANN breached the duty owed to Plaintiff by accepting a fraudulent application submitted by Uniforum/ZACR.

106. ICANN breached the duty owed to Plaintiff by failing to conduct due diligence and an investigation concerning GAC's recommendation to not approve Plaintiff's application.

107. ICANN breached the duty owed to Plaintiff by allowing the GAC to disregard its established rules and procedures and by failing to provide a rationale for the GAC advice regarding Plaintiff's application.

108. ICAN breached the duty owed to Plaintiff by moving forward with the registry agreement with ZACR even while the IRP proceedings were on-going.

109. ICANN breached the duty owed to Plaintiff, as admitted by ICANN's own witness at the IRP proceeding, by failing to act in a transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness and accountability.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Confirmation of IRP Declaration)

110. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 109 as though fully set forth herein.

111. As set forth herein, the IRP is a binding proceeding.

112. As set forth herein, the IRP issued an arbitration award in favor of Plaintiff in July 2015.

113. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that the court confirm the IRP's award.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Relief Against ICANN)

114. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 113 as though fully set forth herein.

115. As set forth herein, the IRP Declaration mandates that ICANN allow DCA's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process.

116. As set forth herein, ICANN did not allow DCA's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process but instead forced DCA to proceed through parts of the process that it had already completed, including review of its geographic endorsements.

117. The holdings and findings of fact found in the IRP are conclusive for purposes of this proceeding based on principals of res judicata.

118. An actual controversy exists among the parties as to the proper implementation of the directives in the IRP declaration.

119. Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that ICANN follow the IRP Declaration and allow the DCA application to proceed through the delegation phase of the application process.

120. Plaintiff is entitled to an injunction (1) requiring ICANN to abide by the IRP ruling and place DCA's application at the proper place in the evaluation process, and (2) directing ICANN to refrain from delegating the rights to .Africa until DCA's application has been fully processed.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Relief Against ICANN)

121. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 120 as though fully set forth herein.

122. As set forth herein, ZACR submitted an improper application and fraudulently obtained a contract for registration rights to .Africa from ICANN.

123. As set forth herein, the IRP declaration stated that ZACR's application should not continue to be processed until DCA's application was fully reviewed.

124. As set forth herein, ICANN has not processed DCA's application in accordance with the IRP Declaration.

125. The holdings and findings of fact found in the IRP are conclusive for purposes of this proceeding based on principals of res judicata.

126. An actual controversy exists among the parties as to ZACR's entitlement to the .Africa registration rights.

127. Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that the registry agreement between ZACR and ICANN be declared null and void and that ZACR's application does not meet ICANN standards.

TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Declaratory Relief Against ICANN)

128. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 127 as though fully set forth herein.

129. ICANN required Plaintiff and other applicants to sign the Guidebook which contained a covenant not to sue in order to apply for .Africa: "Applicant hereby releases ICANN and the ICANN Affiliated Parties [i.e., ICANN's affiliates, subsidiaries, directors, officers, employees, consultants, evaluators, and agents] from any and all claims by applicant that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action, or failure to act, by ICANN or any ICANN Affiliated Party in connection with ICANN's or an ICANN Affiliated Party's review of this application, investigation or verification, and any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application

or the decision by ICANN to recommend, or not to recommend, the approval of applicant's gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR IN ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN AND ICANN AFIILIATED PARTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION."

130. Plaintiff could not obtain the rights to .Africa from anyone but ICANN. ICANN maintained monopolistic power over gTLDs on the Internet. The covenant not to sue was non-negotiable.

131. The covenant not to sue is void as a matter of California public policy and law (*See* Cal. Civ. Code §1668).

132. The covenant not to sue is unconscionable. It is a contract of adhesion, entirely one-sided and not subject to negotiation. It allows ICANN to absolve itself of wrongdoing while affording no remedy to applicants. It does not equally apply to applicants because it does not prevent ICANN from resorting to Court or litigation against applicants.

133. The covenant not to sue was procured by fraud. ICANN'S website and guidebook describe the IRP as an "Independent Third-Party REVIEW OF Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws." In addition, the covenant not to sue in the Guidebook presents the IRP as an alternative to hold ICANN accountable for any wrongdoing: "PROVIDED THAT APPLICANT MAY USE ANY ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM SET FORTH IN ICANN'S BYLAWS FOR PURPOSES OF

CHALLENGING ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION."

134. In fact, ICANN denies in practice that the IRP is binding and does not respect or follow its decisions. ICANN induces and intends to induce applicants to sign the guidebook covenant by falsely representing it has a real and effective dispute resolution mechanism outside of court. However, ICANN has failed to act in accordance with the IRP ruling against it. Plaintiff relied on those misrepresentations in applying to ICANN for .Africa and in instituting the IRP process and investing time and resources in it.

135. As set forth herein, ICANN did not comply with its obligations under the Guidebook.

136. An actual controversy exists among the parties as to the enforceability of the covenant not to sue.

137. Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that the covenant not to sue is unenforceable, unconscionable, procured by fraud and/or or void as a matter of law and public policy.

ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution)

138. Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 137 as though fully set forth herein.

139. The U.S. government traditionally controlled the IANA functions.

140. ICANN was delegated control of the IANA functions, a public function, by the U.S government for the benefit of the public.

141. ICANN's provision of the IANA function is pursuant to its contract with the U.S. government.

142. In addition to its supervisory function through the contract with ICANN, the U.S. government maintains active involvement in ICANN's review of gTLD applications through its seat on ICANN's GAC.

143. ICANN therefore operates in close nexus to the U.S. government and provides a traditional and exclusive governmental function.

144. For the foregoing reasons, ICANN was acting as an agent and arm of the U.S. government in reviewing DCA's application.

145. DCA has a right to a fair review of its .Africa application, consistent with ICANN's rules and the Guidebook, pursuant to the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

146. ICANN violated DCA's procedural due process rights throughout its review of DCA's application for .Africa for the reasons described in this complaint, including by accepting the faulty GAC advice and ceasing to review DCA's application, by failing to follow the IRP declaration, by disregarding DCA's valid endorsements, by aiding and favoring ZACR in its application for .Africa when ICANN promised to act as a neutral and treat applicants fairly, and by ultimately rejecting DCA's application for .Africa.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST prays for relief as follows:

1. For compensatory damages according to proof at the time of trial;
2. For general damages according to proof;
3. For punitive damages according to proof;
4. For confirmation of the IRP Declaration;
5. For specific performance of the IRP Declaration;
6. For rescission of ICANN's registry agreement with ZACR as a null and void contract;

7. An injunction requiring ICANN to consider DCA's application in accordance with the IRP ruling;
8. An injunction requiring ICANN to refrain from processing the ZACR application until they have processed DCA's application in accordance with the IRP ruling;
9. For legal interest on said sums;
10. Attorneys' fees and costs to the extent permitted by law; and
11. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper against all Defendants.

Dated: October 3, 2016

BROWN NERI SMITH & KHAN LLP

By: /s/ Ethan J. Brown
Ethan J. Brown

Attorneys for Plaintiff
DOTCONNECTAFRICA TRUST

EXHIBIT A

AWARD/CONTRACT	1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED ORDER UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)	RATING	PAGE 1 OF PAGES 65
2. CONTRACT (Proc. Inst. Indent.) NO. SA1301-12-CN-0035	3. EFFECTIVE DATE 10/01/2012	4. REQUISITION/PURCHASE REQUEST/PROJECT NO. AA-OAM-??-?-12-00934	

5. ISSUED BY CODE 000SA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE. NW
ACQUISITION SERVICES- ROOM 6520
WASHINGTON DC 20230

6 ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 5) CODE 000SA

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE. NW
ACQUISITION SERVICES- ROOM 6520
WASHINGTON DC 20230

7. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRACTOR (No., street, county, State and ZIP Code)

INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES
AND NUMBERS
4676 ADMIRALTY WAY, SUITE #330
MARINA DEL REY CA 902926648
Vendor ID: 00000428
DUNS: 045511487
Cage Code: 4A4S9
CEC:

CODE FACILITY CODE

8. DELIVERY
☐ FOB ORIGIN ☐ OTHER (See below)

9. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT
NET 30

10. SUBMIT INVOICES (4 copies unless otherwise specified) TO THE ADDRESS SHOWN IN ITEM NISTFSG

11. SHIP TO/MARK FOR CODE NTIA-HCH
NATIONAL TEL. AND INFO. ADMIN
1401 CONSTITUTION AVE. NW
ROOM 4888, HCHB

12. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY CODE NISTFSG
NIST ACCOUNTS PAYABLE OFFICE
BLDG 101, ROOM A-836 MS 1621
100 BUREAU DRIVE

13. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION:
☐ 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)( ) ☐ 41 U.S.C. 253(c)( )

14. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA

15A. ITEM NO.	15B. SUPPLIES/SERVICES	15C. QUANTITY	15D. UNIT	15E. UNIT PRICE	15F. AMOUNT
	Please See Continuation Page for Line Items				

15G. TOTAL AMOUNT OF CONTRACT $ 0.00

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	M	EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD	

CONTRACTING OFFICER WILL COMPLETE ITEM 17 (SEALED-BID OR NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENT) OR 18 (SEALED-BID PROCUREMENT) AS APPLICABLE

17. ☒ CONTRACTOR'S NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT (Contractor is required to sign this document and return 1 copies to issuing office.) Contractor agrees to furnish and deliver all items or perform all the services set forth or otherwise identified above and on any continuation sheets for the consideration stated herein. The rights and obligations of the parties to this contract shall be subject to and governed by the following documents: (a) this award/contract, (b) the solicitation, if any, and (c) such provisions, representations, certifications, and specifications, as are attached or incorporated by reference herein. (Attachments are listed herein.)

18. ☐ SEALED-BID AWARD (Contractor is not required to sign this document.) Your bid on Solicitation Number including the additions or changes made by you which additions or changes are set forth in full above, is hereby accepted as to the terms listed above and on any continuation sheets. This award consummates the contract which consists of the following documents: (a) the Government's solicitation and your bid, and (b) this award/contract. No further contractual document is necessary. (Block 18 should be checked only when awarding a sealed-bid contract.)

19A. NAME AND TITLE OF SIGNER (Type or Print)
ROD A. BECKSTROM
PRESIDENT & CEO, ICANN

19B. NAME OF CONTRACTOR
BY (Signature of person authorized to sign)

19C. DATE SIGNED June 29, 2012

20A. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER
KATHLEEN M. MCGRATH

20B. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY (Signature of Contracting Officer)

20C. DATE SIGNED JUL 02, 2012

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STANDARD FORM 26 (REV. 5/2011)
Prescribed by GSA - FAR (48 CFR) 53.214(a)

SCHEDULE Continued

ITEM NO.	SUPPLIES/SERVICES	QUANTITY	UNIT	UNIT PRICE $	AMOUNT $
	Contracting Officer: Mona-Lisa Dunn, 202-482-1470 Primary Contracting Officer Representative: Vernita D. Harris, 202-482-4686, vharris@NTIA.doc.gov Alternate Contracting Officer Representative(s): Technical Point of Contact: Vernita D. Harris, 202-482-4686, vharris@NTIA.doc.gov The Contractor shall provide the services in accordance with the terms, conditions, and prices described herein. The Contractor's proposal dated May 31, 2012 and as amended through agreed terms and conditions dated June 23, 2012 and June 26, 2012 are hereby incorporated by reference. .				
0001	BASE YEAR - October 1, 2012 - September 30, 2015. The Contractor shall provide the services necessary for the operation of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) in accordance with the attached Statement of Work. The Contractor may not charge the United States Government for performance of the requirements of this contract. Period of Performance: 10/01/2012 to 09/30/2015	0.00	EA	0.00	0.00
0002	OPTION YEAR 1 - October 1, 2015 - September 30, 2017. The Contractor shall provide the services necessary for the operation of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) in accordance with the attached Statement of Work. The Contractor may not charge the United States Government for performance of the requirements of this contract. Accounting and Appropriation Data: 61.12.1200012.100.0012.010102000. 0400000000000000.25970000.000000 $0.00 Period of Performance: 10/01/2015 to 09/30/2017 Pricing Option: Time and Material	1.00	JB	0.00	OPT 0.00
0003	OPTION YEAR 2 - October 1, 2017 - September 30, 2019. The Contractor shall provide the services necessary for the operation of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) in accordance with the attached Statement of Work. The Contractor may not charge the United States Government for performance of the requirements of this contract. Accounting and Appropriation Data: 61.12.1200012.100.0012.010102000. 0400000000000000.25970000.000000 $0.00 Period of Performance: 10/01/2017 to 09/30/2019 Pricing Option: Time and Material	1.00	JB	0.00	OPT 0.00

3SECTION B SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS

This is a no cost, $0.00 time and material contract.

B.2 COST/PRICE

The Contractor may not charge the United States Government to perform the requirements of this Contract. The Contractor may establish and collect fees from third parties provided the fee levels are approved by the Contracting Officer and are fair and reasonable. If fees are charged, the Contractor shall base any proposed fee structure on the cost of providing the specific service for which the fee is charged and the resources necessary to monitor the fee driven requirements. The Contractor may propose an interim fee for the first year of the contract, which will expire one year after the contract award. If the Contractor intends to establish and collect fees from third parties beyond the first year of the Contract, the Contractor must collaborate with the interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3 to develop a proposed fee structure based on a methodology that tracks the actual costs incurred for each discrete IANA function. The Contractor must submit a copy of proposed fee structure, tracking methodology and description of the collaboration efforts and process to the Contracting Officer.

B.3 PRE-AWARD SURVEY – FAR 9.106 and 9.106-4(a)

At the discretion of the Contracting Officer, a site visit to the Offeror's facility (ies) may also be requested and conducted by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) or its designee. The purpose of this visit will be to gather information relevant to the Offeror's responsibility and prospective capability to perform the requirements under any contract that may be awarded. The Contracting Officer will arrange such a visit at least seven (7) days in advance with the Offeror.

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION / SPECS / WORK STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF WORK/SPECIFICATIONS

The Contractor shall furnish the necessary personnel, materials, equipment, services and Facilities (except as otherwise specified) to perform the following Statement Work/Specifications.

C.1 BACKGROUND

C.1.1 The U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has initiated this contract to maintain the continuity and stability of services related to certain interdependent Internet technical management functions, known collectively as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).

C.1.2 Initially, these interdependent technical functions were performed on behalf of the Government under a contract between the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the University of Southern California (USC), as part of a research project known as the Tera-node Network Technology (TNT). As the TNT project neared completion and the DARPA/USC contract neared expiration in 1999, the Government recognized the need for the continued performance of the IANA functions as vital to the stability and correct functioning of the Internet.

C.1.3 The Contractor, in the performance of its duties, must have or develop a close constructive working relationship with all interested and affected parties to ensure quality and satisfactory performance of the IANA functions. The interested and affected parties include, but are not limited to, the multi-stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for the domain name system (DNS) that the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) represents; the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB); Regional Internet Registries (RIRs); top-level domain (TLD) operators/managers (e.g., country codes and generic); governments; and the Internet user community.

C.1.4 The Government acknowledges that data submitted by applicants in connection with the IANA functions may be confidential information. To the extent required by law, the Government shall accord any confidential data submitted by applicants in connection with the IANA functions with the same degree of care as it uses to protect its own confidential information, but not less than reasonable care, to prevent the unauthorized use, disclosure, or publication of confidential information. In providing data that is subject to such a confidentiality obligation to the Government, the Contractor shall advise the Government of that obligation.

C.2 CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS

C.2.1 The Contractor must perform the required services for this contract as a prime Contractor, not as an agent or subcontractor. The Contractor shall not enter into any subcontracts for the performance of the services, or assign or transfer any of its rights or obligations under this Contract, without the Government's prior written consent and any attempt to do so shall be void and without further effect. The Contractor shall be a) a wholly U.S. owned and operated firm or fully accredited United States University or College operating in one of the 50 states of the United States or District of Columbia; b) incorporated within one of the fifty (50) states of the United States or District of Columbia; and c) organized under the laws of a state of the United States or District of Columbia. The Contractor shall perform the primary IANA functions of the Contract in the United States and possess and maintain, throughout the performance of this Contract, a physical address within the United States. The Contractor must be able to demonstrate that all primary operations and systems will remain within the United States (including the District of Columbia). The Government reserves the right to inspect the premises, systems, and processes of all security and operational components used for the performance of all Contract requirements and obligations.

C.2.2 The Contractor shall furnish the necessary personnel, material, equipment, services, and facilities, to perform the following requirements without any cost to the Government. The Contractor shall conduct due diligence in hiring, including full background checks.

C.2.3 The Contractor may not charge the United States Government for performance of the requirements of this contract. The Contractor may establish and collect fees from third parties provided the fee levels are approved by the Contracting Officer (CO) and are fair and reasonable. If fees are charged, the Contractor shall base any proposed fee structure on the cost of providing the specific service for which the fee is charged. The Contractor may propose an interim fee for the first year of the contract, which will expire one year after the contract award. The documentation must be based upon the anticipated cost for providing the specific service for which the fee is charged, including start up costs, if any, equipment, personnel, software, etc. If the Contractor intends to establish and collect fees from third parties beyond the first year of the contract, the Contractor must collaborate with the interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3 to develop a proposed fee structure based on a methodology that tracks the actual costs incurred for each discrete IANA function enumerated and described in C.2.9. The Contractor must submit a copy of any proposed fee structure including tracking methodology and description of the collaboration and process efforts for fees being proposed after the first year contract award to the Contracting Officer. The performance exclusion C.8.3 shall apply to any fee proposed.

C.2.4 The Contractor is required to perform the IANA functions, which are critical for the operation of the Internet's core infrastructure, in a stable and secure manner. The IANA functions are administrative and technical in nature based on established policies developed by

interested and affected parties, as enumerated in Section C.1.3. The Contractor shall treat each of the IANA functions with equal priority and process all requests promptly and efficiently.

C.2.5 Separation of Policy Development and Operational Roles -- The Contractor shall ensure that designated IANA functions staff members will not initiate, advance, or advocate any policy development related to the IANA functions. The Contractor's staff may respond to requests for information requested by interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3 to inform ongoing policy discussions and may request guidance or clarification as necessary for the performance of the IANA functions.

C.2.6 Transparency and Accountability -- Within six (6) months of award, the Contractor shall, in collaboration with all interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3, develop user instructions including technical requirements for each corresponding IANA function and post via a website.

C.2.7 Responsibility and Respect for Stakeholders – Within six (6) months of award, the Contractor shall, in collaboration with all interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3, develop for each of the IANA functions a process for documenting the source of the policies and procedures and how it will apply the relevant policies and procedures for the corresponding IANA function and post via a website.

C.2.8 Performance Standards -- Within six (6) months of award, the Contractor shall develop performance standards, in collaboration with all interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3, for each of the IANA functions as set forth at C.2.9 to C.2.9.4 and post via a website.

C.2.9 Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions -- include (1) the coordination of the assignment of technical Internet protocol parameters; (2) the administration of certain responsibilities associated with the Internet DNS root zone management; (3) the allocation of Internet numbering resources; and (4) other services related to the management of the ARPA and INT top-level domains (TLDs).

C.2.9.1 Coordinate The Assignment Of Technical Protocol Parameters including the management of the Address and Routing Parameter Area (ARPA) TLD -- The Contractor shall review and assign unique values to various parameters (*e.g.,* operation codes, port numbers, object identifiers, protocol numbers) used in various Internet protocols based on established guidelines and policies as developed by interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3. The Contractor shall disseminate the listings of assigned parameters through various means (including on-line publication via a website) and shall review technical documents for consistency with assigned values. The Contractor shall operate the ARPA TLD within the current registration policies for this TLD, as documented in RFC 3172-Management Guidelines & Operational Requirements for the Address and Routing Parameter Area Domain,

and any further clarification of this RFC. The Contractor shall also implement DNSSEC in the ARPA TLD.

C.2.9.2 Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root Zone Management -- The Contractor shall facilitate and coordinate the root zone of the domain name system, and maintain 24 hour-a-day/7 days-a-week operational coverage. The process flow for root zone management involves three roles that are performed by three different entities through two separate legal agreements: the Contractor as the IANA Functions Operator, NTIA as the Administrator, and VeriSign (or any successor entity as designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce) as articulated in Cooperative Agreement Amendment 11, as the Root Zone Maintainer. The Requirements are detailed at Appendix 1 entitled Authoritative Root Zone Management Process that is incorporated by reference herein as if fully set forth. The Contractor shall work collaboratively with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, in the performance of this function.

C.2.9.2.a Root Zone File Change Request Management -- The Contractor shall receive and process root zone file change requests for TLDs. These change requests include addition of new or updates to existing TLD name servers (NS) and delegation signer (DS) resource record (RR) information along with associated 'glue' (A and AAAA RRs). A change request may also include new TLD entries to the root zone file. The Contractor shall process root zone file changes as expeditiously as possible.

C.2.9.2.b Root Zone "WHOIS" Change Request and Database Management -- The Contractor shall maintain, update, and make publicly accessible a Root Zone "WHOIS" database with current and verified contact information for all TLD registry operators. The Root Zone "WHOIS" database, at a minimum, shall consist of the TLD name; the IP address of the primary nameserver and secondary nameserver for the TLD; the corresponding names of such nameservers; the creation date of the TLD; the name, postal address, email address, and telephone and fax numbers of the TLD registry operator; the name, postal address, email address, and telephone and fax numbers of the technical contact for the TLD registry operator; and the name, postal address, email address, and telephone and fax numbers of the administrative contact for the TLD registry operator; reports; and date record last updated; and any other information relevant to the TLD requested by the TLD registry operator. The Contractor shall receive and process root zone "WHOIS" change requests for TLDs.

C.2.9.2.c Delegation and Redelegation of a Country Code Top Level-Domain (ccTLD) **--**The Contractor shall apply existing policy frameworks in processing requests related to the delegation and redelegation of a ccTLD, such as RFC 1591 Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) Principles And Guidelines For The Delegation And Administration Of Country Code Top Level Domains, and any further clarification of these policies by interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3. If a policy framework does not exist to cover a specific instance, the Contractor will consult with the interested and affected parties, as enumerated in Section C.1.3; relevant public authorities;

and governments on any recommendation that is not within or consistent with an existing policy framework. In making its recommendations, the Contractor shall also take into account the relevant national frameworks and applicable laws of the jurisdiction that the TLD registry serves. The Contractor shall submit its recommendations to the COR via a Delegation and Redelegation Report.

C.2.9.2d Delegation and Redelegation of a Generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) -- The Contractor shall verify that all requests related to the delegation and redelegation of gTLDs are consistent with the procedures developed by ICANN. In making a delegation or redelegation recommendation, the Contractor must provide documentation verifying that ICANN followed its own policy framework including specific documentation demonstrating how the process provided the opportunity for input from relevant stakeholders and was supportive of the global public interest. The Contractor shall submit its recommendations to the COR via a Delegation and Redelegation Report.

C.2.9.2.e Root Zone Automation -- The Contractor shall work with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, and collaborate with all interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3, to deploy a fully automated root zone management system within nine (9) months after date of contract award. The fully automated system must, at a minimum, include a secure (encrypted) system for customer communications; an automated provisioning protocol allowing customers to manage their interactions with the root zone management system; an online database of change requests and subsequent actions whereby each customer can see a record of their historic requests and maintain visibility into the progress of their current requests; and a test system, which customers can use to meet the technical requirements for a change request ; an internal interface for secure communications between the IANA Functions Operator; the Administrator, and the Root Zone Maintainer.

C.2.9.2.f Root Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key Management --The Contractor shall be responsible for the management of the root zone Key Signing Key (KSK), including generation, publication, and use for signing the Root Keyset. As delineated in the Requirements at Appendix 2 entitled Baseline Requirements for DNSSEC in the Authoritative Root Zone that is incorporated by reference herein as if fully set forth. The Contractor shall work collaboratively with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, in the performance of this function.

C.2.9.2.g Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP) --The Contractor shall work with NTIA and collaborate with all interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3 to establish and implement within six (6) months after date of contract award a process for IANA function customers to submit complaints for timely resolution that follows industry best practice and includes a reasonable timeframe for resolution.

C.2.9.3 Allocate Internet Numbering Resources --The Contractor shall have responsibility for allocated and unallocated IPv4 and IPv6 address space and Autonomous System Number (ASN)

space based on established guidelines and policies as developed by interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3. The Contractor shall delegate IP address blocks to Regional Internet Registries for routine allocation typically through downstream providers to Internet end-users within the regions served by those registries. The Contractor shall also reserve and direct allocation of space for special purposes, such as multicast addressing, addresses for private networks as described in RFC 1918-Address Allocation for Private Internets, and globally specified applications.

C.2.9.4 Other services -- The Contractor shall operate the INT TLD within the current registration policies for the TLD. Upon designation of a successor registry by the Government, if any, the Contractor shall cooperate with NTIA to facilitate the smooth transition of operation of the INT TLD. Such cooperation shall, at a minimum, include timely transfer to the successor registry of the then-current top-level domain registration data. The Contractor shall also implement modifications in performance of the IANA functions as needed upon mutual agreement of the parties.

C.2.10 The performance of the IANA functions as articulated in Section C.2 Contractor Requirements shall be in compliance with the performance exclusions enumerated in Section C. 8.

C.2.11 The Contracting Officer's Representative(COR) will perform final inspection and acceptance of all deliverables and reports articulated in Section C.2 Contractor Requirements. *Prior to publication/posting of reports the Contractor shall obtain approval from the COR.* The COR shall not unreasonably withhold approval.

C.2.12.a Program Manager. The contractor shall provide trained, knowledgeable technical personnel according to the requirements of this contract. All contractor personnel who interface with the CO and COR must have excellent oral and written communication skills. "Excellent oral and written communication skills" is defined as the capability to converse fluently, communicate effectively, and write intelligibly in the English language. The IANA Functions Program Manager organizes, plans, directs, staffs, and coordinates the overall program effort; manages contract and subcontract activities as the authorized interface with the CO and COR and ensures compliance with Federal rules and regulations and responsible for the following:

- Shall be responsible for the overall contract performance and shall not serve in any other capacity under this contract.
- Shall have demonstrated communications skills with all levels of management.
- Shall meet and confer with COR and CO regarding the status of specific contractor activities and problems, issues, or conflicts requiring resolution.
- Shall be capable of negotiating and making binding decisions for the company.
- Shall have extensive experience and proven expertise in managing similar multi-task contracts of this type and complexity.

- Shall have extensive experience supervising personnel.
- Shall have a thorough understanding and knowledge of the principles and methodologies associated with program management and contract management.

C.2.12.b The Contractor shall assign to this contract the following key personnel: IANA Functions Program Manager (C.2.9); IANA Function Liaison for Technical Protocol Parameters Assignment (C.2.9.1); IANA Function Liaison for Root Zone Management (C.2.9.2); IANA Function Liaison for Internet Number Resource Allocation (C.2.9.3).

C.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

C.3.1 Secure Systems -- The Contractor shall install and operate all computing and communications systems in accordance with best business and security practices. The Contractor shall implement a secure system for authenticated communications between it and its customers when carrying out all IANA function requirements. The Contractor shall document practices and configuration of all systems.

C.3.2 Secure Systems Notification -- The Contractor shall implement and thereafter operate and maintain a secure notification system at a minimum, capable of notifying all relevant stakeholders of the discrete IANA functions, of such events as outages, planned maintenance, and new developments. In all cases, the Contractor shall notify the COR of any outages.

C.3.3 Secure Data -- The Contractor shall ensure the authentication, integrity, and reliability of the data in performing each of the IANA functions.

C.3.4 Security Plan --The Contractor shall develop and execute a Security Plan that meets the requirements of this contract and Section C.3. The Contractor shall document in the security plan the process used to ensure information systems including hardware, software, applications, and general support systems have effective security safeguards, which have been implemented, planned for, and documented. The Contractor shall deliver the plan to the COR after each annual update.

C.3.5 Director of Security -- The Contractor shall designate a Director of Security who shall be responsible for ensuring technical and physical security measures, such as personnel access controls. The Contractor shall notify and consult in advance the COR when there are personnel changes in this position. The Director of Security shall be one of the key personnel assigned to this contract.

C.4 PERFORMANCE METRIC REQUIREMENTS

C.4.1 Meetings -- Program reviews and site visits shall occur annually.

C.4.2 Monthly Performance Progress Report -- The Contractor shall prepare and submit to the COR a performance progress report every month (no later than 15 calendar days following the end of each month) that contains statistical and narrative information on the performance of the IANA functions (*i.e.*, assignment of technical protocol parameters; administrative functions associated with root zone management; and allocation of Internet numbering resources) during the previous calendar month. The report shall include a narrative summary of the work performed for each of the functions with appropriate details and particularity. The report shall also describe major events, problems encountered, and any projected significant changes, if any, related to the performance of requirements set forth in C.2.9 to C.2.9.4.

C.4.3 Root Zone Management Dashboard -- The Contractor shall work collaboratively with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, and all interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3, to develop and make publicly available via a website, a dashboard to track the process flow for root zone management within nine (9) months after date of contract award.

C.4.4 Performance Standards Reports -- The Contractor shall develop and publish reports for each discrete IANA function consistent with Section C.2.8. The Performance Standards Metric Reports will be published via a website every month (no later than 15 calendar days following the end of each month) starting no later than six (6) months after date of contract award.

C.4.5 Customer Service Survey (CSS) --The Contractor shall collaborate with NTIA to develop and conduct an annual customer service survey consistent with the performance standards for each of the discrete IANA functions. The survey shall include a feedback section for each discrete IANA function. No later than 30 days after conducting the survey, the Contractor shall submit the CSS Report to the COR.

C.4.6 Final Report -- The Contractor shall prepare and submit a final report on the performance of the IANA functions that documents standard operating procedures, including a description of the techniques, methods, software, and tools employed in the performance of the IANA functions. The Contractor shall submit the report to the CO and the COR no later than 30 days after expiration of the contract.

C.4.7 Inspection and Acceptance -- The COR will perform final inspection and acceptance of all deliverables and reports articulated in Section C.4. *Prior to publication/posting of reports, the Contractor shall obtain approval from the COR*. The COR shall not unreasonably withhold approval.

C.5 AUDIT REQUIREMENTS

C.5.1 Audit Data -- The Contractor shall generate and retain security process audit record data for one year and provide an annual audit report to the CO and the COR. All root zone management operations shall be included in the audit, and records on change requests to the root zone file. The Contractor shall retain these records in accordance with the clause at

52.215-2. The Contractor shall provide specific audit record data to the CO and COR upon request.

C.5.2 Root Zone Management Audit Data -- The Contractor shall generate and publish via a website a monthly audit report based on information in the performance of *Provision C.9.2(a-g) Perform Administrative Functions Associated With Root Zone Management*. The audit report shall identify each root zone file and root zone "WHOIS" database change request and the relevant policy under which the change was made as well as identify change rejections and the relevant policy under which the change request was rejected. The Report shall start no later than nine (9) months after date of contract award and thereafter is due to the COR no later than 15 calendar days following the end of each month.

C.5.3 External Auditor - - The Contractor shall have an external, independent, specialized compliance audit which shall be conducted annually and it shall be an audit of all the IANA functions security provisions against existing best practices and Section C.3 of this contract.

C.5.4 Inspection and Acceptance -- The COR will perform final inspection and acceptance of all deliverables and reports articulated in Section C.5. *Prior to publication/posting of reports, the Contractor shall obtain approval from the COR*. The COR shall not unreasonably withhold approval.

C. 6 CONFLICT OF INTEREST REQUIREMENTS

C.6.1 The Contractor shall take measures to avoid any activity or situation that could compromise, or give the appearance of compromising, the impartial and objective performance of the contract (e.g., a person has a conflict of interest if the person directly or indirectly appears to benefit from the performance of the contract). The Contractor shall maintain a written, enforced conflict of interest policy that defines what constitutes a potential or actual conflict of interest for the Contractor. At a minimum, this policy must address conflicts based on personal relationships or bias, financial conflicts of interest, possible direct or indirect financial gain from Contractor's policy decisions and employment and post-employment activities. The conflict of interest policy must include appropriate sanctions in case of non-compliance, including suspension, dismissal and other penalties.

C.6.2 The Contractor shall designate a senior staff member to serve as a Conflict of Interest Officer who shall be responsible for ensuring the Contractor is in compliance with the Contractor's internal and external conflict of interest rules and procedures. The Conflict of Interest Officer shall be one of the key personnel assigned to this contract.

C.6.2.1 The Conflict of Interest Officer shall be responsible for distributing the Contractor's conflict of interest policy to all employees, directors, and subcontractors upon their election, re-election or appointment and annually thereafter.

C.6.2.2 The Conflict of Interest Officer shall be responsible for requiring that each of the Contractor's employees, directors and subcontractors complete a certification with disclosures of any known conflicts of interest upon their election, re-election or appointment, and annually thereafter.

C.6.2.3 The Conflict of Interest Officer shall require that each of the Contractor's employees, directors, and subcontractors promptly update the certification to disclose any interest, transaction, or opportunity covered by the conflict of interest policy that arises during the annual reporting period.

C.6.2.4 The Conflict of Interest Officer shall develop and publish subject to applicable laws and regulations, a Conflict Of Interest Enforcement and Compliance Report. The report shall describe major events, problems encountered, and any changes, if any, related to Section C.6.

C.6.2.5 See also the clause at H.5. Organizational Conflict of Interest

C. 7 CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

C.7.1 Continuity of Operations (COP) – The Contractor shall, at a minimum, maintain multiple redundant sites in at least 2, ideally 3 sites, geographically dispersed within the United States as well as multiple resilient communication paths between interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3 to ensure continuation of the IANA functions in the event of cyber or physical attacks, emergencies, or natural disasters.

C.7.2 Contingency and Continuity of Operations Plan (The CCOP) – The Contractor shall collaborate with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer, and all interested and affected parties as enumerated in Section C.1.3, to develop and implement a CCOP for the IANA functions within nine (9) months after date of contract award. The Contractor in collaboration with NTIA and the Root Zone Maintainer shall update and test the plan annually. The CCOP shall include details on plans for continuation of each of the IANA functions in the event of cyber or physical attacks, emergencies, or natural disasters. The Contractor shall submit the CCOP to the COR after each annual update.

C.7.3 Transition to Successor Contractor – In the event the Government selects a successor contractor, the Contractor shall have a plan in place for transitioning each of the IANA functions to ensure an orderly transition while maintaining continuity and security of operations. The plan shall be submitted to the COR eighteen (18) months after date of contract award, reviewed annually, and updated as appropriate.

C.8 PERFORMANCE EXCLUSIONS

C.8.1 This contract does not authorize the Contractor to make modifications, additions, or deletions to the root zone file or associated information. (This contract does not alter the root

zone file responsibilities as set forth in Amendment 11 of the Cooperative Agreement NCR-9218742 between the U.S. Department of Commerce and VeriSign, Inc. or any successor entity as designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce). See Amendment 11 at http://ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/amend11_052206.pdf.

C.8.2 This contract does not authorize the Contractor to make material changes in the policies and procedures developed by the relevant entities associated with the performance of the IANA functions. The Contractor shall not change or implement the established methods associated with the performance of the IANA functions without prior approval of the CO.

C.8.3 The performance of the functions under this contract, including the development of recommendations in connection with Section C.2.9.2, shall not be, in any manner, predicated or conditioned on the existence or entry into any contract, agreement or negotiation between the Contractor and any party requesting such changes or any other third-party. Compliance with this Section must be consistent with C.2.9.2d.

Appendix 1: Authoritative Root Zone Management Process [1]



[1] The Root Zone management partners consist of the IANA Functions Operator (per the IANA functions contract), NTIA/Department of Commerce, and the Root Zone Maintainer (per the Cooperative Agreement with VeriSign (or any successor entity as designated by the U.S. Department of Commerce).

Appendix 2: Baseline Requirements for DNSSEC in the Authoritative Root Zone

DNSSEC at the authoritative Root Zone requires cooperation and collaboration between the root zone management partners and the Department.[2] The baseline requirements encompass the responsibilities and requirements for both the IANA Functions Operator and the Root Zone Maintainer as described and delineated below.

General Requirements

The Root Zone system needs an overall security lifecycle, such as that described in ISO 27001, and any security policy for DNSSEC implementation must be validated against existing standards for security controls.

The remainder of this section highlights security requirements that must be considered in developing any solution. ISO 27002:2005 (formerly ISO 17799:2005) and NIST SP 800-53 are recognized sources for specific controls. Note that reference to SP 800-53 is used as a convenient means of specifying a set of technical security requirements.[3] It is expected that the systems referenced in this document will meet all the SP 800-53 technical security controls required by a HIGH IMPACT system.[4]

Whenever possible, references to NIST publications are given as a source for further information. These Special Publications (SP) and FIPS documents are not intended as a future auditing checklist, but as non-binding guidelines and recommendations to establish a viable IT security policy. Comparable security standards can be substituted where available and appropriate. All of the NIST document references can be found on the NIST Computer Security Research Center webpage (http://www.csrc.nist.gov/).

1) Security Authorization and Management Policy

a) Each partner[5] in the Root Zone Signing process shall have a security policy in place; this security policy must be periodically reviewed and updated, as appropriate.

[2] The Root Zone management partners consist of the IANA Functions Operator (per the IANA functions contract), NTIA/Department of Commerce, and Root Zone Maintainer (per the Cooperative Agreement with VeriSign). This document outlines requirements for both the IANA Functions Operator and Root Zone Maintainer in the operation and maintenance of DNSSEC at the authoritative root zone.

[3] Note in particular that the use of the requirements in SP 800-53 does not imply that these systems are subject to other Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) processes.

[4] For the purpose of identifying SP 800-53 security requirements, the Root Zone system can be considered a HIGH IMPACT system with regards to integrity and availability as defined in FIPS 199.

[5] For this document, the roles in the Root Zone Signing process are those associated with the Key Signing Key holder, the Zone Signing Key holder, Public Key Distributor, and others to be conducted by the IANA Functions Operator and the Root Zone Maintainer.

i) Supplemental guidance on generating a Security Authorization Policy may be found in NIST SP 800-37.

b) These policies shall have a contingency plan component to account for disaster recovery (both man-made and natural disasters).[6]

i) Supplemental guidance on contingency planning may be found in SP 800-34.

c) These policies shall address Incident Response detection, handling and reporting (see 4 below).

i) Supplemental guidance on incident response handling may be found in NIST SP 800-61.

2) IT Access Control

a) There shall be an IT access control policy in place for each of the key management functions and it shall be enforced.

i) This includes both access to hardware/software components and storage media as well as ability to perform process operations.
ii) Supplemental guidance on access control policies may be found in NIST SP 800-12.

b) Users without authentication shall not perform any action in key management.

c) In the absence of a compelling operational requirement, remote access to any cryptographic component in the system (e.g. HSM) is not permitted.[7]

3) Security Training

a) All personnel participating in the Root Zone Signing process shall have adequate IT security training.

i) Supplemental guidance on establishing a security awareness training program may be found in NIST SP 800-50.

4) Audit and Accountability Procedures

[6] For the IANA Functions Operator, the contingency plan must be consistent with and/or included in the "Contingency and Continuity of Operations Pan" as articulated in Section C.7 of the IANA functions contract.
[7] Remote access is any access where a user or information system communicates through a non-organization controlled network (e.g., the Internet).

a) The organization associated with each role shall develop, disseminate, and periodically review/update: (1) a formal, documented, audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance; and (2) formal, documented procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability policy and associated audit and accountability controls.

   i) Supplemental guidance on auditing and accountability policies may be found in NIST SP 800-12.
   ii) Specific auditing events include the following:
      - Generation of keys
      - Generation of signatures
      - Exporting of public key material
      - Receipt and validation of public key material (i.e., from the ZSK holder or from TLDs)
      - System configuration changes
      - Maintenance and/or system updates
      - Incident response handling
      - Other events as appropriate

b) Incident handling for physical and exceptional cyber attacks[8] shall include reporting to the Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in a timeframe and format as mutually agreed by the Department, IANA Functions Operator, and Root Zone Maintainer.

c) The auditing procedures shall include monthly reporting to NTIA.[9]

d) The auditing system shall be capable of producing reports on an ad-hoc basis.

e) A version of these reports must be made publically available.

5) Physical Protection Requirements

a) There shall be physical access controls in place to only allow access to hardware components and media to authorized personnel.

   i) Supplemental guidance on token based access may be found in NIST SP 800-73 and FIPS 201.
   ii) Supplemental guidance on token based access biometric controls may be found in

[8] Non-exceptional events are to be included in monthly reporting as required in 4 c.
[9] For the IANA Functions Operator, audit reporting shall be incorporated into the audit report as articulated in C.5.2 of the IANA functions contract.

NIST SP 800-76.

b) Physical access shall be monitored, logged, and registered for all users and visitors.

c) All hardware components used to store keying material or generate signatures shall have short-term backup emergency power connections in case of site power outage. (*See,* SP 800-53r3)

d) All organizations shall have appropriate protection measures in place to prevent physical damage to facilities as appropriate.

6) All Components

a) All commercial off the shelf hardware and software components must have an established maintenance and update procedure in place.

i) Supplemental guidance on establishing an upgrading policy for an organization may be found in NIST SP 800-40.

b) All hardware and software components provide a means to detect and protect against unauthorized modifications/updates/patching.

Role Specific Requirements

7) Root Zone Key Signing Key (KSK) Holder[10]

The Root Zone KSK Holder (RZ KSK) is responsible for: (1) generating and protecting the private component of the RZ KSK(s); (2) securely exporting or importing any public key components, should this be required (3) authenticating and validating the public portion of the RZ Zone Signing Key (RZ ZSK); and (4) signing the Root Zone's DNSKEY record (ZSK/KSK).

a) Cryptographic Requirements

i) The RZ KSK key pair shall be an RSA key pair, with a modulus of at least 2048 bits.
ii) RSA key generation shall meet the requirements specified in FIPS 186-3.[11] In particular, key pair generation shall meet the FIPS 186-3 requirements for exponent size and primality testing.
iii) The RZ KSK private key(s) shall be generated and stored on a FIPS 140-2 validated

[10] The Root Zone KSK Holder is a responsibility performed by the IANA Functions Operator.
[11] Note that FIPS 186-3 and FIPS 140-2 are referenced as requirements in sections a and b, rather than supplemental guidance.

hardware cryptographic module (HSM)[12], validated at Level 4 overall.[13]

iv) RZ KSK Digital Signatures shall be generated using SHA-256.

v) All cryptographic functions involving the private component of the KSK shall be performed within the HSM; that is, the private component shall only be exported from the HSM with the appropriate controls (FIPS 140-2) for purposes of key backup.

b) Multi-Party Control

At least two persons shall be required to activate or access any cryptographic module that contains the complete RZ KSK private signing key.

i) The RZ KSK private key(s) shall be backed up and stored under at least two-person control. Backup copies shall be stored on FIPS 140-2 compliant HSM, validated at Level 4 overall, or shall be generated using m of n threshold scheme and distributed to organizationally separate parties.

ii) Backup copies stored on HSMs shall be maintained in different physical locations[14], with physical and procedural controls commensurate to that of the operational system.

iii) In the case of threshold secret sharing, key shares shall be physically secured by each of the parties.

iv) In all cases, the names of the parties participating in multi-person control shall be maintained on a list that shall be made available for inspection during compliance audits.

c) Root Zone KSK Rollover

i) Scheduled rollover of the RZ KSK shall be performed.[15] (See Contingency planning for unscheduled rollover.)

ii) RZ KSK rollover procedures shall take into consideration the potential future need for algorithm rollover.

iii) DNSSEC users shall be able to authenticate the source and integrity of the new RZ KSK using the previously trusted RZ KSK's public key.

d) Contingency Planning

[12] FIPS 140 defines hardware cryptographic modules, but this specification will use the more common HSM (for hardware security module) as the abbreviation.

[13] Note that FIPS 186-3 and FIPS 140-2 are referenced as requirements in sections a and b, rather than supplemental guidance.

[14] Backup locations are to be within the United States.

[15] The Department envisions the timeline for scheduled rollover of the RZ KSK to be jointly developed and proposed by the IANA Functions Operator and Root Zone Maintainer, based on consultation and input from the affected parties (e.g. root server operators, large-scale resolver operators, etc). Note that subsequent test plans may specify more or less frequent RZ KSK rollover to ensure adequate testing.

i) Procedures for recovering from primary physical facility failures (e.g., fire or flood that renders the primary site inoperable) shall be designed to reconstitute capabilities within 48 hours.
ii) Procedures for emergency rollover of the RZ KSK shall be designed to achieve key rollover and publication within 48 hours. These procedures, which are understood to address DNSSEC key provision only, should accommodate the following scenarios:
(1) The current RZ KSK has been compromised; and
(2) The current RZ KSK is unavailable, but is not believed to be compromised.

e) DNS Record Generation/Supporting RZ ZSK rollover

i) The RZ KSK Holder shall authenticate the source and integrity of RZ ZSK public key material
(1) Mechanisms must support proof of possession and verify the parameters (i.e., the RSA exponent)
ii) The signature on the root zone's DNSKEY record shall be generated using SHA-256.

f) Audit Generation and Review Procedures

i) Designated Audit personnel may not participate in the multi-person control for the RZ ZSK or RZ KSK.
ii) Audit logs shall be backed up offsite at least monthly.
iii) Audit logs (whether onsite or offsite) shall be protected from modification or deletion.
iv) Audit logs shall be made available upon request for Department review.

8) RZ KSK Public Key Distribution

a) The RZ KSK public key(s) shall be distributed in a secure fashion to preclude substitution attacks.

b) Each mechanism used to distribute the RZ KSK public key(s) shall either

i) Establish proof of possession of the RZ KSK private key (for public key distribution); or
ii) Establish proof of possession of the previous RZ KSK private key (for Root zone key rollover).

9) RZ Zone Signing Key (RZ ZSK) Holder[16]

[16] The RZ ZSK holder is a function performed by the Root Zone Maintainer, NOT the IANA Functions Operator.

The Root Zone ZSK Holder (RZ ZSK) is responsible for (1) generating and protecting the private component of the RZ ZSK(s); (2) securely exporting or importing any public key components, should this be required and (3) generating and signing Zone File Data in accordance to the DNSSEC specifications.

a) Cryptographic Requirements

i) The RZ ZSK key pair shall be an RSA key pair, with a modulus of at least 1024 bits.[17]
ii) RSA key generation shall meet the requirements specified in FIPS 186-3.[18] In particular, key pair generation shall meet the FIPS 186-3 requirements for exponent size and primality testing.
iii) RZ ZSK Digital Signatures shall be generated using SHA-256.
iv) The RZ ZSK private key(s) shall be generated and stored on a FIPS 140-2 compliant HSM. At a minimum, the HSM shall be validated at Level 4 overall.
v) All cryptographic functions involving the private component of the RZ ZSK shall be performed within the HSM; that is, the private component shall not be exported from the HSM except for purposes of key backup.

b) Multi-Party Control

i) Activation of the RZ ZSK shall require at least two-person control. This requirement may be satisfied through a combination of physical and technical controls.
ii) If the RZ ZSK private key(s) are backed up, they shall be backed up and stored under at least two-person control. Backup copies shall be stored on FIPS 140-2 validated HSM, validated at Level 4 overall.[19]
    (1) Backup copies shall be maintained both onsite and offsite[20], with physical and procedural controls commensurate to that of the operational system.
    (2) The names of the parties participating in multi-person control shall be maintained on a list and made available for inspection during compliance audits.

c) Contingency Planning

i) Procedures for recovery from failure of the operational HSM containing the RZ ZSK shall be designed to re-establish the capability to sign the zone within 2 hours.
ii) Procedures for emergency rollover of the RZ ZSK shall be designed to achieve key

[17] Note that these requirements correspond to those articulated in NIST SP 800-78 for authentication keys. Since there is no forward security requirement for the DNSSEC signed data, the more stringent requirements imposed on long term digital signatures do not apply.
[18] Note that FIPS 186-3 and FIPS 140-2 are referenced as requirements in sections 8a and 8 b, rather than as supplemental guidance.
[19] Note that FIPS 186-3 and FIPS 140-2 are referenced as requirements in sections 8a and 8 b, rather than as supplemental guidance.
[20] The Department expects backup locations to be within the United States.

rollover within a technically feasible timeframe as mutually agreed among the Department, Root Zone Maintainer, and the IANA functions operator. These procedures must accommodate the following scenarios:
(1) The current RZ ZSK has been compromised; and
(2) The current RZ ZSK is unavailable (e.g. destroyed), but is not believed to be compromised.

d) Root Zone ZSK Rollover

i) The RZ ZSK shall be rolled over every six months at a minimum.[21]
ii) DNSSEC users shall be able to authenticate the source and integrity of the new RZ ZSK using the previously trusted RZ ZSK's public key.
iii) RZ KSK holder shall be able to authenticate the source and integrity of the new RZ ZSK.

e) Audit Generation and Review Procedures

i) Designated Audit personnel may not participate in the control for the RZ ZSK or RZ KSK.
ii) Audit logs shall be backed up offsite at least monthly.
iii) Audit logs (whether onsite or offsite) shall be protected from unauthorized access, modification, or deletion.
iv) Audit logs shall be made available upon request for NTIA review.

Other Requirements

10) Transition Planning

a) The IANA Functions Operator and Root Zone Maintainer shall have plans in place for transitioning the responsibilities for each role while maintaining continuity and security of operations. In the event the IANA Functions Operator or Root Zone Maintainer are no longer capable of fulfilling their DNSSEC related roles and responsibilities (due to bankruptcy, permanent loss of facilities, etc.) or in the event the Department selects a successor, that party shall ensure an orderly transition of their DNSSEC roles and responsibilities in cooperation with the Department.[22]

11) Personnel Security Requirements

[21] The timelines specified in this document apply to the operational system. Subsequent test plans may specify more or less frequent RZ ZSK rollover to ensure adequate testing.
[22] For the IANA Functions Operator, the transition plan shall be incorporated into that which is called for in section C.7.3 of the IANA functions contract.

a) Separation of Duties

i) Personnel holding a role in the multi-party access to the RZ KSK may not hold a role in the multi-party access to the RZ ZSK, or vice versa.
ii) Designated Audit personnel may not participate in the multi-person control for the RZ ZSK or KSK.
iii) Audit Personnel shall be assigned to audit the RZ KSK Holder or the RZ ZSK Holder, but not both.

b) Security Training

i) All personnel with access to any cryptographic component used with the Root Zone Signing process shall have adequate training for all expected duties.

12) Root Zone Maintainer Basic Requirements

a) Ability to receive NTIA authorized TLD Resource Record Set (RRset) updates from NTIA and IANA Functions Operator
b) Ability to integrate TLD RRset updates into the final zone file
c) Ability to accept NTIA authorized signed RZ keyset(s) and integrate those RRsets into the final zone file

13) IANA Functions Operator Interface Basic Functionality

a) Ability to accept and process TLD DS records. New functionality includes:
   i) Accept TLD DS RRs
      (1) Retrieve TLD DNSKEY record from the TLD, and perform parameter checking for the TLD keys, including verify that the DS RR has been correctly generated using the specified hash algorithm.
   ii) Develop with, and communicate to, TLD operators procedures for:
      (1) Scheduled roll over for TLD key material
      (2) Supporting emergency key roll over for TLD key material.
      (3) Moving TLD from signed to unsigned in the root zone.
b) Ability to submit TLD DS record updates to NTIA for authorization and inclusion into the root zone by the Root Zone Maintainer.
c) Ability to submit RZ keyset to NTIA for authorization and subsequent inclusion into the root zone by the Root Zone Maintainer.

14) Root Zone Management Requirements[23]

[23] The Department envisions the IANA Functions Operator and Root Zone Maintainer jointly agree to utilizing pre-existing processes and/or deciding and proposing new methods by which each of these requirements are designed and implemented, subject to Department approval.

a) Ability and process to store TLD delegations and DS RRs
b) Ability and process to store multiple keys for a delegation with possibly different algorithms
c) Ability and process to maintain a history of DS records used by each delegation
d) Procedures for managing scheduled roll over for TLD key material
e) Procedures for managing emergency key roll over for TLD key material.[24]
f) Procedures for managing the movement of TLD from signed to unsigned.[25]
g) Procedures for DNSSEC revocation at the root zone and returning the root zone to its pre-signed state.

[24] To the extent possible, on 24 hour notice under the existing manual system and on 12 hours notice once the automated system is utilized.
[25] To the extent possible, this must be within 48 hours.

SECTION D - PACKAGING AND MARKING

RESERVED

SECTION E - INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

E.1 INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

The Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) will perform final inspection and acceptance of all work performed, written communications regardless of form, reports, and other services and deliverables related to Section C prior to any publication/posting called for by this Contract. The CO reserves the right to designate other Government agents as authorized representatives upon unilateral written notice to the Contractor, which may be accomplished in the form of a transmittal of a copy of the authorization. The Government reserves the right to inspect the premises, systems, and processes of all security and operational components used for the performance of all Contract requirements and obligations.

E.2 INSPECTION -- TIME-AND-MATERIAL AND LABOR-HOUR (FAR 52.246-6) (MAY 2001)

(a) *Definitions*. As used in this clause--

"Contractor's managerial personnel" means any of the Contractor's directors, officers, managers, superintendents, or equivalent representatives who have supervision or direction of --

(1) All or substantially all of the Contractor's business;

(2) All or substantially all of the Contractor's operation at any one plant or separate location where the contract is being performed; or

(3) A separate and complete major industrial operation connected with the performance of this contract.

"Materials" includes data when the contract does not include the Warranty of Data clause.

(b) The Contractor shall provide and maintain an inspection system acceptable to the Government covering the material, fabricating methods, work, and services under this contract. Complete records of all inspection work performed by the Contractor shall be maintained and made available to the Government during contract performance and for as long afterwards as the contract requires.

(c) The Government has the right to inspect and test all materials furnished and services performed under this contract, to the extent practicable at all places and times, including the period of performance, and in any event before acceptance. The Government may also inspect the plant or plants of the Contractor or any subcontractor engaged in contract performance.

The Government shall perform inspections and tests in a manner that will not unduly delay the work.

(d) If the Government performs inspection or test on the premises of the Contractor or a subcontractor, the Contractor shall furnish and shall require subcontractors to furnish all reasonable facilities and assistance for the safe and convenient performance of these duties.

(e) Unless otherwise specified in the contract, the Government shall accept or reject services and materials at the place of delivery as promptly as practicable after delivery, and they shall be presumed accepted 60 days after the date of delivery, unless accepted earlier.

(f) At any time during contract performance, but not later than 6 months (or such other time as may be specified in the contract) after acceptance of the services or materials last delivered under this contract, the Government may require the Contractor to replace or correct services or materials that at time of delivery failed to meet contract requirements. Except as otherwise specified in paragraph (h) of this clause, the cost of replacement or correction shall be determined under the Payments Under Time-and-Materials and Labor-Hour Contracts clause, but the "hourly rate" for labor hours incurred in the replacement or correction shall be reduced to exclude that portion of the rate attributable to profit. The Contractor shall not tender for acceptance materials and services required to be replaced or corrected without disclosing the former requirement for replacement or correction, and, when required, shall disclose the corrective action taken.

(g)

(1) If the Contractor fails to proceed with reasonable promptness to perform required replacement or correction, and if the replacement or correction can be performed within the ceiling price (or the ceiling price as increased by the Government), the Government may --

(i) By contract or otherwise, perform the replacement or correction, charge to the Contractor any increased cost, or deduct such increased cost from any amounts paid or due under this contract; or

(ii) Terminate this contract for default.

(2) Failure to agree to the amount of increased cost to be charged to the Contractor shall be a dispute.

(h) Notwithstanding paragraphs (f) and (g) above, the Government may at any time require the Contractor to remedy by correction or replacement, without cost to the Government, any failure by the Contractor to comply with the requirements of this contract, if the failure is due to --

(1) Fraud, lack of good faith, or willful misconduct on the part of the Contractor's managerial personnel; or

(2) The conduct of one or more of the Contractor's employees selected or retained by the Contractor after any of the Contractor's managerial personnel has reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is habitually careless or unqualified.

(i) This clause applies in the same manner and to the same extent to corrected or replacement materials or services as to materials and services originally delivered under this contract.

(j) The Contractor has no obligation or liability under this contract to correct or replace materials and services that at time of delivery do not meet contract requirements, except as provided in this clause or as may be otherwise specified in the contract.

(k) Unless otherwise specified in the contract, the Contractor's obligation to correct or replace Government-furnished property shall be governed by the clause pertaining to Government property.

SECTION F - DELIVERIES AND PERFORMANCE

F.1 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

The period of performance of this contract is: October 1, 2012 – September 30, 2015.

F.2 PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

The Contractor shall perform all work at the Contractor's facilities.

F.3 DISTRIBUTION OF DELIVERABLES

The Contractor shall submit **one (1) copy** to the COR.

F.4 DELIVERABLES

The listed below are the deliverables required by this contract. Section C of this contract contains information about the deliverables.

Clause No.	Clause	Deliverable	Due Date
C.2.6	Transparency and Accountability	User instructional documentation including technical requirements	Six months after award
C.2.7	Responsibility and Respect for Stakeholders	Documenting the source of the policies and procedures.	Six months after award
C.2.8	Performance Standards	Performance Standards	Six months after award
C.2.9.2e	Root Zone Automation	Automated Root Zone	Nine months after award
C.2.9.2g	Customer Service Complaint Resolution Process (CSCRP)	Customer Compliant Process	Six months after award
C.3.4	Security Plan	Documenting Practices and configuration of all systems	Annually
C.4.1	Monthly Performance Progress Report includes DNSSEC	Report based on C.2	Monthly
C.4.2	Root Zone Management	Root Zone Management	Nine months

Clause No.	Clause	Deliverable	Due Date
	Dashboard	Dashboard	after award
C.4.3	Performance Standards Reports	Performance Standards Report	Six months after award and monthly thereafter
C.4.4	Customer Service Survey	Customer Service Survey	Annual Report of Customer Survey
C.4.5	Final Report	Final Report	Expiration of Contract
C.5.1	Audit Data	Audit Report	Annually
C.5.2	Root Zone Management Audit Data	Root Zone Management Audit Report	Nine Months after award and Monthly Report thereafter
C.5.3	External Auditor	External Audit Report	Annually
C.6.2.4	Conflict of Interest Enforcement and Compliance Report	Enforcement and Compliance Report	Annually
C.7.2	Contingency and Continuity of Operations Plan (The CCOP)	Contingency and Continuity of Operations for the continuation of the IANA Functions in case of an emergency.	Annually
C.7.3	Transition to Successor	Transition plan in case of successor contractor.	Eighteen (18) months after date of contract award

F.5 GOVERNMENT RIGHTS TO DELIVERABLES

All deliverables provided under this contract become the property of the U.S. Government.

F.6 GOVERNMENT REVIEW OF DELIVERABLES

The Government shall review all deliverables and determine acceptability. Any deficiencies shall be corrected by the Contractor and resubmitted to the Government within ten (10) workdays after notification.

F.7 REQUIRED DELIVERABLES

The Contractor shall transmit all deliverables so the deliverables are received by the parties listed above on or before the indicated due dates.

F.8 MEETINGS

Program reviews will be scheduled monthly and site visits will occur annually.

SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

Notwithstanding the Contractor's responsibility for total management during the performance of the contract, the administration of the contract will require maximum coordination between the Department of Commerce and the Contractor. The following individuals will be the Department of Commerce points of contact during the performance of the contract.

G.1 CONTRACTING OFFICER'S AUTHORITY

CONTRACTING OFFICER'S AUTHORITY (CAR 1352.201-70) (APR 2010)

The Contracting Officer is the only person authorized to make or approve any changes in any of the requirements of this contract, and, notwithstanding any provisions contained elsewhere in this contract, the said authority remains solely in the Contracting Officer. In the event the contractor makes any changes at the direction of any person other than the Contracting Officer, the change will be considered to have been made without authority and no adjustment will be made in the contract terms and conditions, including price.

CONTRACTING OFFICER'S REPRESENTATIVE (COR) (CAR 1352.201-72) (APR 2010)

(a) **Vernita D. Harris, Deputy Associate Administrator** is hereby designated as the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). The COR may be changed at any time by the Government without prior notice to the contractor by a unilateral modification to the contract.

The COR is located at:
1401 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room 4701, Washington, DC 20230
PHONE NO: 202.482.4686
Email: vharris@ntia.doc.gov

(b) The responsibilities and limitations of the COR are as follows:

(1) The COR is responsible for the technical aspects of the contract and serves as technical liaison with the contractor. The COR is also responsible for the final inspection and acceptance of all deliverables and such other responsibilities as may be specified in the contract.

(2) The COR is not authorized to make any commitments or otherwise obligate the Government or authorize any changes which affect the contract price, terms or conditions. Any contractor request for changes shall be referred to the Contracting Officer directly or through the COR. No such changes shall be made without the express written prior authorization of the Contracting Officer. The Contracting Officer may designate assistant or alternate COR(s) to act for the COR by naming such

assistant/alternate(s) in writing and transmitting a copy of such designation to the contractor.

SECTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

H.1 AUDIT AND RECORDS – NEGOTIATION (FAR 52.215-2) (OCT 2010)

(a) As used in this clause, "records" includes books, documents, accounting procedures and practices, and other data, regardless of type and regardless of whether such items are in written form, in the form of computer data, or in any other form.

(b) *Examination of costs.* If this is a cost-reimbursement, incentive, time-and-materials, labor-hour, or price redeterminable contract, or any combination of these, the Contractor shall maintain and the Contracting Officer, or an authorized representative of the Contracting Officer, shall have the right to examine and audit all records and other evidence sufficient to reflect properly all costs claimed to have been incurred or anticipated to be incurred directly or indirectly in performance of this contract. This right of examination shall include inspection at all reasonable times of the Contractor's plants, or parts of them, engaged in performing the contract.

(c) *Certified cost or pricing data.* If the Contractor has been required to submit certified cost or pricing data in connection with any pricing action relating to this contract, the Contracting Officer, or an authorized representative of the Contracting Officer, in order to evaluate the accuracy, completeness, and currency of the cost or pricing data, shall have the right to examine and audit all of the Contractor's records, including computations and projections, related to --

(1) The proposal for the contract, subcontract, or modification;
(2) The discussions conducted on the proposal(s), including those related to negotiating;
(3) Pricing of the contract, subcontract, or modification; or
(4) Performance of the contract, subcontract or modification.

(d) *Comptroller General—*

(1) The Comptroller General of the United States, or an authorized representative, shall have access to and the right to examine any of the Contractor's directly pertinent records involving transactions related to this contract or a subcontract hereunder and to interview any current employee regarding such transactions.

(2) This paragraph may not be construed to require the Contractor or subcontractor to create or maintain any record that the Contractor or subcontractor does not maintain in the ordinary course of business or pursuant to a provision of law.

(e) *Reports*. If the Contractor is required to furnish cost, funding, or performance reports, the Contracting Officer or an authorized representative of the Contracting Officer shall have the

right to examine and audit the supporting records and materials, for the purpose of evaluating --

(1) The effectiveness of the Contractor's policies and procedures to produce data compatible with the objectives of these reports; and

(2) The data reported.

(f) *Availability*. The Contractor shall make available at its office at all reasonable times the records, materials, and other evidence described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this clause, for examination, audit, or reproduction, until 3 years after final payment under this contract or for any shorter period specified in Subpart 4.7, Contractor Records Retention, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), or for any longer period required by statute or by other clauses of this contract. In addition --

(1) If this contract is completely or partially terminated, the Contractor shall make available the records relating to the work terminated until 3 years after any resulting final termination settlement; and

(2) The Contractor shall make available records relating to appeals under the Disputes clause or to litigation or the settlement of claims arising under or relating to this contract until such appeals, litigation, or claims are finally resolved.

(g) The Contractor shall insert a clause containing all the terms of this clause, including this paragraph (g), in all subcontracts under this contract that exceed the simplified acquisition threshold, and --

(1) That are cost-reimbursement, incentive, time-and-materials, labor-hour, or price-redeterminable type or any combination of these;

(2) For which certified cost or pricing data are required; or

(3) That require the subcontractor to furnish reports as discussed in paragraph (e) of this clause.

The clause may be altered only as necessary to identify properly the contracting parties and the Contracting Officer under the Government prime contract.

Alternate I (Mar 2009). As prescribed in 15.209 (b)(2), substitute the following paragraphs (d)(1) and (g) for paragraphs (d)(1) and (g) of the basic clause:

(d) *Comptroller General or Inspector General*.

(1) The Comptroller General of the United States, an appropriate Inspector General appointed under section 3 or 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), or an authorized representative of either of the foregoing officials, shall have access to and the right to—

(i) Examine any of the Contractor's or any subcontractor's records that pertain to and involve transactions relating to this contract or a subcontract hereunder; and

(ii) Interview any officer or employee regarding such transactions.

(g)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (g)(2) of this clause, the Contractor shall insert a clause containing all the terms of this clause, including this paragraph (g), in all subcontracts under this contract. The clause may be altered only as necessary to identify properly the contracting parties and the Contracting Officer under the Government prime contract.

(2) The authority of the Inspector General under paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this clause does not flow down to subcontracts.

Alternate II (Apr 1998). As prescribed in 15.209(b)(3), add the following paragraph (h) to the basic clause:

(h) The provisions of OMB Circular No.A-133, "Audits of States, Local Governments, and Nonprofit Organizations," apply to this contract.

Alternate III (Jun 1999). As prescribed in 15.209(b)(4), delete paragraph (d) of the basic clause and redesignate the remaining paragraphs accordingly, and substitute the following paragraph (e) for the redesignated paragraph (e) of the basic clause:

(e) Availability. The Contractor shall make available at its office at all reasonable times the records, materials, and other evidence described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this clause, for examination, audit, or reproduction, until 3 years after final payment under this contract or for any shorter period specified in Subpart 4.7, Contractor Records Retention, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), or for any longer period required by statute or by other clauses of this contract. In addition—

(1) If this contract is completely or partially terminated, the Contractor shall make available the records relating to the work terminated until 3 years after any resulting final termination settlement; and

(2) The Contractor shall make available records relating to appeals under the Disputes clause or to litigation or the settlement of claims arising under or relating to this contract until such appeals, litigation, or claims are finally resolved.

H.2 PATENT RIGHTS -- OWNERSHIP BY THE CONTRACTOR (FAR 52.227-11) (DEC 2007)

(a) As used in this clause—

"Invention" means any invention or discovery that is or may be patentable or otherwise protectable under title 35 of the U.S. Code, or any variety of plant that is or may be protectable under the Plant Variety Protection Act (7 U.S.C. 2321, *et seq*.)

"Made" means—

(1) When used in relation to any invention other than a plant variety, the conception or first actual reduction to practice of the invention; or

(2) When used in relation to a plant variety, that the Contractor has at least tentatively determined that the variety has been reproduced with recognized characteristics.

"Nonprofit organization" means a university or other institution of higher education or an organization of the type described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 501(c)) and exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. 501(a)) or any nonprofit scientific or educational organization qualified under a state nonprofit organization statute.

"Practical application" means to manufacture, in the case of a composition of product; to practice, in the case of a process or method, or to operate, in the case of a machine or system; and, in each case, under such conditions as to establish that the invention is being utilized and that is benefits are, to the extent permitted by law or Government regulations, available to the public on reasonable terms.

"Subject invention" means any invention of the Contractor made in the performance of work under this contract.

(b) *Contractor's rights.*

(1) *Ownership.* The Contractor may retain ownership of each subject invention throughout the world in accordance with the provisions of this clause.

(2) *License.*

(i) The Contractor shall retain a nonexclusive royalty-free license throughout the world in each subject invention to which the Government obtains title, unless the Contractor fails to disclose the invention within the times specified in paragraph (c) of this clause. The Contractor's license extends to any domestic subsidiaries and affiliates within the corporate structure of which the Contractor

is a part, and includes the right to grant sublicenses to the extent the Contractor was legally obligated to do so at contract award. The license is transferable only with the written approval of the agency, except when transferred to the successor of that part of the Contractor's business to which the invention pertains.

(ii) The Contractor's license may be revoked or modified by the agency to the extent necessary to achieve expeditious practical application of the subject invention in a particular country in accordance with the procedures in FAR 27.302(i)2() and 27.(304(f).

(c) *Contractor's obligations.*

(1) The Contractor shall disclose in writing each subject invention to the Contracting Officer within 2 months after the inventor discloses it in writing to Contractor personnel responsible for patent matters. The disclosure shall identify the inventor(s) and this contract under which the subject invention was made. It shall be sufficiently complete in technical detail to convey a clear understanding of the subject invention. The disclosure shall also identify any publication, on sale (*i.e*., sale or offer for sale), or public use of the subject invention, or whether a manuscript describing the subject invention has been submitted for publication and, if so, whether it has been accepted for publication. In addition, after disclosure to the agency, the Contractor shall promptly notify the Contracting Officer of the acceptance of any manuscript describing the subject invention for publication and any on sale or public use.

(2) The Contractor shall elect in writing whether or not to retain ownership of any subject invention by notifying the Contracting Officer within 2 years of disclosure to the agency. However, in any case where publication, on sale, or public use has initiated the 1-year statutory period during which valid patent protection can be obtained in the United States, the period for election of title may be shortened by the agency to a date that is no more than 60 days prior to the end of the statutory period.

(3) The Contractor shall file either a provisional or a nonprovisional patent application or a Plant Variety Protection Application on an elected subject invention within 1 year after election. However, in any case where a publication, on sale, or public use has initiated the 1-year statutory period during which valid patent protection can be obtained in the United States, the Contractor shall file the application prior to the end of that statutory period. If the Contractor files a provisional application, it shall file a nonprovisional application within 10 months of the filing of the provisional application. The Contractor shall file patent applications in additional countries or international patent offices within either 10 months of the first filed patent application (whether provisional or nonprovisional) or 6 months from the date permission is granted by the Commissioner

of Patents to file foreign patent applications where such filing has been prohibited by a Secrecy Order.

(4) The Contractor may request extensions of time for disclosure, election, or filing under paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) of this clause.

(d) *Government's rights*—

(1) *Ownership*. The Contractor shall assign to the agency, on written request, title to any subject invention—

(i) If the Contractor fails to disclose or elect ownership to the subject invention within the times specified in paragraph (c) of this clause, or elects not to retain ownership; provided, that the agency may request title only within 60 days after learning of the Contractor's failure to disclose or elect within the specified times.

(ii) In those countries in which the Contractor fails to file patent applications within the times specified in paragraph (c) of this clause; provided, however, that if the Contractor has filed a patent application in a country after the times specified in paragraph (c) of this clause, but prior to its receipt of the written request of the agency, the Contractor shall continue to retain ownership in that country.

(iii) In any country in which the Contractor decides not to continue the prosecution of any application for, to pay the maintenance fees on, or defend in reexamination or opposition proceeding on, a patent on a subject invention.

(2) *License*. If the Contractor retains ownership of any subject invention, the Government shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice, or have practiced for or on its behalf, the subject invention throughout the world.

(e) *Contractor action to protect the Government's interest*.

(1) The Contractor shall execute or have executed and promptly deliver to the agency all instruments necessary to—

(i) Establish or confirm the rights the Government has throughout the world in those subject inventions in which the Contractor elects to retain ownership; and

(ii) Assign title to the agency when requested under paragraph (d) of this clause and to enable the Government to obtain patent protection and plant variety protection for that subject invention in any country.

(2) The Contractor shall require, by written agreement, its employees, other than clerical and nontechnical employees, to disclose promptly in writing to personnel identified as responsible for the administration of patent matters and in the Contractor's format, each subject invention in order that the Contractor can comply with the disclosure provisions of paragraph (c) of this clause, and to execute all papers necessary to file patent applications on subject inventions and to establish the Government's rights in the subject inventions. The disclosure format should require, as a minimum, the information required by paragraph (c)(1) of this clause. The Contractor shall instruct such employees, through employee agreements or other suitable educational programs, as to the importance of reporting inventions in sufficient time to permit the filing of patent applications prior to U.S. or foreign statutory bars.

(3) The Contractor shall notify the Contracting Officer of any decisions not to file a nonprovisional patent application, continue the prosecution of a patent application, pay maintenance fees, or defend in a reexamination or opposition proceeding on a patent, in any country, not less than 30 days before the expiration of the response or filing period required by the relevant patent office.

(4) The Contractor shall include, within the specification of any United States nonprovisional patent or plant variety protection application and any patent or plant variety protection certificate issuing thereon covering a subject invention, the following statement, “This invention was made with Government support under (identify the contract) awarded by (identify the agency). The Government has certain rights in the invention.”

(f) *Reporting on utilization of subject inventions.* The Contractor shall submit, on request, periodic reports no more frequently than annually on the utilization of a subject invention or on efforts at obtaining utilization of the subject invention that are being made by the Contractor or its licensees or assignees. The reports shall include information regarding the status of development, date of first commercial sale or use, gross royalties received by the Contractor, and other data and information as the agency may reasonably specify. The Contractor also shall provide additional reports as may be requested by the agency in connection with any march-in proceeding undertaken by the agency in accordance with paragraph (h) of this clause. The Contractor also shall mark any utilization report as confidential/proprietary to help prevent inadvertent release outside the Government. As required by 35 U.S.C. 202(c)(5), the agency will not disclose that information to persons outside the Government without the Contractor's permission.

(g) *Preference for United States industry*. Notwithstanding any other provision of this clause, neither the Contractor nor any assignee shall grant to any person the exclusive right to use or sell any subject invention in the United States unless the person agrees that any products embodying the subject invention or produced through the use of the subject invention will be manufactured substantially in the United States. However, in individual cases, the requirement

for an agreement may be waived by the agency upon a showing by the Contractor or its assignee that reasonable but unsuccessful efforts have been made to grant licenses on similar terms to potential licensees that would be likely to manufacture substantially in the United States, or that under the circumstances domestic manufacture is not commercially feasible.

(h) *March-in rights*. The Contractor acknowledges that, with respect to any subject invention in which it has retained ownership, the agency has the right to require licensing pursuant to 35 U.S.C. 203 and 210(c), and in accordance with the procedures in 37 CFR 401.6 and any supplemental regulations of the agency in effect on the date of contract award.

(i) Special provisions for contracts with nonprofit organizations. If the Contractor is a nonprofit organization, it shall—

(1) Not assign rights to a subject invention in the United States without the written approval of the agency, except where an assignment is made to an organization that has as one of its primary functions the management of inventions, provided, that the assignee shall be subject to the same provisions as the Contractor;

(2) Share royalties collected on a subject invention with the inventor, including Federal employee co-inventors (but through their agency if the agency deems it appropriate) when the subject invention is assigned in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 202(e) and 37 CFR 401.10;

(3) Use the balance of any royalties or income earned by the Contractor with respect to subject inventions, after payment of expenses (including payments to inventors) incidental to the administration of subject inventions for the support of scientific research or education; and

(4) Make efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to attract licensees of subject inventions that are small business concerns, and give a preference to a small business concern when licensing a subject invention if the Contractor determines that the small business concern has a plan or proposal for marketing the invention which, if executed, is equally as likely to bring the invention to practical application as any plans or proposals from applicants that are not small business concerns; provided, that the Contractor is also satisfied that the small business concern has the capability and resources to carry out its plan or proposal. The decision whether to give a preference in any specific case will be at the discretion of the Contractor.

(5) Allow the Secretary of Commerce to review the Contractor’s licensing program and decisions regarding small business applicants, and negotiate changes to its licensing policies, procedures, or practices with the Secretary of Commerce when the Secretary's review discloses that the Contractor could take reasonable steps to more effectively implement the requirements of paragraph (i)(4) of this clause.

(j) *Communications*. [*Complete according to agency instructions*.]

(k) *Subcontracts*.

(1) The Contractor shall include the substance of this clause, including this paragraph (k), in all subcontracts for experimental, developmental, or research work to be performed by a small business concern or nonprofit organization.

(2) The Contractor shall include in all other subcontracts for experimental, developmental, or research work the substance of the patent rights clause required by FAR Subpart 27.3.

(3) At all tiers, the patent rights clause must be modified to identify the parties as follows: references to the Government are not changed, and the subcontractor has all rights and obligations of the Contractor in the clause. The Contractor shall not, as part of the consideration for awarding the subcontract, obtain rights in the subcontractor's subject inventions.

(4) In subcontracts, at any tier, the agency, the subcontractor, and the Contractor agree that the mutual obligations of the parties created by this clause constitute a contract between the subcontractor and the agency with respect to the matters covered by the clause; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph is intended to confer any jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act in connection with proceedings under paragraph (h) of this clause.

H.3 RESERVED

H.4 RIGHTS IN DATA – SPECIAL WORKS (FAR 52.227-17) (DEC 2007)

(a) *Definitions*. As used in this clause--

“Data” means recorded information, regardless of form or the medium on which it may be recorded. The term includes technical data and computer software. The term does not include information incidental to contract administration, such as financial, administrative, cost or pricing, or management information.

“Unlimited rights” means the rights of the Government to use, disclose, reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and display publicly, in any manner and for any purpose, and to have or permit others to do so.

(b) *Allocation of Rights.*

(1) The Government shall have—

(i) Unlimited rights in all data delivered under this contract, and in all data first produced in the performance of this contract, except as provided in paragraph (c) of this clause for copyright.

(ii) The right to limit assertion of copyright in data first produced in the performance of this contract, and to obtain assignment of copyright in that data, in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this clause.

(iii) The right to limit the release and use of certain data in accordance with paragraph (d) of this clause.

(2) The Contractor shall have, to the extent permission is granted in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this clause, the right to assert claim to copyright subsisting in data first produced in the performance of this contract.

(c) *Copyright—*

(1) *Data first produced in the performance of this contract.*

(i) The Contractor shall not assert or authorize others to assert any claim to copyright subsisting in any data first produced in the performance of this contract without prior written permission of the Contracting Officer. When copyright is asserted, the Contractor shall affix the appropriate copyright notice of 17 U.S.C. 401 or 402 and acknowledgment of Government sponsorship (including contract number) to the data when delivered to the Government, as well as when the data are published or deposited for registration as a published work in the U.S. Copyright Office. The Contractor grants to the Government, and others acting on its behalf, a paid-up, nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide license for all delivered data to reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and display publicly, by or on behalf of the Government.

(ii) If the Government desires to obtain copyright in data first produced in the performance of this contract and permission has not been granted as set forth in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this clause, the Contracting Officer shall direct the Contractor to assign (with or without registration), or obtain the assignment of, the copyright to the Government or its designated assignee.

(2) *Data not first produced in the performance of this contract.* The Contractor shall not, without prior written permission of the Contracting Officer, incorporate in data delivered under this contract any data not first produced in the performance of this contract and which contain the copyright notice of 17 U.S.C. 401 or 402, unless the

Contractor identifies such data and grants to the Government, or acquires on its behalf, a license of the same scope as set forth in subparagraph (c)(1) of this clause.

(d) *Release and use restrictions.* Except as otherwise specifically provided for in this contract, the Contractor shall not use, release, reproduce, distribute, or publish any data first produced in the performance of this contract, nor authorize others to do so, without written permission of the Contracting Officer.

(e) *Indemnity*. The Contractor shall indemnify the Government and its officers, agents, and employees acting for the Government against any liability, including costs and expenses, incurred as the result of the violation of trade secrets, copyrights, or right of privacy or publicity, arising out of the creation, delivery, publication, or use of any data furnished under this contract; or any libelous or other unlawful matter contained in such data. The provisions of this paragraph do not apply unless the Government provides notice to the Contractor as soon as practicable of any claim or suit, affords the Contractor an opportunity under applicable laws, rules, or regulations to participate in the defense of the claim or suit, and obtains the Contractor's consent to the settlement of any claim or suit other than as required by final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction; and these provisions do not apply to material furnished to the Contractor by the Government and incorporated in data to which this clause applies.

H.5 RIGHTS IN DATA -- EXISTING WORKS (FAR 52.227-18) (DEC 2007)

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this contract, the Contractor grants to the Government, and others acting on its behalf, a paid-up nonexclusive, irrevocable, worldwide license to reproduce, prepare derivative works, and perform publicly and display publicly, by or on behalf of the Government, for all the material or subject matter called for under this contract, or for which this clause is specifically made applicable.

(b) The Contractor shall indemnify the Government and its officers, agents, and employees acting for the Government against any liability, including costs and expenses, incurred as the result of (1) the violation of trade secrets, copyrights, or right of privacy or publicity, arising out of the creation, delivery, publication or use of any data furnished under this contract; or (2) any libelous or other unlawful matter contained in such data. The provisions of this paragraph do not apply unless the Government provides notice to the Contractor as soon as practicable of any claim or suit, affords the Contractor an opportunity under applicable laws, rules, or regulations to participate in the defense of the claim or suit, and obtains the Contractor's consent to the settlement of any claim or suit other than as required by final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction; and do not apply to material furnished to the Contractor by the Government and incorporated in data to which this clause applies.

H.6 BANKRUPTCY (FAR 52.242-13) (JUL 1995)

In the event the Contractor enters into proceedings relating to bankruptcy, whether voluntary or involuntary, the Contractor agrees to furnish, by certified mail or electronic commerce method authorized by the contract, written notification of the bankruptcy to the Contracting Officer responsible for administering the contract. This notification shall be furnished within five days of the initiation of the proceedings relating to bankruptcy filing. This notification shall include the date on which the bankruptcy petition was filed, the identity of the court in which the bankruptcy petition was filed, and a listing of Government contract numbers and contracting offices for all Government contracts against which final payment has not been made. This obligation remains in effect until final payment under this contract.

H.7 PRINTING (CAR 1352.208-70) (APR 2010)

(a) The contractor is authorized to duplicate or copy production units provided the requirement does not exceed 5,000 production units of any one page or 25,000 production units in the aggregate of multiple pages. Such pages may not exceed a maximum image size of 103/4by 141/4inches. A "production unit" is one sheet, size 81/2x 11 inches (215 x 280 mm), one side only, and one color ink. Production unit requirements are outlined in the Government Printing and Binding Regulations.

(b) This clause does not preclude writing, editing, preparation of manuscript copy, or preparation of related illustrative material as a part of this contract, or administrative duplicating/copying (for example, necessary forms and instructional materials used by the contractor to respond to the terms of the contract).

(c) Costs associated with printing, duplicating, or copying in excess of the limits in paragraph (a) of this clause are unallowable without prior written approval of the Contracting Officer. If the contractor has reason to believe that any activity required in fulfillment of the contract will necessitate any printing or substantial duplicating or copying, it shall immediately provide written notice to the Contracting Officer and request approval prior to proceeding with the activity. Requests will be processed by the Contracting Officer in accordance with FAR 8.802.

(d) The contractor shall include in each subcontract which may involve a requirement for any printing, duplicating, and copying in excess of the limits specified in paragraph (a) of this clause, a provision substantially the same as this clause, including this paragraph (d).

H.8 KEY PERSONNEL (CAR 1352.237-75) (APR 2010)

(a) The contractor shall assign to this contract the following key personnel:

NAME	POSITION
Elise Gerich	IANA Functions Program Manager

Michelle Cotton	IANA Function Liaison for Technical Protocol Parameters Assignment
Kim Davies	IANA Function Liaison for Root Zone Management
Leo Vegoda	IANA Function Liaison for Internet Number Resource Allocation
Tomofumi Okubo	Security Director
Steve Antonoff	Conflict of Interest Officer

(b) The contractor shall obtain the consent of the Contracting Officer prior to making key personnel substitutions. Replacements for key personnel must possess qualifications equal to or exceeding the qualifications of the personnel being replaced, unless an exception is approved by the Contracting Officer.

(c) Requests for changes in key personnel shall be submitted to the Contracting Officer at least 15 working days prior to making any permanent substitutions. The request should contain a detailed explanation of the circumstances necessitating the proposed substitutions, complete resumes for the proposed substitutes, and any additional information requested by the Contracting Officer. The Contracting Officer will notify the contractor within 10 working days after receipt of all required information of the decision on substitutions. The contract will be modified to reflect any approved changes.

H.9 ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST (CAR 1352.209-74) (APR 2010)

(a) Purpose. The purpose of this clause is to ensure that the contractor and its subcontractors:

(1) Are not biased because of their financial, contractual, organizational, or other interests which relate to the work under this contract, and

(2) Do not obtain any unfair competitive advantage over other parties by virtue of their performance of this contract.

(b) Scope. The restrictions described herein shall apply to performance or participation by the contractor, its parents, affiliates, divisions and subsidiaries, and successors in interest (hereinafter collectively referred to as “contractor”) in the activities covered by this clause as a prime contractor, subcontractor, co-sponsor, joint venturer, consultant, or in any similar capacity. For the purpose of this clause, affiliation occurs when a business concern is controlled by or has the power to control another or when a third party has the power to control both.

(c) Warrant and Disclosure. The warrant and disclosure requirements of this paragraph apply with full force to both the contractor and all subcontractors. The contractor warrants that, to the best of the contractor's knowledge and belief, there are no relevant facts or circumstances which would give rise to an organizational conflict of interest, as defined in FAR Subpart 9.5, and that the contractor has disclosed all relevant information regarding any actual or potential conflict. The contractor agrees it shall make an immediate and full disclosure, in writing, to the

Contracting Officer of any potential or actual organizational conflict of interest or the existence of any facts that may cause a reasonably prudent person to question the contractor's impartiality because of the appearance or existence of bias or an unfair competitive advantage. Such disclosure shall include a description of the actions the contractor has taken or proposes to take in order to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate any resulting conflict of interest.

(d) Remedies. The Contracting Officer may terminate this contract for convenience, in whole or in part, if the Contracting Officer deems such termination necessary to avoid, neutralize or mitigate an actual or apparent organizational conflict of interest. If the contractor fails to disclose facts pertaining to the existence of a potential or actual organizational conflict of interest or misrepresents relevant information to the Contracting Officer, the Government may terminate the contract for default, suspend or debar the contractor from Government contracting, or pursue such other remedies as may be permitted by law or this contract.

(e) Subcontracts. The contractor shall include a clause substantially similar to this clause, including paragraphs (f) and (g), in any subcontract or consultant agreement at any tier expected to exceed the simplified acquisition threshold. The terms “contract,” “contractor,” and “Contracting Officer” shall be appropriately modified to preserve the Government's rights.

(f) Prime Contractor Responsibilities. The contractor shall obtain from its subcontractors or consultants the disclosure required in FAR Part 9.507–1, and shall determine in writing whether the interests disclosed present an actual, or significant potential for, an organizational conflict of interest. The contractor shall identify and avoid, neutralize, or mitigate any subcontractor organizational conflict prior to award of the contract to the satisfaction of the Contracting Officer. If the subcontractor's organizational conflict cannot be avoided, neutralized, or mitigated, the contractor must obtain the written approval of the Contracting Officer prior to entering into the subcontract. If the contractor becomes aware of a subcontractor's potential or actual organizational conflict of interest after contract award, the contractor agrees that the Contractor may be required to eliminate the subcontractor from its team, at the contractor's own risk.

(g) Waiver. The parties recognize that this clause has potential effects which will survive the performance of this contract and that it is impossible to foresee each circumstance to which it might be applied in the future. Accordingly, the contractor may at any time seek a waiver from the Head of the Contracting Activity by submitting such waiver request to the Contracting Officer, including a full written description of the requested waiver and the reasons in support thereof.

H.10 RESTRICTIONS AGAINST DISCLOSURE (CAR 1352.209-72) (APR 2010)

(a) The contractor agrees, in the performance of this contract, to keep the information furnished by the Government or acquired/developed by the contractor in performance of the contract and designated by the Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer's Representative, in

the strictest confidence. The contractor also agrees not to publish or otherwise divulge such information, in whole or in part, in any manner or form, nor to authorize or permit others to do so, taking such reasonable measures as are necessary to restrict access to such information while in the contractor's possession, to those employees needing such information to perform the work described herein, *i.e.,* on a "need to know" basis. The contractor agrees to immediately notify the Contracting Officer in writing in the event that the contractor determines or has reason to suspect a breach of this requirement has occurred.

(b) The contractor agrees that it will not disclose any information described in subsection (a) to any person unless prior written approval is obtained from the Contracting Officer. The contractor agrees to insert the substance of this clause in any consultant agreement or subcontract hereunder.

H.11 COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS (CAR 1352.209-73) (APR 2010)

The contractor shall comply with all applicable laws, rules and regulations which deal with or relate to performance in accord with the terms of the contract.

H.12 DUPLICATION OF EFFORT (CAR 1352.231-71) (APR 2010)

The contractor hereby certifies that costs for work to be performed under this contract and any subcontracts hereunder are not duplicative of any costs charged against any other Government contract, subcontract, or other Government source. The contractor agrees to advise the Contracting Officer, in writing, of any other Government contract or subcontract it has performed or is performing which involves work directly related to the purpose of this contract. The contractor also certifies and agrees that any and all work performed under this contract shall be directly and exclusively for the use and benefit of the Government, and not incidental to any other work, pursuit, research, or purpose of the contractor, whose responsibility it will be to account for it accordingly.

H.13 HARMLESS FROM LIABILITY

The Contractor shall hold and save the Government, its officers, agents, and employees harmless from liability of any nature or kind, including costs and expenses to which they may be subject, for or on account of any or all suits or damages of any character whatsoever resulting from injuries or damages sustained by any person or persons or property by virtue of performance of this contract, arising or resulting in whole or in part from the fault, negligence, wrongful act or wrongful omission of the Contractor, or any subcontractor, their employees, and agents.

H.14 CONTRACTOR IDENTIFICATION RESPONSIBILITIES

(a) All Contractor personnel attending meetings, answering Government telephones, and working in other situations where their Contractor status is not obvious to third parties, are required to identify themselves as such to avoid creating an impression in the minds of the public that they are Government officials.

(b) All documents or reports produced by the Contractor shall be suitably marked as Contractor products or that Contractor participation is appropriately identified.

H.15 NOTICE REQUIREMENT

The Contractor agrees that it will immediately inform the Contracting Officer and the Contracting Officer's Representative in the event that the Contractor's Chairman of the Board of Directors initiates any investigation by an independent auditor of potential corporate insolvency.

H.16 CERTIFICATION REGARDING TERRORIST FINANCING IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224

(a) By signing and submitting this application, the prospective Contractor provides the certification set out below:

(1) The Contractor, to the best of its current knowledge, did not provide, within the previous ten years, and will take all reasonable steps to ensure that it does not and will not knowingly provide, material support or resources to any individual or entity that commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts, as that term is defined in Executive Order 13224.

(2) Before providing any material support or resources to an individual or entity, the Contractor will consider all information about that individual or entity of which it is aware and all public information that is reasonably available to it or of which it must be aware.

(3) The Contractor also will implement reasonable monitoring and oversight procedures to safeguard against assistance being diverted to support terrorist activity.

(b) For the purposes of this certification, the Contractor's obligations under paragraph "a" are not applicable to the procurement of goods and/or services by the Contractor that are acquired in the ordinary course of business through contract or purchase, e.g., utilities, rents, office supplies, gasoline, unless the Contractor has reason to believe that a vendor or supplier of such goods and services commits, attempts to commit, advocates, facilitates or participates in terrorist acts, or has committed, attempted to commit, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.

(c) This certification is an express term and condition of any agreement issued as a result of this application, and any violation of it shall be grounds for unilateral termination of the agreement by DoC prior to the end of its term.

SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES

FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR)

I.1 52.252-2 CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE (FEB 1998)

This contract incorporates one or more clauses by reference, with the same force and effect as if they were given in full text. Upon request, the Contracting Officer will make their full text available. Also, the full text of a clause may be accessed electronically at this address: **https://www.acquisition.gov/far/**

I.2 52.202-1 DEFINITIONS (JUL 2004)

I.3 52.203-3 GRATUTIES (APR 1984)

I.4 52.203-5 COVENANT AGAINST CONTINGENT FEES (APR 1984)

I.5 52.203-6 RESTRICTIONS ON SUBCONTRACTOR SALES TO THE GOVERNMENT (JUL 1995)

I.6 52.203-7 ANTI-KICKBACK PROCEDURES (JUL 1995)

I.7 52.203-8 CANCELLATION, RESCISSION, AND RECOVERY OF FUNDS FOR ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITY (JAN 1997)

I.8 52.203-12 LIMITATION ON PAYMENTS TO INFLUENCE CERTAIN FEDERAL TRANSACTIONS (SEPT 2007)

I.9 52.203-13 CONTRACTOR CODE OF BUSINESS ETHICS AND CONDUCT (APR 2010)

I.10 52.204-2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (AUG 2000)

I.11 52.204-4 PRINTED OR COPIED DOUBLE-SIDED ON RECYCLED PAPER (AUG 2000)

I.12 52.214-34 SUBMISSION OF OFFERS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (APR 1991)

I.13 52.215-8 ORDER OF PRECEDENCE—UNIFORM CONTRACT FORMAT (OCT 1997)

I.14 52.216-7 ALLOWABLE COST AND PAYMENT (JUN 2011)

I.15 RESERVED

I.16 52.222-21 PROHIBITION OF SEGREGATED FACILITIES (FEB 1999)

I.17 52.222-26 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY (MAR 2007)

I.18 52.222.35 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR SPECIAL DISABLED VETERANS, VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM ERA, AND OTHER ELIGIBLE VETERANS (SEP 2006)

I.19 52.222-36 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES (JUN 1998)

I.20 52.222-37 EMPLOYMENT REPORTS ON SPECIAL DISABLED VETERANS, VETERANS OF THE VIETNAM ERA, AND OTHER ELIGIBLE VETERANS (SEP 2006)

I.21 52.222-50 COMBATTING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (FEB 2009)

I.22 52.222.54 EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION (JAN 2009)

I.23 52.223-6 DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (MAY 2001)

I.24 52.223-18 ENCOURAGING CONTRACTOR POLICIES TO BAN TEXT MESSAGING WHILE DRIVING (AUG 2011)

I.25 52.225-13 RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN FOREIGN PURCHASES (JUN 2008)

I.26 52.227-1 AUTHORIZATION AND CONSENT (DEC 2007)

I.27 52.227-2 NOTICE OF ASSISTANCE REGARDING PATENT AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT (DEC 2007)

I.28 52.227-3 PATENT INDEMNITY (APR 1984)

I.29 52.227-14 RIGHTS IN DATA—GENERAL, ALTERNATES I, II, III, IV (DEC 2007)

I.30 52.229-3 FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES (APR 2003)

I.31 52.232-20 LIMITATION OF COST (APR 1984)

I.32 52.232-23 ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS (JAN 1986)

I.33 52.232-25 PROMPT PAYMENT (OCT 2008)

I.34 52.232-33 PAYMENT BY ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER—CENTRAL CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION (OCT 2003)

I.35 52.233-1 DISPUTES (JUL 2002), ALTERNATE I (DEC 1991)

I.36 52.233-3 PROTEST AFTER AWARD (AUG 1996)

I.37 52.233-4 APPLICABLE LAW FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM (OCT 2004)

I.38 52.239-1 PRIVACY OR SECURITY SAFEGUARDS (AUG 1996)

I.39 52.242-1 NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISALLOW COSTS (APR 1984)

I.40 52.242-4 CERTIFICATION OF FINAL INDIRECT COSTS (JAN 1997)

I.41 52.242-13 BANKRUPTCY (JUL 1995)

I.42 52.242-14 SUSPENSION OF WORK (APR 1984)

I.43 52.242-15 STOP-WORK ORDER (AUG 1989)

I.44 52.243-1 CHANGES-FIXED PRICE (AUG 1987) Alternate I (APR 1984)

I.45 52.243-2 CHANGES--COST-REIMBURSEMENT (AUG 1987), ALTERNATE I (APR 1984)

I.46 52.244-2 SUBCONTRACTS (OCT 2010)

I.47 52.244-6 SUBCONTRACTS FOR COMMERCIAL ITEMS (DEC 2010)

I.48 52.245-1 GOVERNMENT PROPERTY (APR 2012)

I.49 52.246-20 WARRANTY OF SERVICES (MAY 2001)
[The Contracting Officer shall give written notice of any defect or nonconformance to the Contractor within 120 days from the date of acceptance by the Government.]

I.50 52.246-25 LIMITATION OF LIABILITY—SERVICES (FEB 1997)

I.51 52.249-2 TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT (MAY 2004) ALT II (SEP 1996)

I.52 52.249-5 TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT (EDUCATIONAL AND OTHER NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS) (SEP 1996)

I.53 52.249-6 TERMINATION (COST REIMBURSEMENT) (MAY 2004) (ALT V) (SEP 1996)

I.54 52.249-14 EXCUSABLE DELAYS (APR 1984)

I.55 52.253-1 COMPUTER GENERATED FORMS (JAN 1991)

CLAUSES INCORPORATED IN FULL TEXT

I.56 52.204-7 CENTRAL CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION (FEB 2012)

(a) Definitions. As used in this clause—

"Central Contractor Registration (CCR) database" means the primary Government repository for Contractor information required for the conduct of business with the Government.

"Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number" means the 9-digit number assigned by Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. (D&B) to identify unique business entities.

"Data Universal Numbering System+4 (DUNS+4) number" means the DUNS number means the number assigned by D&B plus a 4-character suffix that may be assigned by a business concern. (D&B has no affiliation with this 4-character suffix.) This 4-character suffix may be assigned at the discretion of the business concern to establish additional CCR records for identifying alternative Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) accounts (see the FAR at Subpart 32.11) for the same concern.

"Registered in the CCR database" means that—

(1) The Contractor has entered all mandatory information, including the DUNS number or the DUNS+4 number, into the CCR database; and

(2) The Government has validated all mandatory data fields, to include validation of the Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and has marked the record "Active". The Contractor will be required to provide consent for TIN validation to the Government as a part of the CCR registration process.

(b)

(1) By submission of an offer, the offeror acknowledges the requirement that a prospective awardee shall be registered in the CCR database prior to award, during performance, and through final payment of any contract, basic agreement, basic ordering agreement, or blanket purchasing agreement resulting from this solicitation.

(2) The offeror shall enter, in the block with its name and address on the cover page of its offer, the annotation "DUNS" or "DUNS+4" followed by the DUNS or DUNS+4 number that identifies the offeror's name and address exactly as stated in the offer. The DUNS number will be used by the Contracting Officer to verify that the offeror is registered in the CCR database.

(c) If the offeror does not have a DUNS number, it should contact Dun and Bradstreet directly to obtain one.

(1) An offeror may obtain a DUNS number—

(i) Via the internet at http://fedgov.dnb.com/webform or if the offeror does not have internet access, it may call Dun and Bradstreet at 1-866-705-5711 if located within the United States; or

(ii) If located outside the United States, by contacting the local Dun and Bradstreet office. The offeror should indicate that it is an offeror for a U.S. Government contract when contacting the local Dun and Bradstreet office.

(2) The offeror should be prepared to provide the following information:

(i) Company legal business name.

(ii) Tradestyle, doing business, or other name by which your entity is commonly recognized.

(iii) Company physical street address, city, state and Zip Code.

(iv) Company mailing address, city, state and Zip Code (if separate from physical).

(v) Company telephone number.

(vi) Date the company was started.

(vii) Number of employees at your location.

(viii) Chief executive officer/key manager.

(ix) Line of business (industry).

(x) Company Headquarters name and address (reporting relationship within your entity).

(d) If the Offeror does not become registered in the CCR database in the time prescribed by the Contracting Officer, the Contracting Officer will proceed to award to the next otherwise successful registered Offeror.

(e) Processing time, which normally takes 48 hours, should be taken into consideration when registering. Offerors who are not registered should consider applying for registration immediately upon receipt of this solicitation.

(f) The Contractor is responsible for the accuracy and completeness of the data within the CCR database, and for any liability resulting from the Government's reliance on inaccurate or incomplete data. To remain registered in the CCR database after the initial registration, the Contractor is required to review and update on an annual basis from the date of initial registration or subsequent updates its information in the CCR database to ensure it is current, accurate and complete. Updating information in the CCR does not alter the terms and conditions of this contract and is not a substitute for a properly executed contractual document.

(g)

(1)

(i) If a Contractor has legally changed its business name, "doing business as" name, or division name (whichever is shown on the contract), or has transferred the assets used in performing the contract, but has not completed the necessary requirements regarding novation and change-of-name agreements in Subpart 42.12, the Contractor shall provide the responsible Contracting Officer a minimum of one business day's written notification of its intention to:

(A) Change the name in the CCR database;

(B) Comply with the requirements of Subpart 42.12 of the FAR;

(C) Agree in writing to the timeline and procedures specified by the responsible Contracting Officer. The Contractor must provide with the notification sufficient documentation to support the legally changed name.

(ii) If the Contractor fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this clause, or fails to perform the agreement at paragraph (g)(1)(i)(C) of this clause, and, in the absence of a properly executed novation or change-of-name agreement, the CCR information that shows the Contractor to be other than the Contractor indicated in the contract will be considered to be incorrect information within the meaning of the "Suspension of Payment" paragraph of the electronic funds transfer (EFT) clause of this contract.

(2) The Contractor shall not change the name or address for EFT payments or manual payments, as appropriate, in the CCR record to reflect an assignee for the purpose of

assignment of claims (see FAR Subpart 32.8, Assignment of Claims). Assignees shall be separately registered in the CCR database. Information provided to the Contractor's CCR record that indicates payments, including those made by EFT, to an ultimate recipient other than that Contractor will be considered to be incorrect information within the meaning of the "Suspension of payment" paragraph of the EFT clause of this contract.

(h) Offerors and Contractors may obtain information on registration and annual confirmation requirements via the CCR accessed through https://www.acquisition.gov or by calling 1-888-227-2423, or 269-961-5757.

I.57 52.216-11 COST CONTRACT – NO FEE (APR 1984)

(a) The Government shall not pay the Contractor a fee for performing this contract.

I.58 52.217-8 OPTION TO EXTEND SERVICES (NOV 1999)

The Government may require continued performance of any services within the limits and at the rates specified in the contract. The option provision may be exercised more than once, but the total extension of performance hereunder shall not exceed 6 months. The Contracting Officer may exercise the option by written notice to the Contractor within 15 calendar days of expiration of the contract.

I.59 52.217-9 OPTION TO EXTEND THE TERM OF THE CONTRACT (MAR 2000)

(a) The Government may extend the term of this contract by written notice to the Contractor **within 15 calendar days before the expiration of the contract**; provided that the Government gives the Contractor a preliminary written notice of its intent to extend **at least 30 calendar days before the contract expires**. The preliminary notice does not commit the Government to an extension.

(b) If the Government exercises this option, the extended contract shall be considered to include this option clause.

(c) The total duration of this contract, including the exercise of any options under this clause, shall not exceed seven years.

I.60 52.233-2 SERVICE OF PROTEST (SEP 2006)

(a) Protests, as defined in section 31.101 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, that are filed directly with an agency, and copies of any protests that are filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), shall be served on the Contracting Officer addressed as follows: Mona-Lisa Dunn, Contracting Officer, 1401 Constitution Avenue, NW, Room 6521, Washington, DC 20230 by obtaining written and dated acknowledgment of receipt from Mona-Lisa Dunn.

(b) The copy of any protest shall be received in the office designated above within one day of filing a protest with the GAO.

I.61 52.237-3 CONTINUITY OF SERVICES (JAN 1991)

(a) The Contractor recognizes that the services under this contract are vital to the Government and must be continued without interruption and that, upon contract expiration, a successor, either the Government or another contractor, may continue them. The Contractor agrees to --

(1) Furnish phase-in training; and

(2) Exercise its best efforts and cooperation to effect an orderly and efficient transition to a successor.

(b) The Contractor shall, upon the Contracting Officer's written notice,

(1) furnish phase-in, phase-out services for up to 90 days after this contract expires and

(2) negotiate in good faith a plan with a successor to determine the nature and extent of phase-in, phase-out services required.

The plan shall specify a training program and a date for transferring responsibilities for each division of work described in the plan, and shall be subject to the Contracting Officer's approval. The Contractor shall provide sufficient experienced personnel during the phase-in, phase-out period to ensure that the services called for by this contract are maintained at the required level of proficiency.

(c) The Contractor shall allow as many personnel as practicable to remain on the job to help the successor maintain the continuity and consistency of the services required by this contract. The Contractor also shall disclose necessary personnel records and allow the successor to conduct on-site interviews with these employees. If selected employees are agreeable to the change, the Contractor shall release them at a mutually agreeable date and negotiate transfer of their earned fringe benefits to the successor.

(d) The Contractor shall be reimbursed for all reasonable phase-in, phase-out costs (i.e., costs incurred within the agreed period after contract expiration that result from phase-in, phase-out operations) and a fee (profit) not to exceed a pro rata portion of the fee (profit) under this contract.

COMMERCE ACQUISITION REGULATION (CAR) CLAUSES INCORPORATED IN FULL TEXT

I.62 1352.208-70 RESTRICTIONS ON PRINTING AND DUPLICATING (APR 2010)

(a) The contractor is authorized to duplicate or copy production units provided the requirement does not exceed 5,000 production units of any one page or 25,000 production units in the aggregate of multiple pages. Such pages may not exceed a maximum image size of 10-3/4 by 14-1/4 inches. A "production unit" is one sheet, size 8-1/2 x 11 inches (215 x 280 mm), one side only, and one color ink. Production unit requirements are outlined in the Government Printing and Binding Regulations.

(b) This clause does not preclude writing, editing, preparation of manuscript copy, or preparation of related illustrative material as a part of this contract, or administrative duplicating/copying (for example, necessary forms and instructional materials used by the contractor to respond to the terms of the contract).

(c) Costs associated with printing, duplicating, or copying in excess of the limits in paragraph (a) of this clause are unallowable without prior written approval of the Contracting Officer. If the contractor has reason to believe that any activity required in fulfillment of the contract will necessitate any printing or substantial duplicating or copying, it shall immediately provide written notice to the Contracting Officer and request approval prior to proceeding with the activity. Requests will be processed by the Contracting Officer in accordance with FAR 8.802.

(d) The contractor shall include in each subcontract which may involve a requirement for any printing, duplicating, and copying in excess of the limits specified in paragraph (a) of this clause, a provision substantially the same as this clause, including this paragraph (d).

I.63 1352.209-72 RESTRICTIONS AGAINST DISCLOSURE (APR 2010)

(a) The contractor agrees, in the performance of this contract, to keep the information furnished by the Government or acquired/developed by the contractor in performance of the contract and designated by the Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer's Representative, in the strictest confidence. The contractor also agrees not to publish or otherwise divulge such information, in whole or in part, in any manner or form, nor to authorize or permit others to do so, taking such reasonable measures as are necessary to restrict access to such information while in the contractor's possession, to those employees needing such information to perform the work described herein, *i.e.*, on a "need to know" basis. The contractor agrees to immediately notify the Contracting Officer in writing in the event that the contractor determines or has reason to suspect a breach of this requirement has occurred.

(b) The contractor agrees that it will not disclose any information described in subsection (a) to any person unless prior written approval is obtained from the Contracting Officer. The contractor agrees to insert the substance of this clause in any consultant agreement or subcontract hereunder.

I.64 1352.209-73 COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAWS (APR 2010)

The contractor shall comply with all applicable laws, rules and regulations which deal with or relate to performance in accord with the terms of the contract.

I.65 1352.233-70 AGENCY PROTESTS (APR 2010)

(a) An agency protest may be filed with either: (1) The Contracting Officer, or (2) at a level above the Contracting Officer, with the appropriate agency Protest Decision Authority. *See* 64 FR 16,651 (April 6, 1999).

(b) Agency protests filed with the Contracting Officer shall be sent to the following address:

Ms. Mona-Lisa Dunn, Contracting Officer
U.S. Department of Commerce
Office of Acquisition Management
Commerce Acquisition Solutions, Room 6521
14th and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20230
Fax: 202-482-1470
Email: mdunn@doc.gov

(c) Agency protests filed with the agency Protest Decision Authority shall be sent to the following address:

Mr. Mark Langstein, Esquire
U.S. Department of Commerce
Office of the General Counsel
Contract Law Division--Room 5893
Herbert C. Hoover Building
14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20230.
FAX: (202) 482-5858

(d) A complete copy of all agency protests, including all attachments, shall be served upon the Contract Law Division of the Office of the General Counsel within one day of filing a protest with either the Contracting Officer or the Protest Decision Authority.

(e) Service upon the Contract Law Division shall be made as follows: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the General Counsel, Chief, Contract Law Division, Room 5893, Herbert C. Hoover Building, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. FAX: (202) 482–5858.

I.66 1352.233-71 GAO AND COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS PROTESTS (APR 2010)

(a) A protest may be filed with either the Government Accountability Office (GAO) or the Court of Federal Claims unless an agency protest has been filed.

(b) A complete copy of all GAO or Court of Federal Claims protests, including all attachments, shall be served upon (i) the Contracting Officer, and (ii) the Contract Law Division of the Office of the General Counsel, within one day of filing a protest with either GAO or the Court of Federal Claims.

(c) Service upon the Contract Law Division shall be made as follows: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the General Counsel, Chief, Contract Law Division, Room 5893, Herbert C. Hoover Building, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230. FAX: (202) 482–5858.

I.67 1352.237-71 SECURITY PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS - LOW RISK CONTRACTS (APR 2010)

(a) Investigative Requirements for Low Risk Contracts. All contractor (and subcontractor) personnel proposed to be employed under a Low Risk contract shall undergo security processing by the Department's Office of Security before being eligible to work on the premises of any Department of Commerce owned, leased, or controlled facility in the United States or overseas, or to obtain access to a Department of Commerce IT system. All Department of Commerce security processing pertinent to this contract will be conducted at no cost to the contractor.

(b) Investigative requirements for Non-IT Service Contracts are:

(1) Contracts more than 180 days – National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI)

(2) Contracts less than 180 days – Special Agency Check (SAC)

(c) Investigative requirements for IT Service Contracts are:

(1) Contracts more than 180 days – National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI)

(2) Contracts less than 180 days – National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI)

(d) In addition to the investigations noted above, non-U.S. citizens must have a background check that includes an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency check.

(e) Additional Requirements for Foreign Nationals (Non-U.S. Citizens). Non-U.S. citizens (lawful permanent residents) to be employed under this contract within the United States must have:

(1) Official legal status in the United States;

(2) Continuously resided in the United States for the last two years; and

(3) Obtained advance approval from the servicing Security Officer in consultation with the Office of Security headquarters.

(f) DoC Security Processing Requirements for Low Risk Non-IT Service Contracts. Processing requirements for Low Risk non-IT Service Contracts are as follows:

(1) Processing of a NACI is required for all contract employees employed in Low Risk non-IT service contracts for more than 180 days. The Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) will invite the prospective contractor into e-QIP to complete the SF-85. The contract employee must also complete fingerprinting.

(2) Contract employees employed in Low Risk non-IT service contracts for less than 180 days require processing of Form OFI-86C Special Agreement Check (SAC), to be processed. The Sponsor will forward a completed Form OFI-86C, FD-258, Fingerprint Chart, and Credit Release Authorization to the servicing Security Officer, who will send the investigative packet to the Office of Personnel Management for processing.

(3) Any contract employee with a favorable SAC who remains on the contract over 180 days will be required to have a NACI conducted to continue working on the job site.

(4) For Low Risk non-IT service contracts, the scope of the SAC will include checks of the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII), other agency files (INVA), Defense Clearance Investigations Index (DCII), FBI Fingerprint (FBIF), and the FBI Information Management Division (FBIN).

(5) In addition, for those individuals who are not U.S. citizens (lawful permanent residents), the Sponsor may request a Customs Enforcement SAC on Form OFI-86C, by checking Block #7, Item I. In Block 13, the Sponsor should enter the employee's Alien Registration Receipt Card number to aid in verification.

(6) Copies of the appropriate forms can be obtained from the Sponsor or the Office of Security. Upon receipt of the required forms, the Sponsor will forward the forms to the servicing Security Officer. The Security Officer will process the forms and advise the Sponsor and the Contracting Officer whether the contract employee can commence work prior to completion of the suitability determination based on the type of work and risk to the facility (i.e., adequate controls and restrictions are in place). The Sponsor will notify the contractor of favorable or unfavorable findings of

the suitability determinations. The Contracting Officer will notify the contractor of an approved contract start date.

(g) Security Processing Requirements for Low Risk IT Service Contracts. Processing of a NACI is required for all contract employees employed under Low Risk IT service contracts.

(1) Contract employees employed in all Low Risk IT service contracts will require a National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI) to be processed. The Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) will invite the prospective contractor into e-QIP to complete the SF-85. Fingerprints and a Credit Release Authorization must be completed within three working days from start of work, and provided to the Servicing Security Officer, who will forward the investigative package to OPM.

(2) For Low Risk IT service contracts, individuals who are not U.S. citizens (lawful permanent residents) must undergo a NACI that includes an agency check conducted by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service. The Sponsor must request the ICE check as a part of the NAC.

(h) Notification of Disqualifying Information. If the Office of Security receives disqualifying information on a contract employee, the Sponsor and Contracting Officer will be notified. The Sponsor shall coordinate with the Contracting Officer for the immediate removal of the employee from duty requiring access to Departmental facilities or IT systems. Contract employees may be barred from working on the premises of a facility for any of the following reasons:

(1) Conviction of a felony crime of violence or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.

(2) Falsification of information entered on security screening forms or of other documents submitted to the Department.

(3) Improper conduct once performing on the contract, including criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct or other conduct prejudicial to the Government regardless of whether the conduct was directly related to the contract.

(4) Any behavior judged to pose a potential threat to Departmental information systems, personnel, property, or other assets.

(i) Failure to comply with security processing requirements may result in termination of the contract or removal of contract employees from Department of Commerce facilities or denial of access to IT systems.

(j) Access to National Security Information. Compliance with these requirements shall not be construed as providing a contract employee clearance to have access to national security information.

(k) The contractor shall include the substance of this clause, including this paragraph, in all subcontracts.

I.68 1352.242-70 POSTAWARD CONFERENCE (APR 2010)

A post award conference with the successful Offeror may be required. If required, the Contracting Officer will contact the contractor within 10 days of contract award to arrange the conference.

I.69 1352.246-70 PLACE OF ACCEPTANCE (APR 2010)

(a) The Contracting Officer or the duly authorized representative will accept supplies and services to be provided under this contract.

(b) The place of acceptance will be:

U.S Department of Commerce – NTIA
Office of International Affairs
1401 Constitution Avenue, NW,
Room 4701
Washington, DC 20230

I.70 1352.270-70 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE (APR 2010)

(a) The base period of performance of this contract is from October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2015. If an option is exercised, the period of performance shall be extended through the end of that option period.

(b) The option periods that may be exercised are as follows:

Period	Start Date	End Date
Option I	October 1, 2015	September 30, 2017
Option II	October 1, 2017	September 30, 2019

(c) The notice requirements for unilateral exercise of option periods are set out in FAR 52.217-9 (see Paragraph I.59 above).

EXHIBIT B

INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Independent Review Panel

CASE #50 2013 001083

FINAL DECLARATION

In the matter of an Independent Review Process (IRP) pursuant to the Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Number's (ICANN's) Bylaws, the *International Dispute Resolution Procedures* (ICDR Rules) and the *Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process* of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR),

Between: **DotConnectAfrica Trust**;
("Claimant" or "DCA Trust")

Represented by Mr. Arif H. Ali, Ms. Meredith Craven, Ms. Erin Yates and Mr. Ricardo Ampudia of Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP located at 1300 Eye Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC 2005, U.S.A.

And

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN);
("Respondent" or "ICANN")

Represented by Mr. Jeffrey A. LeVee and Ms. Rachel Zernik of Jones Day, LLP located at 555 South Flower Street, Fiftieth Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90071, U.S.A.

Claimant and Respondent will together be referred to as "Parties".

IRP Panel

Prof. Catherine Kessedjian
Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.)
Babak Barin, *President*

I. BACKGROUND

1. DCA Trust is non-profit organization established under the laws of the Republic of Mauritius on 15 July 2010 with its registry operation – DCA Registry Services (Kenya) Limited – as its principal place of business in Nairobi, Kenya.

2. DCA Trust was formed with the charitable purpose of, among other things, advancing information technology education in Africa and providing a continental Internet domain name to provide access to internet services for the people of Africa and not for the public good.

3. In March 2012, DCA Trust applied to ICANN for the delegation of the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains ("gTLD") Internet Expansion Program (the "New gTLD Program"), an internet resource available for delegation under that program.

4. ICANN is a non-profit corporation established on 30 September 1998 under the laws of the State of California, and headquartered in Marina del Rey, California, U.S.A. According to its Articles of Incorporation, ICANN was established for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole and is tasked with carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law, international conventions and local law.

5. On 4 June 2013, the ICANN Board New gTLD Program Committee ("NGPC") posted a notice that it had decided not to accept DCA Trust's application.

6. On 19 June 2013, DCA Trust filed a request for reconsideration by the ICANN Board Governance Committee ("BGC"), which denied the request on 1 August 2013.

7. On 19 August 2013, DCA Trust informed ICANN of its intention to seek relief before an Independent Review Panel under ICANN's Bylaws. Between August and October 2013, DCA Trust and ICANN participated in a Cooperative Engagement Process ("CEP") to try and resolve the issues relating to DCA Trust's application. Despite several meetings, no resolution was reached.

8. On 24 October 2013, DCA Trust filed a Notice of Independent Review Process with the ICDR in accordance with Article IV, Section 3 of ICANN's Bylaws.

9. In an effort to safeguard its rights pending the ongoing constitution of the IRP Panel, on 22 January 2014, DCA Trust wrote to ICANN requesting that it immediately cease any further processing of all applications for the delegation of the .AFRICA gTLD, failing which DCA Trust would seek emergency relief under Article 37 of the ICDR Rules.

10. DCA Trust also indicated that it believed it had the right to seek such relief because there was no standing panel as anticipated in the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process ("Supplementary Procedures"), which could otherwise hear requests for emergency relief.

11. In response, on 5 February 2014, ICANN wrote:

> Although ICANN typically is refraining from further processing activities in conjunction with pending gTLD applications where a competing applicant has a pending reconsideration request, ICANN does not intend to refrain from further processing of applications that relate in some way to pending independent review proceedings. In this particular instance, ICANN believes that the grounds for DCA's IRP are exceedingly weak, and that the decision to refrain from the further processing of other applications on the basis of the pending IRP would be unfair to others.

12. In its Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection subsequently submitted on 28 March 2014, DCA Trust pleaded, *inter alia*, that, in an effort to preserve its rights, in January 2014, DCA requested that ICANN suspend its processing of applications for .AFRICA during the pendency of this proceeding. ICANN, however, summarily refused to do so.

13. DCA Trust also submitted that "on 23 March 2014, DCA became aware that ICANN intended to sign an agreement with DCA's competitor (a South African company called ZACR) on 26 March 2014 in Beijing […] Immediately upon receiving this information, DCA contacted ICANN and asked it to refrain from signing the agreement with ZACR in light of the fact that this proceeding was still pending. Instead, according to ICANN's website, ICANN *signed its agreement with ZACR the very next day, two days ahead of plan, on 24 March instead of 26 March*."

14. According to DCA Trust, that same day, "ICANN then responded to DCA's request by presenting the execution of the contract as a *fait accompli*, arguing that DCA should have sought to stop ICANN from proceeding with ZACR's application, as ICANN had already informed DCA of its intention [to] ignore its obligations to participate in this proceeding in good faith."

15. DCA Trust also submitted that on 25 March 2014, as per ICANN's email to the ICDR, "ICANN for the first time informed DCA that it would accept the application of Article 37 of the ICDR Rules to this proceeding contrary to the express provisions of the Supplementary Procedures of ICANN has put in place for the IRP Process."

16. In its Request, DCA Trust argued that it "is entitled to an accountability proceeding with legitimacy and integrity, with the capacity to provide a meaningful remedy. […] DCA has requested the opportunity to compete for rights to .AFRICA pursuant to the rules that ICANN put into place. Allowing ICANN to delegate .AFRICA to DCA's only competitor – which took actions that were instrumental in the process leading to ICANN's decision to reject DCA's application – would eviscerate the very purpose of this proceeding and deprive DCA of its rights under ICANN's own constitutive instruments and international law."

17. Finally, among other things, DCA Trust requested the following interim relief:

> a. An order compelling *ICANN to refrain from any further steps toward delegation of the .AFRICA gTLD*, including but not limited to execution or assessment of pre-delegation testing, negotiations or discussions relating to delegation with the entity ZACR or any of its officers or agents; […]

18. On 24 April and 12 May 2014, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 1, a Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, and a list of questions for the Parties to answer.

19. In its 12 May 2014 Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, the Panel required ICANN to "immediately refrain from any further processing of any application for .AFRICA until [the Panel] heard the merits of DCA Trust's Notice of Independent Review Process and issued its conclusions regarding the same".

20. In the Panel's unanimous view, among other reasons, it would have been "unfair and unjust to deny DCA Trust's request for interim relief when the need for such a relief…[arose] out of ICANN's failure to follow its own Bylaws and procedures." The Panel also reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

21. On 27 May and 4 June 2015, the Panel issued Procedural Order No. 2 and a Decision on ICANN's request for Partial Reconsideration of certain portions of its Decision on Interim Measures of Protection.

22. In its 4 June 2014 Decision on ICANN's request for Partial Reconsideration, the Panel unanimously concluded that ICANN's request must be denied. In that Decision, the Panel observed:

> 9. After careful consideration of the Parties' respective submissions, the Panel is of the unanimous view that ICANN's Request must be denied for two reasons.
>
> 10. First, there is nothing in ICANN's Bylaws, the International Dispute Resolution Procedures of the ICDR effective as at 1 June 2009 or the Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process that in any way address the Panel's ability to address ICANN's Request. The Panel has not been able to find any relevant guidance in this regard in any of the above instruments and ICANN has not pointed to any relevant provision or rule that would support its argument that the Panel has the authority to reconsider its Decision of 12 May 2014.
>
> 11.Moreover, ICANN has not pointed to any clerical, typographical or computation error or shortcoming in the Panel's Decision and it has not requested an interpretation of the Panel's Decision based on any ambiguity or vagueness. To the contrary, ICANN has asked the Panel to reconsider its prior findings with respect to certain references in its Decision that ICANN disagrees with, on the basis that those references are in ICANN's view, inaccurate.
>
> 12. Second, even if the Panel were to reconsider based on any provision or rule available, its findings with respect to those passages complained of by ICANN as being inaccurate in its Decision – namely paragraphs 29 to 33 – after deliberation, the Panel would still conclude that ICANN has failed to follow its own Bylaws as more specifically explained in the above paragraphs, in the context of addressing which of the Parties should be viewed as responsible for the delays associated with DCA Trust's Request for Interim Measures of Protection. It is not reasonable to construe the By-law proviso for consideration by a provider-appointed *ad hoc* panel when a standing panel is not in place as relieving ICANN indefinitely of forming the required standing panel. Instead, the provider appointed panel is properly viewed as an interim procedure to be used before ICANN has a chance to form a standing panel. Here, more than a year has elapsed, and ICANN has offered no explanation why the standing panel has not been formed, nor indeed any indication that formation of that panel is in process, or has begun, or indeed even is planned to begin at some point.

The Panel also reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

23. On 14 August 2014, the Panel issued a Declaration on the IRP Procedure ("2014 Declaration") pursuant to which it (1) ordered a reasonable documentary exchange, (2) permitted the Parties to benefit from additional filings and supplementary briefing, (3) allowed a video hearing, and (4) permitted both Parties at the hearing to

challenge and test the veracity of any written statements made by witnesses.

The Panel also concluded that its Declaration on the IRP and its future Declaration on the Merits of the case were binding on the Parties. In particular, the Panel decided:

> 98. Various provisions of ICANN's Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures support the conclusion that the Panel's decisions, opinions and declarations are binding. There is certainly nothing in the Supplementary Rules that renders the decisions, opinions and declarations of the Panel either advisory or non-binding.
>
> […]
>
> 100. Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures resembles Article 27 of the ICDR Rules. Whereas Article 27 refers to "Awards", section 10 refers to "Declarations". Section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures, however, is silent on whether Declarations made by the IRP Panel are "final and binding" on the parties.
>
> 101. As explained earlier, as per Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 8 of the Bylaws, the Board of Directors of ICANN has given its approval to the ICDR to establish a set of operating rules and procedures for the conduct of the IRP set out in section 3. The operating rules and procedures established by the ICDR are the ICDR Rules as referred to in the preamble of the Supplementary Procedures. These Rules have been supplemented with the Supplementary Procedures.
>
> 102. This is clear from two different parts of the Supplementary Procedures. First, in the preamble, where the Supplementary Procedures state that: "These procedures supplement the International Centre for Dispute Resolution's International Arbitration Rules in accordance with the independent review procedures set forth in Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws".
>
> 103. And second, under section 2 entitled (Scope), that states that the "ICDR will apply these Supplementary Procedures, in addition to the INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, in all cases submitted to the ICDR in connection with the Article IV, Section 3(4) of the ICANN Bylaws". It is therefore clear that ICANN intended the operating rules and procedures for the independent review to be an international set of arbitration rules supplemented by a particular set of additional rules.
>
> 104. There is also nothing inconsistent between section 10 of the Supplementary Procedures and Article 27 of the ICDR Rules.
>
> 105. One of the hallmarks of international arbitration is the binding and final nature of the decisions made by the adjudicators. Binding arbitration is the essence of what the ICDR Rules, the ICDR itself and its parent, the American Arbitration Association, offer. The selection of the ICDR Rules as the baseline set of procedures for IRP's, therefore, points to a binding adjudicative process.

> 106. Furthermore, the process adopted in the Supplementary Procedures is an adversarial one where counsel for the parties present competing evidence and arguments, and a panel decides who prevails, when and in what circumstances. The panellists who adjudicate the parties' claims are also selected from among experienced arbitrators, whose usual charter is to make binding decisions.
>
> 107. The above is further supported by the language and spirit of section 11 of ICANN's Bylaws. Pursuant to that section, the IRP Panel has the authority to summarily dismiss requests brought without standing, lacking in substance, or that are frivolous or vexatious. Surely, such a decision, opinion or declaration on the part of the Panel would not be considered advisory.
>
> […]
>
> 110. ICANN points to the extensive public and expert input that preceded the formulation of the Supplementary Procedures. The Panel would have expected, were a mere advisory decision, opinion or declaration the objective of the IRP, that this intent be clearly articulated somewhere in the Bylaws or the Supplementary Procedures. In the Panel's view, this could have easily been done.
>
> 111. The force of the foregoing textual and construction considerations as pointing to the binding effect of the Panel's decisions and declarations are reinforced by two factors: 1) the exclusive nature of the IRP whereby the non-binding argument would be clearly in contradiction with such a factor; and, 2) the special, unique, and publicly important function of ICANN. As explained before, ICANN is not an ordinary private non-profit entity deciding for its own sake who it wishes to conduct business with, and who it does not. ICANN rather, is the steward of a highly valuable and important international resource.
>
> […]
>
> 115. Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that it is acceptable for ICANN to adopt a remedial scheme with no teeth, the Panel is of the opinion that, at a minimum, the IRP should forthrightly explain and acknowledge that the process is merely advisory. This would at least let parties know before embarking on a potentially expensive process that a victory before the IRP panel may be ignored by ICANN. And, a straightforward acknowledgment that the IRP process is intended to be merely advisory might lead to a legislative or executive initiative to create a truly independent compulsory process. The Panel seriously doubts that the Senators questioning former ICANN President Stuart Lynn in 2002 would have been satisfied had they understood that a) ICANN had imposed on all applicants a waiver of all judicial remedies, *and* b) the IRP process touted by ICANN as the "ultimate guarantor" of ICANN accountability was only an advisory process, the benefit of which accrued only to ICANN. [Underlining is from the original decision.]

The Panel also reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

24. On 5 September and 25 September 2014, the Panel issued Procedural Orders No. 3 and No. 4. In Procedural Order No. 3, the Panel notably required the Parties to complete their respective filing of briefs in accordance with the IRP Procedure Guidelines by 3 November 2014 for DCA Trust and 3 December 2014 for ICANN.

25. In Procedural Order No. 4 dated 25 September 2014, the Panel reached a decision regarding document production issues.

26. On 3 November 2014 and 3 December 2014, the Parties filed their Memorial and Response Memorial on the Merits in accordance with the timetable set out in Procedural Order No. 3.

27. On 26 February 2015, following the passing away of the Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret.) and confirmation by the ICDR of his replacement arbitrator, the Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.), ICANN requested that this Panel consider revisiting the part of this IRP relating to the issue of hearing witnesses addressed in the Panel's 2014 Declaration.

28. In particular, ICANN submitted that given the replacement of Justice Neal, Article 15.2 of the ICDR Rules together with the Supplementary Procedures permitted this IRP to in its sole discretion, determine "whether all or part" of this IRP should be repeated.

29. According to ICANN, while it was not necessary to repeat all of this IRP, since the Panel here had exceeded its authority under the Supplementary Procedures when it held in its 2014 Declaration that it could order live testimony of witnesses, the Panel should then at a minimum consider revisiting that issue.

30. According to ICANN, panelists derived "their powers and authority from the relevant applicable rules, the parties' requests, and the contractual provisions agreed to by the Parties (in this instance, ICANN's Bylaws, which establish the process of independent review). The authority of panelists is limited by such rules, submissions and agreements."

31. ICANN emphasized that "compliance with the Supplementary Procedures [was] critical to ensure predictability for ICANN, applicants for and objectors to gTLD applications, and the entire ICANN community…", and while "ICANN [was] committed to fairness and accessibility…ICANN [was] also committed to predictability and the like treatment of all applicants. For this Panel to change the rules

for this single applicant [did] not encourage any of these commitments."

32. ICANN also pleaded that, DCA specifically agreed to be bound by the Supplementary Procedures when it initially submitted its application, the Supplementary Procedures apply to both ICANN and DCA alike, ICANN is now in the same position when it comes to testing witness declarations and finally, in alternative dispute resolution proceedings where cross examination of witnesses is allowed, parties often waive cross-examination.

33. Finally, ICANN advanced that:

> [T]he Independent Review process is an alternative dispute resolution procedure adapted to the specific issues to be addressed pursuant to ICANN's Bylaws. The process cannot be transformed into a full-fledged trial without amending ICANN's Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures, which specifically provide for a hearing that includes counsel argument only. Accordingly, ICANN strongly urges the Panel to follow the rules for this proceeding and to declare that the hearing in May will be limited to argument of counsel.

34. On 24 March 2015, the Panel issued its Declaration on ICANN's Request for Revisiting of the 14 August Declaration on the IRP Procedure following the Replacement of Panel Member. In that Declaration, the newly constituted Panel unanimously concluded that it was not necessary for it to reconsider or revisit its 2014 Declaration.

35. In passing and not at all as a result of any intended or inadvertent reconsideration or revisiting of its 2014 Declaration, the Panel referred to Articles III and IV of ICANN's Bylaws and concluded:

> Under the general heading, Transparency, and title "Purpose", Section 1 of Article III states: "ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness." Under the general heading, Accountability and Review, and title "Purpose", Section 1 of Article IV reads: "In carrying out its mission as set out in these Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws, and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of these Bylaws." In light of the above, and again in passing only, it is the Panel's unanimous view, that the filing of fact witness statements (as ICANN has done in this IRP) and limiting telephonic or in-person hearings to argument only is inconsistent with the objectives setout in Articles III and IV setout above.

The Panel again reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

36. On 24 March and 1 April 2015, the Panel rendered Procedural Orders No. 5 and 6, in which, among other things, the Panel recorded the Parties' "agreement that there will no cross-examination of any of the witnesses" at the hearing of the merits.

37. On 20 April 2015, the Panel rendered its Third Declaration on the IRP Procedure. In that Declaration, the Panel decided that the hearing of this IRP should be an in-person one in Washington, D.C. and required all three witnesses who had filed witness statements to be present at the hearing.

38. The Panel in particular noted that:

> 13. […] Article IV, Section 3, and Paragraph 4 of ICANN's Bylaws (reproduced above) – the Independent Review Process – was designed and set up to offer the Internet community, an accountability process that would ensure that ICANN acted in a manner consistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.
>
> 14. Both ICANN's Bylaws and the Supplementary Rules require an IRP Panel to *examine* and *decide* whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. As ICANN's Bylaws explicitly put it, an IRP Panel is "*charged with* comparing contested actions of the Board […], and with *declaring* whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.
>
> 15. The IRP is the only independent third party process that allows review of board actions to ensure their consistency with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. As already explained in this Panel's 14 August 2014 Declaration on the IRP Procedure ("August 2014 Declaration"), the avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do *not* include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN's Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:
>
> > "Applicant hereby releases ICANN […] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN […] in connection with ICANN's review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant's gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM."
>
> Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, then the only and ultimate "accountability" remedy for an applicant is the IRP.
>
> 16. Accountability requires an organization to explain or give reasons for its activities, accept responsibility for them and to disclose the results in a transparent manner.

[…]

21. In order to keep the costs and burdens of independent review as low as possible, ICANN's Bylaws, in Article IV, Section 3 and Paragraph 12, suggests that the IRP Panel conduct its proceedings by email and otherwise via the Internet to the maximum extent feasible, and where necessary the IRP Panel may hold meetings by telephone. Use of the words "should" and "may" versus "shall" are demonstrative of this point. In the same paragraph, however, ICANN's Bylaws state that, "in the unlikely event that a telephonic or in-person hearing is convened, the hearing *shall* be limited to argument only; all evidence, including witness statements, must be submitted in writing in advance."

22. The Panel finds that this last sentence in Paragraph 12 of ICANN's Bylaws, unduly and improperly restricts the Panel's ability to conduct the "independent review" it has been explicitly mandated to carryout in Paragraph 4 of Section 3 in the manner it considers appropriate.

23. How can a Panel compare contested actions of the Board and declare whether or not they are consistent with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, without the ability to fact find and make enquiries concerning those actions in the manner it considers appropriate?

24. How can the Panel for example, determine, if the Board acted without conflict of interest, exercised due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it, or exercised independent judgment in taking decisions, if the Panel cannot ask the questions it needs to, in the manner it needs to or considers fair, just and appropriate in the circumstances?

25. How can the Panel ensure that the parties to this IRP are treated with equality and that each party has the right to be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case with respect to the mandate the Panel has been given, if as ICANN submits, "ICANN's Bylaws do not permit any examination of witnesses by the parties or the Panel during the hearing"?

26. The Panel is unanimously of the view that it cannot. The Panel is also of the view that any attempt by ICANN in this case to prevent it from carrying out its independent review of ICANN Board's actions in the manner that the Panel considers appropriate under the circumstances deprives the accountability and review process set out in the Bylaws of any meaning.

27. ICANN has filed two 'Declarations' in this IRP, one signed by Ms. Heather Dryden, a Senior Policy Advisor at the International Telecommunications Policy and Coordination Directorate at Industry Canada, and Chair of ICANN Government Advisory Committee from 2010 to 2013, and the other by Mr. Cherine Chalaby, a member of the Board of Directors of ICANN since 2010. Mr. Chalaby is also, since its inception, one of three members of the Subcommittee on Ethics and Conflicts of ICANN's Board of Governance Committee.

28. In their respective statements, both individuals have confirmed that they "have personal knowledge of the matters set forth in [their] declaration and [are] competent to testify to these matters *if called as a witness*."

> […]
>
> 29. In his Declaration, Mr. Chalaby states that "all members of the NGPC were asked to and did specifically affirm that they did not have a conflict of interest related to DCA's application for .AFRICA when they voted on the GAC advice. In addition, the NGPC asked the BGC to look into the issue further, and the BGC referred the matter to the Subcommittee. After investigating the matter, the Subcommittee concluded that Chris Disspain and Mike Silber did not have conflicts of interest with respect to DCA's application for .AFRICA."
>
> 30. The Panel considers it important and useful for ICANN's witnesses, and in particular, Mr. Chalaby as well as for Ms. Sophia Bekele Eshete to be present at the hearing of this IRP.
>
> 31. While the Panel takes note of ICANN's position depicted on page 2 of its 8 April 2015 letter, the Panel nonetheless invites ICANN to reconsider its position.
>
> 32. The Panel also takes note of ICANN's offer in that same letter to address written questions to its witnesses before the hearing, and if the Panel needs more information after the hearing to clarify the evidence presented during the hearing. The Panel, however, is unanimously of the view that this approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the requirements in ICANN's Bylaws for it to act openly, transparently, fairly and with integrity.
>
> 33. As already indicated in this Panel's August 2014 Declaration, analysis of the propriety of ICANN's decisions in this case will depend at least in part on evidence about the intentions and conduct of ICANN's top personnel. Even though the Parties have explicitly agreed that neither will have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the other in this IRP, the Panel is of the view that ICANN should not be allowed to rely on written statements of its top officers attesting to the propriety of their actions and decisions without an opportunity for the Panel and thereafter DCA Trust's counsel to ask any follow-up questions arising out of the Panel's questions of ICANN's witnesses. The same opportunity of course will be given to ICANN to ask questions of Ms. Bekele Eshete, after the Panel has directed its questions to her.
>
> 34. The Parties having agreed that there will be no cross-examination of witnesses in this IRP, the procedure for asking witnesses questions at the hearing shall be as follows:
>
> a) The Panel shall first have an opportunity to ask any witness any questions it deems necessary or appropriate;
> b) Each Party thereafter, shall have an opportunity to ask any follow-up questions the Panel permits them to ask of any witness.

The Panel again reserved its decision on the issue of costs relating to that stage of the proceeding until the hearing of the merits.

39. On 27 April and 4 May 2015, the Panel issued its Procedural Order No. 7 and 8, and on that last date, it held a prehearing conference call with the Parties as required by the ICDR Rules. In Procedural

Order No. 8, the Panel set out the order of witness and party presentations agreed upon by the Parties.

40. On 18 May 2015, and in response to ZA Central Registry's (ZACR) request to have two of its representatives along with a representative from the African Union Commission (AUC) attend at the IRP hearing scheduled for 22 and 23 May 2015 in Washington, D.C., the Panel issued its Procedural Order No. 9, denying the requests made by ZACR and AUC to be at the merits hearing of this matter in Washington, D.C.

41. In a letter dated 11 May 2015, ZACR and AUC's legal representative had submitted that both entities had an interest in this matter and it would be mutually beneficial for the IRP to permit them to attend at the hearing in Washington, D.C.

42. ZACR's legal representative had also argued that "allowing for interests of a materially affected party such as ZACR, the successful applicant for the dotAfrica gTLD, as well as broader public interests, to be present enhances the legitimacy of the proceedings and therefore the accountability and transparency of ICANN and its dispute resolution procedures."

43. For the Panel, Article 20 of the ICDR Rules, which applied in this matter, stated that the hearing of this IRP was "private unless the parties agree otherwise". The Parties in this IRP did not consent to the presence of ZACR and AUC. While ICANN indicated that it had no objection to the presence of ZACR and AUC, DCA Trust was not of the same view. Therefore, ZACR and AUC were not permitted to attend.

44. The in-person hearing of the merits of this IRP took place on 22 and 23 May 2015 at the offices of Jones Day LLP in Washington, D.C. All three individuals who had filed witness statements in this IRP, namely Ms. Sophia Bekele Eshete, representative for DCA Trust, Ms. Heather Dryden and Mr. Cherine Chalaby, representatives for ICANN, attended in person and answered questions put to them by the Panel and subsequently by the legal representatives of both Parties. In attendance at the hearing was also Ms. Amy Stathos, Deputy General Counsel of ICANN.

45. The proceedings of the hearing were reported by Ms. Cindy L. Sebo of TransPerfect Legal Solutions, who is a Registered Merit Real-Time Court Reporter.

46. On the last day of the hearing, DCA Trust was asked by the Panel to clearly and explicitly articulate its prayers for relief. In a document entitled Claimant's Final Request for Relief which was signed by the Executive Director of DCA Trust, Ms. Sophia Bekele and marked at the hearing as Hearing Exhibit 4, DCA Trust asked the Panel to:

> Declare that the Board violated ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and the Applicant Guidebook (AGB) by:
>
> - Discriminating against DCA and wrongfully assisting the AUC and ZACR to obtain rights to the .AFRICA gTLD;
> - Failing to apply ICANN's procedures in a neutral and objective manner, with procedural fairness when it accepted the GAC Objection Advice against DCA; and
> - Failing to apply its procedures in a neutral and objective manner, with procedural fairness when it approved the BGC's recommendation not to reconsider the NGPC's acceptance of the GAC Objection Advice against DCA;
>
> And to declare that:
>
> - DCA is the prevailing party in this IRP and, consequently, shall be entitled to its costs in this proceeding; and
> - DCA is entitled to such other relief as the Panel may find appropriate under the circumstances described herein.
>
> Recommend, as a result of each of these violations, that:
>
> - ICANN cease all preparations to delegate the .AFRICA gTLD to ZACR;
> - ICANN permit DCA's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process and be granted a period of no less than 18 months to obtain Government support as set out in the AGB and interpreted by the Geographic Names Panel, or accept that the requirement is satisfied as a result of the endorsement of DCA Trust's application by UNECA; and
> - ICANN compensate DCA for the costs it has incurred as a result of ICANN's violations of its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and AGB.

47. In its response to DCA Trust's Final Request for Relief, ICANN submitted that, "the Panel should find that no action (or inaction) of the ICANN Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws, and accordingly none of DCA's requested relief is appropriate."

48. ICANN also submitted that:

> DCA urges that the Panel issue a declaration in its favor…and also asks that the Panel declare that DCA is the prevailing party and entitled to its costs. Although ICANN believes that the evidence does not support the

> declarations that DCA seeks, ICANN does not object to the form of DCA's requests.
>
> At the bottom of DCA's Final Request for Relief, DCA asks that the Panel recommend that ICANN cease all preparations to delegate the .AFRICA gTLD to ZACR, and that ICANN permit DCA's application to proceed and give DCA no less than 18 additional months from the date of the Panel's declaration to attempt to obtain the requisite support of the countries in Africa. ICANN objects to that appropriateness of these requested recommendations because they are well outside the Panel's authority as set forth in the Bylaws.
>
> […]
>
> Because the Panel's authority is limited to declaring whether the Board's conduct was inconsistent with the Articles or the Bylaws, the Panel should limit its declaration to that question and refrain from recommending how the Board should then proceed in light of the Panel's declaration. Pursuant to Paragraph 12 of that same section of the Bylaws, the Board will consider the Panel's declaration at its next meeting, and if the Panel has declared that the Board's conduct was inconsistent with the Articles or the Bylaws, the Board will have to determine how to act upon the opinion of the Panel.
>
> By way of example only, if the Panel somehow found that the unanimous NGPC vote on 4 June 2013 was not properly taken, the Board might determine that the vote from that meeting should be set aside and that the NGPC should consider the issue anew. Likewise, if the Panel were to determine that the NGPC did not adequately consider the GAC advice at [the] 4 June 2013 meeting, the Board might require that the NGPC reconsider the GAC advice.
>
> In all events, the Bylaws mandate that the Board has the responsibility of fashioning the appropriate remedy once the Panel has declared whether or not it thinks the Board's conduct was inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The Bylaws do not provide the Panel with the authority to make any recommendations or declarations in this respect.

49. In response to ICANN's submissions above, on 15 June 2015, DCA Trust advanced that the Panel had already ruled that its declaration on the merits will be binding on the Parties and that nothing in ICANN's Bylaws, the Supplementary Procedures or the ICDR Rules applicable in these proceedings prohibits the Panel from making a recommendation to the ICANN Board of Directors regarding an appropriate remedy. DCA Trust also submitted that:

> According to ICANN's Bylaws, the Independent Review Process is designed to provide a remedy for "any" person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board. Further, "in order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation. Indeed, the ICANN New gTLD Program Committee, operating under the delegated authority of the ICANN Board, itself suggested that DCA could seek relief through ICANN's accountability

> mechanisms or, in other words, the Reconsideration process and the Independent Review Process. If the IRP mechanism – the mechanism of last resort for gTLD applicants – is intended to provide a remedy for a claimant materially injured or harmed by Board action or inaction, and it serves as the only alternative to litigation, then naturally the IRP Panel may recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress such injury or harm.

50. On 25 June 2015, the Panel issued its Procedural Order No. 10, directing the Parties to by 1 July 2015 simultaneously file their detailed submissions on costs and their allocation in these proceedings.

51. The additional factual background and reasons in the above decisions, procedural orders and declarations rendered by the Panel are hereby adopted and incorporated by reference in this Final Declaration.

52. On 1 and 2 July 2015, the Parties filed their respective positions and submissions on costs.

II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' POSITIONS ON THE MERITS & REQUEST FOR RELIEF

53. According to DCA Trust and as elaborated on in it's Memorial on Merits dated 3 November 2014, the central dispute between it and ICANN in this IRP may be summarized as follows:

> 32. By preventing DCA'S application from proceeding through the new gTLD review process and by coordinating with the AUC and others to ensure that the AUC obtained the rights to .AFRICA, ICANN breached its obligations of independence, transparency and due process contained in its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, including its obligation to conduct itself consistent with its duty of good faith under relevant principles of international law.

54. According to DCA Trust, among other things, "instead of functioning as a disinterested regulator of a fair and transparent gTLD application process, ICANN used its authority and oversight over that process to assist ZACR and to eliminate its only competitor, DCA, from the process."

55. DCA Trust also advanced that, "as a result, ICANN deprived DCA of the right to compete for .AFRICA in accordance with the rules ICANN established for the new gTLD program, in breach of the Applicant Guidebook ("AGB") and ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws."

56. In its 3 December 2014 Response to DCA's Memorial on the Merits, among other things, ICANN submitted that, "ICANN's conduct with respect to DCA's application for .AFRICA was fully consistent with ICANN's Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation and the Applicant Guidebook. ICANN also pleaded that it acted through open and transparent processes, evaluated DCA's application for .AFRICA in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Guidebook, and followed the procedures set forth in its Bylaws in evaluating DCA's Request for Reconsideration."

57. ICANN advanced that, "DCA is using this IRP as a mean to challenge the right of African countries to support a specific (and competing) application for .AFRICA, and to rewrite the Guidebook."

58. ICANN also added that, "ICANN provided assistance to those who requested, cooperated with governmental authorities, and respected the consensus advice issued by the GAC, which speaks on behalf of the governments of the world."

59. In its Final Request for Relief filed on 23 May 2015, DCA Trust asked this Panel to:

> 1.Declare that the Board violated ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and the Applicant Guidebook (AGB);
> 2.Declare that DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP and, consequently entitled to its costs in this proceeding; and
> 3.Recommend as a result of the Board violations a course of action for the Board to follow going forward.

60. In its response letter of 1 June 2015, ICANN confirmed that it did not object to the form of DCA Trust's requests above, even though it believes that the evidence does not support the declarations that DCA Trust seeks. ICANN did, however, object to the appropriateness of the request for recommendations on the ground that they are outside of the Panel's authority as set forth in the Bylaws.

III. THE ISSUES RAISED AND THE PANEL'S DECISION

61. After carefully considering the Parties' written and oral submissions, perusing the three witness statements filed and hearing *viva voce* the testimonies of the witnesses at the in-person hearing of this IRP in Washington, D.C., the Panel answers the following four questions put to it as follows:

1. Did the Board act or fail to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

Answer: Yes.

2. Can the IRP Panel recommend a course of action for the Board to follow as a consequence of any declaration that the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook (AGB)?

Answer: Yes.

3. Who is the prevailing party in this IRP?

Answer: DCA Trust

4. Who is responsible for bearing the costs of this IRP and the cost of the IRP Provider?

Answer: ICANN, in full.

Summary of Panel's Decision

For reasons explained in more detail below, and pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (c) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel declares that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

Furthermore, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel recommends that ICANN continue to refrain from delegating the .AFRICA gTLD and permit DCA Trust's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process.

Finally, DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP and ICANN is responsible for bearing, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, Article 11 of Supplementary Procedures and Article 31 of the ICDR Rules, the totality of the costs of this IRP and the totality of the costs of the IRP Provider.

As per the last sentence of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, DCA Trust and ICANN shall each bear their own expenses. The Parties shall also each bear their own legal representation fees.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES AND REASONS FOR THE PANEL'S DECISION

1) Did the Board act or fail to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

62. Before answering this question, the Panel considers it necessary to quickly examine and address the issue of "standard of review" as referred to by ICANN in its 3 December 2014 Response to DCA's Memorial on the Merits or the "law applicable to these proceedings" as pleaded by DCA Trust in its 3 November 2014 Memorial on the Merits.

63. According to DCA Trust:

> 30. The version of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws in effect at the time DCA filed its Request for IRP applies to these proceedings. [Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (21 November 1998) and Bylaws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (11 April 2013)]. ICANN's agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications & Information Administration ("NTIA"), the "Affirmation of Commitments," is also instructive, as it explains ICANN's obligations in light of its role as regulator of the Domain Name System ("DNS"). The standard of review is a *de novo* "independent review" of whether the actions of the Board violated the Bylaws, with focus on whether the Board acted without conflict of interest, with due diligence and care, and exercised independent judgment in the best interests of ICANN and its many stakeholders. (Underlining added).
>
> 31. All of the obligations enumerated in these documents are to be carried out *first* in conformity with "relevant principles of international law" and *second* in conformity with local law. As explained by Dr. Jack Goldsmith in his Expert Report submitted in *ICM v. ICANN*, the reference to "principles of international law" in ICANN's Articles of Incorporation should be understood to include both customary international law and general principles of law.

64. In response, ICANN submits that:

> 11. The IRP is a unique process available under ICANN's Bylaws for persons or entities that claim to have been materially and adversely affected by a decision or action of the ICANN Board, but only to the extent that Board action was inconsistent with ICANN's Bylaws or Articles. This IRP Panel is tasked with providing its opinion as to whether the challenged Board actions violated ICANN's Bylaws or Articles. ICANN's Bylaws specifically identify the deferential standard of review that the IRP Panel must apply when evaluating the actions of the ICANN Board, focusing on:

> a. Did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?;
>
> b. Did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and
>
> c. Did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?
>
> 12. DCA disregards the plain language of ICANN's Bylaws and relies instead on the IRP Panel's declaration in a prior Independent Review proceeding, *ICM v. ICANN*. However, *ICM* was decided in 2010 under a previous version of ICANN's Bylaws. In its declaration, the *ICM* Panel explicitly noted that ICANN's then-current Bylaws "d[id] not specify or imply that the [IRP] process provided for s[hould] (or s[hould] not) accord deference to the decisions of the ICANN Board." As DCA acknowledges, the version of ICANN's Bylaws that apply to this proceeding are the version as amended in April 2013. The current Bylaws provide for the deferential standard of review set forth above. [Underlining is added]

65. For the following reasons, the Panel is of the view that the standard of review is a *de novo*, objective and independent one examining whether the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

66. ICANN is not an ordinary California nonprofit organization. Rather it has a large international purpose and responsibility to coordinate and ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems.

67. Indeed, Article 4 of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation require ICANN to "operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets." ICANN's Bylaws also impose duties on it to act in an open, transparent and fair manner with integrity.

68. ICANN's Bylaws (as amended on 11 April 2013) which both Parties explicitly agree that applies to this IRP, reads in relevant parts as follows:

> **ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW**
>
> **Section 3. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS**

> 1. In addition to the reconsideration process described in Section 2 of this Article, ICANN shall have in place a separate process for independent third-party review of Board actions alleged by an affected party to be inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws.
>
> […]
>
> 4. Requests for such independent review shall be referred to an Independent Review Process Panel […], which shall be charged with comparing contested actions of the Board to Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, and with declaring whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of those Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. The IRP Panel must apply a defined standard of review to the IRP request, focusing on:
>
> a. did the Board act without conflict of interest in taking its decision?
> b. did the Board exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of them?; and
> c. did the Board members exercise independent judgment in taking the decision, believed to be in the best interests of the company?

69. Section 8 of the Supplementary Procedures similarly subject the IRP to the standard of review set out in subparagraphs a., b., and c., above, and add:

> If a requestor demonstrates that the ICANN Board did not make a reasonable inquiry to determine it had sufficient facts available, ICANN Board members had a conflict of interest in participating in the decision, or the decision was not an exercise in independent judgment, believed by the ICANN Board to be in the best interests of the company, after taking account of the internet community and the global public interest, the requestor will have established proper grounds for review.

70. In the Panel's view, Article IV, Section 3, and Paragraph 4 of ICANN's Bylaws (reproduced above) – the Independent Review Process – was designed and set up to offer the Internet community, a *de novo, objective and independent* accountability process that would ensure that ICANN acted in a manner consistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

71. Both ICANN's Bylaws and the Supplementary Rules require an IRP Panel to *examine* and *decide* whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws. As ICANN's Bylaws explicitly put it, an IRP Panel is "*charged with* comparing contested actions of the Board […], and with *declaring* whether the Board has acted consistently with the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws.

72. The IRP is the only independent third party process that allows review of board actions to ensure their consistency with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws. As already explained in this Panel's 14 August 2014 Declaration on the IRP Procedure ("August 2014 Declaration"), the avenues of accountability for applicants that have disputes with ICANN do *not* include resort to the courts. Applications for gTLD delegations are governed by ICANN's Guidebook, which provides that applicants waive all right to resort to the courts:

> Applicant hereby releases ICANN […] from any and all claims that arise out of, are based upon, or are in any way related to, any action or failure to act by ICANN […] in connection with ICANN's review of this application, investigation, or verification, any characterization or description of applicant or the information in this application, any withdrawal of this application or the decision by ICANN to recommend or not to recommend, the approval of applicant's gTLD application. APPLICANT AGREES NOT TO CHALLENGE, IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA, ANY FINAL DECISION MADE BY ICANN WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION, AND IRREVOCABLY WAIVES ANY RIGHT TO SUE OR PROCEED IN COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDICIAL FORA ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM AGAINST ICANN ON THE BASIS OF ANY OTHER LEGAL CLAIM.

73. Thus, assuming that the foregoing waiver of any and all judicial remedies is valid and enforceable, then the only and ultimate "accountability" remedy for an applicant is the IRP.

74. As previously decided by this Panel, such accountability requires an organization to explain or give reasons for its activities, accept responsibility for them and to disclose the results in a transparent manner.

75. Such accountability also requires, to use the words of the IRP Panel in the *Booking.com B.V. v. ICANN* (ICDR Case Number: 50-20-1400-0247), this IRP Panel to "objectively" determine whether or not the Board's actions are in fact consistent with the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and Guidebook, which this Panel, like the one in *Booking.com* "understands as requiring that the Board's conduct be appraised independently, and without any presumption of correctness."

76. The Panel therefore concludes that the "standard of review" in this IRP is a *de novo, objective and independent* one, which does not require any presumption of correctness.

77. With the above in mind, the Panel now turns it mind to whether or not the Board in this IRP acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent

with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook.

DCA Trust's Position

78. In its 3 November 2014 Memorial on the Merits, DCA Trust criticizes ICANN for variety of shortcomings and breaches relating to the Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and Applicant Guidebook. DCA Trust submits:

> 32. By preventing DCA's application from proceeding through the new gTLD review process and by coordinating with the AUC and others to ensure that the AUC obtained the rights to .AFRICA, ICANN breached its obligations of independence, transparency and due process contained in its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, including its obligation to conduct itself consistent with its duty of good faith under relevant principles of international law.

79. DCA Trust also pleads that ICANN breached its Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws by discriminating against DCA Trust and failing to permit competition for the .AFRICA gTLD, ICANN abused it Regulatory authority in its differential treatment of the ZACR and DCA Trust applications, and in contravention of the rules for the New gTLD Program, ICANN colluded with AUC to ensure that the AUC would obtain control over .AFRICA.

80. According to DCA Trust:

> 34. ICANN discriminated against DCA and abused its regulatory authority over new gTLDs by treating it differently from other new gTLD applicants without justification or any rational basis— particularly relative to DCA's competitor ZACR—and by applying ICANN's policies in an unpredictable and inconsistent manner so as to favor DCA's competitor for .AFRICA. ICANN staff repeatedly disparaged DCA and portrayed it as an illegitimate bidder for .AFRICA, and the Board failed to stop the discriminatory treatment despite protests from DCA.
>
> 35. Moreover, ICANN staff worked with InterConnect to ensure that ZACR, but not DCA, would be able to pass the GNP evaluation, even going so far as to draft a letter supporting ZACR for the AUC to submit back to ICANN. While ICANN staff purported to hold DCA to the strict geographic support requirement set forth in the AGB, once DCA was removed from contention for .AFRICA, ICANN staff immediately bypassed these very same rules in order to allow ZACR's application to pass the GNP evaluation. After DCA's application was pulled from processing on 7 June 2013, ICANN staff directed InterConnect to equate the AUC's support for ZACR's application as support from 100% of African governments. This was a complete change of policy for ICANN, which had insisted (until DCA's application was no longer being considered) that the AUC endorsement was not material to the geographic requirement.

> 36. However, none of the AUC statements ZACR submitted were adequate endorsements under the AGB, either. ICANN staff then took the remarkable step of drafting the AUC endorsement letter in order to enable ZACR to pass review. The Director of gTLD Operations, Trang Nguyen, personally composed an endorsement letter corresponding to all the AGB requirements for Commissioner Ibrahim's signature. Once Commissioner Ibrahim responded with a signed, stamped copy of the letter incorporating minor additions, ICANN staff rushed to pass ZACR's application just over one week later.
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> 37. In its Response to the GAC Advice rendered against its application, DCA raised concerns that the two .AFRICA applications had been treated differently, though at the time it had no idea of just how far ICANN was going or would go to push ZACR's application through the process. Apparently the NGPC failed to make any inquiry into those allegations. .AFRICA was discussed at one meeting only, and there is no rationale listed for the NGPC's decision in the "Approved Resolutions" for the 4 June 2013 meeting. An adequate inquiry into ICANN staff's treatment of DCA's and ZACR's application—even simply asking the Director of gTLD Operations whether there was any merit to DCA's concerns—would have revealed a pattern of discriminatory behavior against DCA and special treatment by both ICANN staff and the ICANN Board in favor of ZACR's application.
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> 38. In all of these acts and omissions, ICANN breached the AGB and its own Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, which require it to act in good faith, avoid discriminating against any one party, and ensure open, accurate and unbiased application of its policies. Furthermore, ICANN breached principles of international law by failing to exercise its authority over the application process in good faith and committing an abuse of right by ghost-writing an endorsement letter for ZACR and the AUC, and then decreeing that the letter was all that would be needed for ZACR to pass. Finally, the Board's failure to inquire into the actions of its staff, even when on notice of the myriad of discriminatory actions, violates its obligation to comply with its Bylaws with appropriate care and diligence.

81. DCA Trust submits that the NGPC breached ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws by failing to apply ICANN's Procedures in a neutral and objective manner with procedural fairness, when it accepted the GAC Objection Advice against DCA Trust, the NGPC should have investigated questions about the GAC Objection Advice being obtained through consensus, and the NGPC should have consulted with an independent expert about the GAC advice given that the AUC used the GAC to circumvent the AGB's community objection procedures.

82. According to DCA Trust:

> 44. The decision of the NGPC, acting pursuant to the delegated authority of the ICANN Board, to accept the purported "consensus" GAC Objection Advice, violated ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Article III § 1 of its Bylaws, requiring transparency, consistency and fairness. ICANN ignored

the serious issues raised by DCA and others with respect to the rendering and consideration of the GAC Objection Advice, breaching its obligation to operate "to the maximum extent possible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness." It also breaches ICANN's obligation under Article 4 of its Articles of Incorporation to abide by principles of international law, including good faith application of rules and regulations and the prohibition on the abuse of rights.

45. The NGPC gave undue deference to the GAC and failed to investigate the serious procedural irregularities and conflicts of interest raised by DCA and others relating to the GAC's Objection Advice on .AFRICA. ICANN had a duty under principles of international law to exercise good faith and due diligence in evaluating the GAC advice rather than accepting it wholesale and without question, despite having notice of the irregular manner in which the advice was rendered. Importantly, ICANN was well aware that the AUC was using the GAC to effectively reserve .AFRICA for itself, pursuant to ICANN's own advice that it should use the GAC for that purpose and contrary to the New gTLD Program objective of enhancing competition for TLDs. The AUC's very presence on the GAC as a member rather than an observer demonstrates the extraordinary lengths ICANN took to ensure that the AUC was able to reserve .AFRICA for its own use notwithstanding the new gTLD application process then underway.

46. The ICANN Board and staff members had actual knowledge of information calling into question the notion that there was a consensus among the GAC members to issue the advice against DCA's application, prohibiting the application of the rule in the AGB concerning consensus advice (which creates a "strong presumption" for the Board that a particular application "should not proceed" in the gTLD evaluation process).The irregularities leading to the advice against DCA's application included proposals offered by Alice Munyua, who no longer represented Kenya as a GAC advisor at the time, and the fact that the genuine Kenya GAC advisor expressly refused to endorse the advice. The GAC emails referenced in Ms. Dryden's witness statement clearly show that Kenya accepted the text only insofar as it supported the AUC's endeavor and not insofar as it objected to DCA's application. Finally, the ICANN Board knew very well that the AUC might attempt to use the GAC in an anticompetitive manner, since it was ICANN itself that informed the AUC it could use the GAC to achieve that very goal.

47. At a bare minimum, this information put ICANN Board and staff members on notice that further investigation into the rationale and support for the GAC's decision was necessary. During the very meeting wherein the NGPC accepted the Objection Advice, the NGPC acknowledged that due diligence required a conversation with the GAC, even where the advice *was* consensus advice. The evidence shows that ICANN simply decided to push through the AUC's appointed applicant in order to allow the AUC to control .AFRICA, as it had previously requested.

48. Even if the GAC's Objection Advice could be characterized as "consensus" advice, the NGPC's failure to consult with an independent expert about the GAC's Objection Advice was a breach of ICANN's duty to act to the "maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner

> and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness." The AGB specifically provides that when the Board is considering any form of GAC advice, it "may consult with independent experts, such as those designated to hear objections in the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure, in cases where the issues raised in the GAC advice are pertinent to one of the subject matter areas of the objection procedures."
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> 49. Given the unique circumstances surrounding the applications for .AFRICA—namely that one applicant was the designee of the AUC, which wanted to control .AFRICA without competition— ICANN should not have simply accepted GAC Objection Advice, proposed and pushed through by the AUC. If it was in doubt as to how to handle GAC advice sponsored by DCA's only competitor for .AFRICA, it could have and should have consulted a third-party expert in order to obtain appropriate guidance. Its failure to do so was, at a minimum, a breach of ICANN's duty of good faith and the prohibition on abuse of rights under international law. In addition, in light of the multiple warning signs identified by DCA in its Response to the GAC Objection Advice and its multiple complaints to the Board, failure to consult an independent expert was certainly a breach of the Board's duty to ensure its fair and transparent application of its policies and its duty to promote and protect competition.

83. DCA Trust also submits that the NGPC breached ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws by failing to apply its procedures in a neutral and objective manner, with procedural fairness, when it approved the BGC's recommendation not to reconsider the NGPC's acceptance of the GAC Objection Advice against DCA.

84. According to DCA Trust:

> 50. Not only did the NGPC breach ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws by accepting the GAC's Objection Advice, but the NGPC also breached ICANN's Articles of Incorporation and its Bylaws by approving the BGC's recommendation not to reconsider the NGPC's earlier decision to accept the GAC Objection Advice. Not surprisingly, the NGPC concluded that its earlier decision should not be reconsidered.
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> 51. First, the NGPC's decision not to review its own acceptance of the GAC Objection Advice lacks procedural fairness, because the NGPC literally reviewed its own decision to accept the Objection Advice. It is a well-established general principle of international law that a party cannot be the judge of its own cause. No independent viewpoint entered into the process. In addition, although Mr. Silber recused himself from the vote on .AFRICA, he remained present for the entire discussion of .AFRICA, and Mr. Disspain apparently concluded that he did not feel conflicted, so both participated in the discussion and Mr. Disspain voted on DCA's RFR.
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> 52. Second, the participation of the BGC did not provide an independent intervention into the NGPC's decision-making process, because the BGC is primarily a subset of members of the NGPC. At the time the BGC made its recommendation, the majority of BGC members were also members of the NGPC.

> 53. Finally, the Board did not exercise due diligence and care in accepting the BGC's recommendation, because the BGC recommendation essentially proffered the NGPC's inadequate diligence in accepting the GAC Objection Advice in the first place, in order to absolve the NGPC of the responsibility to look into any of DCA's grievances in the context of the Request for Review. The basis for the BGC's recommendation to deny was that DCA did not state proper grounds for reconsideration, because failure to follow correct procedure is not a ground for reconsideration, and DCA did not identify the actual information an independent expert would have provided, had the NGPC consulted one. Thus, the BGC essentially found that the NGPC did not fail to take account of material information, because the NGPC did not have before it the material information that would have been provided by an independent expert's viewpoint. The BGC even claimed that if DCA had wanted the NGPC to exercise due diligence and consult an independent expert, DCA should have made such a suggestion in its Response to the GAC Objection Advice. Applicants should not have to remind the Board to comply with its Bylaws in order for the Board to exercise due diligence and care.
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> 54. ICANN's acts and omissions with respect to the BGC's recommendation constitute further breaches of ICANN's Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation, including its duty to carry out its activities in good faith and to refrain from abusing its position as the regulator of the DNS to favor certain applicants over others.

85. Finally, DCA Trust pleads that:

> [As] a result of the Board's breaches of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and general principles of international law, ICANN must halt the process of delegating .AFRICA to ZACR and ZACR should not be permitted to retain the rights to .AFRICA it has procured as a result of the Board's violations. Because ICANN's handling of the new gTLD application process for .AFRICA was so flawed and so deeply influenced by ICANN's relationships with various individuals and organizations purporting to represent "the African community," DCA believes that any chance it may have had to compete for .AFRICA has been irremediably lost and that DCA's application could not receive a fair evaluation even if the process were to be re-set from the beginning. Under the circumstances, DCA submits that ICANN should remove ZACR's application from the process altogether and allow DCA's application to proceed under the rules of the New gTLD Program, allowing DCA up to 18 months to negotiate with African governments to obtain the necessary endorsements so as to enable the delegation and management of the .AFRICA string.

ICANN's Position

86. In its Response to DCA's Memorial on the Merits filed on 3 December 2014 ("ICANN Final Memorial"), ICANN submits that:

> 2. […] Pursuant to ICANN's New gTLD Applicant Guidebook ("Guidebook"), applications for strings that represent geographic regions—such as "Africa"—require the support of at least 60% of the respective national governments in the relevant region. As DCA has acknowledged on

multiple occasions, including in its Memorial, DCA does not have the requisite governmental support; indeed, DCA now asks that ICANN be required to provide it with eighteen more months to try to gather the support that it was supposed to have on the day it submitted its application in 2012.

3. DCA is using this IRP as a means to challenge the right of African countries to support a specific (and competing) application for .AFRICA, and to rewrite the Guidebook. The Guidebook provides that countries may endorse multiple applications for the same geographic string. However, in this instance, the countries of Africa chose to endorse only the application submitted by ZA Central Registry ("ZACR") because ZACR prevailed in the Request for Proposal ("RFP") process coordinated by the African Union Commission ("AUC"), a process that DCA chose to boycott. There was nothing untoward about the AUC's decision to conduct an RFP process and select ZACR, nor was there anything inappropriate about the African countries' decision to endorse only ZACR's application.

4. Subsequently, as they had every right to do, GAC representatives from Africa urged the GAC to issue advice to the ICANN Board that DCA's application for .AFRICA not proceed (the "GAC Advice"). One or more countries from Africa—or, for that matter, from any continent—present at the relevant GAC meeting could have opposed the issuance of this GAC Advice, yet not a single country stated that it did not want the GAC to issue advice to the ICANN Board that DCA's application should not proceed. As a result, under the GAC's rules, the GAC Advice was "consensus" advice.

5. GAC consensus advice against an application for a new gTLD creates a "strong presumption" for ICANN's Board that the application should not proceed. In accordance with the Guidebook's procedures, the Board's New gTLD Program Committee (the "NGPC") considered the GAC Advice, considered DCA's response to the GAC Advice, and properly decided to accept the GAC Advice that DCA's application should not proceed. As ZACR's application for .AFRICA subsequently passed all evaluation steps, ICANN and ZACR entered into a registry agreement for the operation of .AFRICA. Following this Panel's emergency declaration, ICANN has thus far elected not to proceed with the delegation of the .AFRICA TLD into the Internet root zone.

6. DCA's papers contain much mudslinging and many accusations, which frankly do not belong in these proceedings. According to DCA, the entire ICANN community conspired to prevent DCA from being the successful applicant for .AFRICA. However, the actions that DCA views as nefarious were, in fact, fully consistent with the Guidebook. They also were not actions taken by the Board or the NGPC that in any way violated ICANN's Bylaws or Articles, the only issue that this IRP Panel is tasked with assessing.

87. ICANN submits that the Board properly advised the African Union's member states of the Guidebook Rules regarding geographic strings, the NGPC did not violate the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation by accepting the GAC Advice, the AUC and the African GAC members properly supported the .AFRICA applicant chosen through the RFP

process, the GAC issued consensus advice opposing DCA's application and the NGPC properly accepted the consensus GAC Advice.

88. According to ICANN:

> 13. DCA's first purported basis for Independent Review is that ICANN improperly responded to a 21 October 2011 communiqué issued by African ministers in charge of Communication and Information Technologies for their respective countries ("Dakar Communiqué"). In the Dakar Communiqué, the ministers, acting pursuant to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, committed to continued and enhanced participation in ICANN and the GAC, and requested that ICANN's Board take numerous steps aimed at increasing Africa's representation in the ICANN community, including that ICANN "include ['Africa'] and its representation in any other language on the Reserved Names List in order [for those strings] to enjoy [] special legislative protection, so [they could be] managed and operated by the structure that is selected and identified by the African Union."
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> 14. As DCA acknowledges, in response to the request in the Dakar Communiqué that .AFRICA (and related strings) be reserved for a operator of the African ministers' own choosing, ICANN advised that .AFRICA and its related strings could not be placed on the Reserved Names List because ICANN was "not able to take actions that would go outside of the community-established and documented guidelines of the program." Instead, ICANN explained that, pursuant to the Guidebook, "protections exist that w[ould] allow the African Union and its member states to play a prominent role in determining the outcome of any application for these top-level domain name strings."
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> 15. It was completely appropriate for ICANN to point the AU member states to the publicly-stated Guidebook protections for geographic names that were put in place to address precisely the circumstance at issue here—where an application for a string referencing a geographic designation did not appear to have the support of the countries represented by the string. DCA argues that ICANN was giving "instructions . . . as to how to bypass ICANN's own rules," but all ICANN was doing was responding to the Dakar Communiqué by explaining the publicly-available rules that ICANN already had in place. This conduct certainly did not violate ICANN's Bylaws or Articles.
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> 16. In particular, ICANN explained that, pursuant to the Guidebook, "Africa" constitutes a geographic name, and therefore any application for .AFRICA would need: (i) documented support from at least 60% of the national governments in the region; and (ii) no more than one written statement of objection . . . from "relevant governments in the region and/or from public authorities associated with the continent and region." Next, ICANN explained that the Guidebook provides an opportunity for the GAC, whose members include the AU member states, to provide "Early Warnings" to ICANN regarding specific gTLD applications. Finally, ICANN explained that there are four formal objection processes that can be initiated by the public, including the Community Objection process, which may be filed where there is "substantial opposition to the gTLD application from a significant

portion of the community to which the gTLD string may be explicitly or implicitly targeted. Each of these explanations was factually accurate and based on publicly available information. Notably, ICANN did not mention the possibility of GAC consensus advice against a particular application (and, of course, such advice could not have occurred if even a single country had voiced its disagreement with that advice during the GAC meeting when DCA's application was discussed).

17. DCA's objection to ICANN's response to the Dakar Communiqué reflects nothing more than DCA's dissatisfaction with the fact that African countries, coordinating themselves through the AUC, opposed DCA's application. However, the African countries had every right to voice that opposition, and ICANN's Board acted properly in informing those countries of the avenues the Guidebook provided them to express that opposition.

18. In another attempt to imply that ICANN improperly coordinated with the AUC, DCA insinuates that the AUC joined the GAC at ICANN's suggestion. ICANN's response to the Dakar Communiqué does not even mention this possibility. Further, in response to DCA's document requests, ICANN searched for communications between ICANN and the AUC relating to the AUC becoming a voting member of the GAC, and the search revealed no such communications. This is not surprising given that ICANN has no involvement in, much less control over, whether the GAC grants to any party voting membership status, including the AUC; that decision is within the sole discretion of the GAC. ICANN's Bylaws provide that membership in the GAC shall be open to "multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, on the invitation of the [GAC] through its Chair." In any event, whether the AUC was a voting member of the GAC is irrelevant to DCA's claims. As is explained further below, the AUC alone would not have been able to orchestrate consensus GAC Advice opposing DCA's application.

19. DCA's next alleged basis for Independent Review is that ICANN's NGPC improperly accepted advice from the GAC that DCA's application should not proceed. However, nearly all of DCA's Memorial relates to conduct of the AUC, the countries of the African continent, and the GAC. None of these concerns is properly the subject of an Independent Review proceeding because they do not implicate the conduct of the ICANN Board or the NGPC. The only actual decision that the NGPC made was to accept the GAC Advice that DCA's application for .AFRICA should not proceed, and that decision was undoubtedly correct, as explained below.

20. Although the purpose of this proceeding is to test whether ICANN's Board (or, in this instance, the NGPC) acted in conformance with its Bylaws and Articles, ICANN addresses the conduct of third parties in the next few sections because that additional context demonstrates that the NGPC's decision to accept the GAC Advice—the only decision reviewable here—was appropriate in all aspects.

21. After DCA's application was posted for public comment (as are all new gTLD applications), sixteen African countries—Benin, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda—submitted GAC Early Warnings regarding DCA's application.

Early Warnings are intended to "provid[e] [] applicant[s] with an indication that the[ir] application is seen as potentially sensitive or problematic by one or more governments." These African countries used the Early Warnings to notify DCA that they had requested the AUC to conduct an RFP for .AFRICA, that ZACR had been selected via that RFP, and that they objected to DCA's application for .AFRICA. They further notified DCA that they did not believe that DCA had the requisite support of 60% of the countries on the African continent.

22. DCA minimizes the import of these Early Warnings by arguing that they did not involve a "permissible reason" for objecting to DCA's application. But DCA does not explain how any of these reasons was impermissible, and the Guidebook explicitly states that Early Warnings "may be issued for any reason." DCA demonstrated the same dismissive attitude towards the legitimate concerns of the sixteen governments that issued Early Warnings by arguing to the ICANN Board and the GAC that the objecting governments had been "teleguided (or manipulated)."

23. In response to these Early Warnings, DCA conceded that it did not have the necessary level of support from African governments and asked the Board to "waive th[e] requirement [that applications for geographic names have the support of the relevant countries] because of the confusing role that was played by the African Union." DCA did not explain how the AUC's role was "confusing," and DCA ignored the fact that, pursuant to the Guidebook, the AUC had every right to promote one applicant over another. The AUC's decision to promote an applicant other than DCA did not convert the AUC's role from proper to improper or from clear to confusing.

24. Notably, long before the AUC opposed DCA's application, DCA itself recognized the AUC's important role in coordinating continent-wide technology initiatives. In 2009, DCA approached the AUC for its endorsement prior to seeking the support of individual African governments. DCA obtained the AUC's support at that time, including the AUC's commitment to "assist[] in the coordination of [the] initiative with African Ministers and Governments."

25. The AUC, however, then had a change of heart (which it was entitled to do, particularly given that the application window for gTLD applications had not yet opened and would not open for almost two more years). On 7 August 2010, African ministers in charge of Communication and Information Technologies for their respective countries signed the Abuja Declaration. In that declaration, the ministers requested that the AUC coordinate various projects aimed at promoting Information and Communication Technologies projects on the African continent. Among those projects was "set[ting] up the structure and modalities for the [i]mplementation of the DotAfrica Project."

26. Pursuant to that mandate, the AUC launched an open RFP process, seeking applications from private organizations (including DCA) interested in operating the .AFRICA gTLD. The AUC notified DCA that "following consultations with relevant stakeholders . . . [it] no longer endorse[d] individual initiatives [for .AFRICA]." Instead, "in coordination with the Member States . . . the [AUC] w[ould] go through [an] open [selection]

process"—hardly an inappropriate decision (and not a decision of ICANN or its Board). DCA then refused to participate in the RFP process, thereby setting up an inevitable clash with whatever entity the AUC selected. When DCA submitted its gTLD application in 2012 and attached its 2009 endorsement letter from the AUC, DCA knew full well (but did not disclose) that the AUC had retracted its support.

27. In sum, the objecting governments' concerns were the result of DCA's own decision to boycott the AUC's selection process, resulting in the selection of a different applicant, ZACR, for .AFRICA. Instead of addressing those governments' concerns, and instead of obtaining the necessary support of 60% of the countries on the African continent, DCA asked ICANN to re-write the Guidebook in DCA's favor by eliminating the most important feature of any gTLD application related to a geographic region—the support of the countries in that region. ICANN, in accordance with its Bylaws, Articles and Guidebook, properly ignored DCA's request to change the rules for DCA's benefit.

28. At its 10 April 2013 meeting in Beijing, the GAC advised ICANN that DCA's application for .AFRICA should not proceed.[40] As noted earlier, the GAC operates on the basis of consensus: if a single GAC member at the 10 April 2013 meeting (from any continent, not just from Africa) had opposed the advice, the advice would not have been considered "consensus."[41] As such, the fact that the GAC issued consensus GAC Advice against DCA's application shows that not a single country opposed that advice. Most importantly, this included Kenya: Michael Katundu, the GAC Representative for Kenya, and Kenya's only official GAC representative,was present at the 10 April 2013 Beijing meeting and did not oppose the issuance of the consensus GAC Advice.

29. DCA attempts to argue that the GAC Advice was not consensus advice and relies solely on the purported email objection of Sammy Buruchara, Kenya's GAC advisor (as opposed to GAC representative). As a preliminary matter (and as DCA now appears to acknowledge), the GAC's Operating Principles require that votes on GAC advice be made in person. Operating Principle 19 provides that:

If a Member's accredited representative, or alternate representative, is not present at a meeting, then it shall be taken that the Member government or organisation is not represented at that meeting. Any decision made by the GAC without the participation of a Member's accredited representative shall stand and nonetheless be valid.

Similarly, Operating Principle 40 provides:

One third of the representatives of the Current Membership with voting rights shall constitute a quorum at any meeting. A quorum shall only be necessary for any meeting at which a decision or decisions must be made. The GAC may conduct its general business face-to-face or online.

25. DCA argues that Mr. Buruchara objected to the GAC Advice via email, but even if objections could be made via email (which they cannot), Mr. Katundu, Kenya's GAC representative who was in Beijing at the GAC

meeting, not Mr. Buruchara, Kenya's GAC advisor, was authorized to speak on Kenya's behalf. Accordingly, under the GAC rules, Mr. Buruchara's email exchanges could not have constituted opposition to the GAC Advice.

26. Moreover, the full text of Mr. Buruchara's emails (only a small portion of which DCA included in it IRP Notice) demonstrate that he withdrew any opposition to the issuance of the consensus GAC Advice against DCA's application. And, tellingly, DCA did not to submit a declaration from Mr. Buruchara, which might have provided context or support for DCA's argument.

27. The complete email chain discussing the proposed advice included several branches and a number of drafts of, and revisions to, the proposed GAC advice. Mr. Buruchara's last email on the topic was made in response to Michel Tchonang, Cameroon's GAC representative. Mr. Tchonang had written to express his disagreement with Mr. Buruchara's earlier-expressed opposition to the proposed GAC advice. Mr. Tchonang reminded Mr. Buruchara that Kenya had previously agreed to the Abuja Declaration, and that Kenya's ICT minister had written a letter supporting the RFP process for .AFRICA. Mr. Buruchara responded that he "did not object to the AUC's position," and that while Kenya "support[ed] the AUC's preferred candidate," ZACR, he would prefer that the GAC "support/endorse the preferred candidate and leave the rest of the process to the Evaluation committee." Mr. Tchonang responded: "We are a team, let us have a unified voice." At this, Mr. Buruchara responded that "[c]ertainly as AUC, we are united on this one and I am glad my position is clarified."

28. Notably, immediately prior to becoming Kenya's GAC advisor, Mr. Buruchara had served as the chairman of DCA's Strategic Advisory Board. But despite Mr. Buruchara's close ties with DCA and with Ms. Bekele, the Kenyan government had: (i) endorsed the Abuja Declaration; (ii) supported the AUC's processes for selecting the proposed registry operator; and (iii) issued an Early Warning objecting to DCA's application.

In other words, the Kenyan government was officially on record as supporting ZACR's application and opposing DCA's application, regardless of what Mr. Buruchara was writing in emails.

29. Furthermore, correspondence produced by DCA in this proceeding (but not referenced in either of DCA's briefs) shows that, despite Ms. Bekele's and Mr. Buruchara's efforts to obtain the support (or at least non-opposition) of the Kenyan government, the Kenyan government had rescinded its earlier support of DCA in favor of ZACR. For example, in February 2013, Ms. Bekele emailed a Kenyan government official asking that Kenya issue an Early Warning regarding ZACR's application. The official responded that he would have to escalate the matter to the Foreign Ministry because the Kenyan president "was part of the leaders of the AU who endorsed AU to be the custodian of dot Africa." On 10 April 2013, Ms. Bekele emailed Mr. Buruchara, asking him to make further points objecting to the proposed GAC advice. Mr. Buruchara responded that he was unable to do so because the Kenyan government had been informed (erroneously informed, according to Mr. Buruchara), that Mr. Buruchara was "contradict[ing] the Heads of State agreement in Abuja." On 8 July 2013,

Mr. Buruchara explained to Ms. Bekele that he "stuck [his] neck out for DCA inspite [*sic*] of lack of Govt support."

30. Because DCA did not submit a declaration from Mr. Buruchara (and because Ms. Bekele's declaration is, of course, limited to her own interpretation of email correspondence drafted by others), the Panel is left with a record demonstrating that: (i) Mr.

Buruchara was not authorized by the Kenyan government to oppose the GAC Advice; (ii) even if he had been so authorized, Mr. Buruchara withdrew his initial purported opposition to the GAC Advice; and (iii) the actual GAC representative from Kenya (Mr. Katundu) attended the 10 April 2013 meeting in Beijing and did not oppose the issuance of the consensus GAC Advice that DCA's application for .AFRICA should not proceed.

31. In short, DCA's primary argument in support of this Independent Review proceeding—that the GAC should not have issued consensus advice against DCA's application—is not supported by any evidence and is, instead, fully contradicted by the evidence. And, of course, Independent Review proceedings do not test whether the GAC's conduct was appropriate (even though in this instance there is no doubt that the GAC appropriately issued consensus advice).

32. As noted above, pursuant to the Guidebook, GAC consensus advice that a particular application should not proceed creates a "strong presumption for the ICANN Board that the application should not be approved." The ICANN Board would have been required to develop a reasoned and well-supported rationale for not accepting the consensus GAC Advice; no such reason existed at the time the NGPC resolved to accept that GAC Advice (5 June 2013), and no such reason has since been revealed. The consensus GAC Advice against DCA's application was issued in the ordinary course, it reflected the sentiment of numerous countries on the African continent, and it was never rescinded.

33. DCA's objection to the Board's acceptance of the GAC Advice is twofold. First, DCA argues that the NGPC failed to investigate DCA's allegation that the GAC advice was not consensus advice. Second, DCA argues that the NGPC should have consulted an independent expert prior to accepting the advice. DCA also argued in its IRP Notice that two NGPC members had conflicts of interest when they voted to accept the GAC Advice, but DCA does not pursue that argument in its Memorial (and the facts again demonstrate that DCA's argument is incorrect).

34. As to the first argument, the Guidebook provides that, when the Board receives GAC advice regarding a particular application, it publishes that advice and notifies the applicant. The applicant is given 21 days from the date of the publication of the advice to submit a response to the Board. Those procedures were followed here. Upon receipt of the GAC Advice, ICANN posted the advice and provided DCA with an opportunity to respond. DCA submitted a lengthy response explaining "[w]hy DCA Trust disagree[d]" with the GAC Advice. A primary theme was that its application had been unfairly blocked by the very countries whose support the Guidebook required DCA to obtain, and that the AUC should not have been allowed to endorse an applicant for .AFRICA. DCA argued that it had been

> unfairly "victimized" and "muzzled into insignificance" by the "collective power of the governments represented at ICANN," and that "the issue of government support [should] be made irrelevant in the process so that both contending applications for .Africa would be allowed to move forward . . . ." In other words, DCA was arguing that the AUC's input was inappropriate, and DCA was requesting that ICANN change the Guidebook requirement regarding governmental support for geographic names in order to accommodate DCA. ICANN's NGPC reviewed and appropriately rejected DCA's arguments.
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> 35. One of DCA's three "supplementary arguments," beginning on page 10 of its response to the GAC Advice, was that there had been no consensus GAC advice, in part allegedly evidenced by Mr. Buruchara's (incomplete) email addressed above. DCA, however, chose not to address the fact that: (i) DCA lacked the requisite support of the African governments; (ii) Mr. Buruchara was not the Kenyan GAC representative; (iii) Mr. Buruchara was not at the Beijing meeting; (iv) the government of Kenya had withdrawn any support it may have previously had for DCA's application; and (iv) the actual Kenyan GAC representative (Mr. Katundu) was at the ICANN meeting in Beijing and did not oppose the issuance of the GAC Advice against DCA's application for .AFRICA. All of these facts were well known to DCA at the time of its response to the GAC Advice.
>
> 36. The NGPC's resolution accepting the GAC Advice states that the NGPC considered DCA's response prior to accepting the GAC Advice, and DCA presents no evidence to the contrary. DCA's disagreement with the NGPC's decision does not, of course, demonstrate that the NGPC failed to exercise due diligence in determining to accept the consensus GAC Advice.
>
> 37. As to DCA's suggestion that the NGPC should have consulted an independent expert, the Guidebook provides that it is within the Board's discretion to decide whether to consult with an independent expert:
>
> ICANN will consider the GAC Advice on New gTLDs as soon as practicable. The Board may consult with independent experts, such as those designated to hear objections in the New gTLD Dispute Resolution Procedure, in cases where the issues raised in the GAC advice are pertinent to one of the subject matter areas of the objection procedures.
>
> The NGPC clearly did not violate its Bylaws, Articles or Guidebook in deciding that it did not need to consult any independent expert regarding the GAC Advice. Because DCA's challenge to the GAC Advice was whether one or more countries actually had opposed the advice, there was no reason for the NGPC to retain an "expert" on that subject, and DCA has never stated what useful information an independent expert possibly could have provided.

89. ICANN also submits that the NGPC properly denied DCA's request for reconsideration, ICANN's actions following the acceptance of the GAC Advice are not relevant to the IRP, and in any event they were not improper, the ICANN staff directed the ICC to treat the two

African applications consistently, and ICANN staff did not violate any policy in drafting a template letter at the AUC request.

90. According to ICANN:

> 38. DCA argues that the NGPC improperly denied DCA's Reconsideration Request, which sought reconsideration of the NGPC's acceptance of the GAC Advice. Reconsideration is an accountability mechanism available under ICANN's Bylaws and administered by ICANN's Board Governance Committee ("BGC"). DCA's Reconsideration Request asked that the NGPC's acceptance of the GAC Advice be rescinded and that DCA's application be reinstated. Pursuant to the Bylaws, reconsideration of a Board (or in this case NGPC) action is appropriate only where the NGPC took an action "without consideration of material information" or in "reliance on false or inaccurate material information."
>
> 39. In its Reconsideration Request, DCA argued (as it does here) that the NGPC failed to consider material information by failing to consult with an independent expert prior to accepting the GAC Advice. The BGC noted that DCA had not identified any material information that the NGPC had not considered, and that DCA had not identified what advice an independent expert could have provided to the NGPC or how such advice might have altered the NGPC's decision to accept the GAC Advice. The BGC further noted that, as discussed above, the Guidebook is clear that the decision to consult an independent expert is at the discretion of the NGPC.
>
> 40. DCA does not identify any Bylaws or Articles provision that the NGPC violated in denying the Reconsideration Request. Instead, DCA simply disagrees with the NGPC's determination that DCA had not identified any material information on which the NGPC failed to rely. That disagreement is not a proper basis for a Reconsideration Request or an IRP. DCA also argues (again without citing to the Bylaws or Articles) that, because the NGPC accepted the GAC Advice, the NGPC could not properly consider DCA's Reconsideration Request. In fact, the DCA's Reconsideration Request was handled exactly in the manner prescribed by ICANN's Bylaws: the BGC—a separate Board committee charged with considering Reconsideration Requests—reviewed the material and provided a recommendation to the NGPC. The NGPC then reviewed the BGC's recommendation and voted to accept it. In short, the various Board committees conducted themselves exactly as ICANN's Bylaws require.
>
> 41. The NGPC accepted the GAC Advice on 4 June 2013. As a result, DCA's application for .AFRICA did not proceed. In its Memorial, DCA attempts to cast aspersions on ICANN's evaluation of ZACR's application, but that evaluation has no bearing on whether the NGPC acted consistently with its Bylaws and Articles in handling the GAC advice related to DCA's application. Indeed, the evaluation of ZACR's application did not involve any action by ICANN's Board (or NGPC), and is therefore not a proper basis for Independent Review. Although the actions of ICANN's staff are not relevant to this proceeding, ICANN addresses DCA's allegations for the sake of thoroughness and because the record demonstrates that ZACR's application was evaluated fully in conformance with the Guidebook requirements.

42. DCA alleges that "ICANN staff worked with [the ICC] to ensure that ZACR, but not DCA, would be able to pass the GNP evaluation." DCA's argument is based on false and unsupported characterizations of the ICC's evaluation of the two .AFRICA applications.

43. First, DCA claims (without relevant citation) that ICANN determined that the AUC's endorsement would count as an endorsement from each of the AU's member states only after ICANN had stopped processing DCA's application. In fact, the record indicates that ICANN accepted the ICC's recommendation that the AUC's endorsement would qualify as an endorsement from each of the AU's member states while DCA's application was still in contention, at a time when the recommendation had the potential to benefit both applicants for .AFRICA (had DCA also in fact received the AUC's support).

44. The Guidebook provides that the Geographic Names Panel is responsible for "verifying the relevance and authenticity of supporting documentation." Accordingly, it was the ICC's responsibility to evaluate how the AUC's endorsement should be treated. The ICC recommended that the AUC's endorsement should count as an endorsement from each of the AU's member states. The ICC's analysis was based on the Abuja Declaration, which the ICC interpreted as "instruct[ing] the [AUC] to pursue the DotAfrica project, and in [the ICC's] independent opinion, provide[d] suitable evidence of support from relevant governments or public authorities." The evidence shows that ICANN accepted the ICC's recommendation before the NGPC accepted the GAC Advice regarding DCA's application— in a 26 April 2013 email discussing the preparation of clarifying questions regarding the AUC's letters of support, ICANN explained to the ICC that "if the applicant(s) is/are unable to obtain a revised letter of support from the AU [], they may be able to fulfill the requirements by approaching the individual governments."

45. DCA also claims that ICANN determined that endorsements from the UNECA would not be taken into account for geographic evaluations. This simply is not true. Pursuant to the ICC's advice, the UNECA's endorsement was taken into account. Like the AUC, the UNECA had signed letters of support for both DCA and ZACR. The ICC advised that because the UNECA was specifically named in the Abuja Declaration, it too should be treated as a relevant public authority. ICANN accepted the ICC's advice.

46. DCA argues that, after ICANN had stopped processing DCA's application, ICANN staff improperly assisted the AUC in drafting a support letter for ZACR. As is reflected in the clarifying questions the ICC drafted regarding the endorsement letters submitted on behalf of each of the two .AFRICA applications, the Guidebook contains specific requirements for letters of support from governments and public authorities. In addition to "clearly express[ing] the government's or public authority's support for or non- objection to the applicant's application," letters must "demonstrate the government's or public authority's understanding of the string being requested and its intended use" and that "the string is being sought through the gTLD application process and that the applicant is willing to accept the conditions under which the string will be available, i.e., entry into a registry agreement with ICANN . . . ". In light of these specific requirements, the Guidebook even includes a sample letter of support.

> 47. The first letter of support that the AUC submitted for ZACR's application did not follow the correct format and resulted in a clarifying question from the ICC. As a result, the AUC requested ICANN staff's assistance in drafting a letter that conformed to the Guidebook's requirements. ICANN staff drafted a template based on the sample letter of support in the Guidebook, and the AUC then made significant edits to that template. DCA paints this cooperation as nefarious, but there was absolutely nothing wrong with ICANN staff assisting the AUC, assistance that DCA would certainly have welcomed, and which ICANN would have provided, had the AUC been supporting DCA instead of ZACR.

91. Finally, ICANN submits:

> 50. ICANN's conduct with respect to DCA's application for .AFRICA was fully consistent with ICANN's Bylaws, its Articles of Incorporation and the Applicant Guidebook. ICANN acted through open and transparent processes, evaluated DCA's application for .AFRICA in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Guidebook, and followed the procedures set forth in its Bylaws in evaluating DCA's Request for Reconsideration. ICANN provided assistance to those who requested, cooperated with governmental authorities, and respected the consensus advice issued by the GAC, which speaks on behalf of the governments of the world.
>
> 51. DCA knew, as did all applicants for new gTLDs, that some of the applications would be rejected. There can only be one registry operator for each gTLD string, and in the case of strings that relate to geographic regions, no application can succeed without the significant support of the countries in that region. There is no justification whatsoever for DCA's repeated urging that the support (or lack thereof) of the countries on the African continent be made irrelevant to the process.
>
> 52. Ultimately, the majority of the countries in Africa chose to support another application for the .AFRICA gTLD, and decided to oppose DCA's application. At a critical time, no country stood up to defend DCA's application. These countries—and the AUC— had every right to take a stand and to support the applicant of their choice. In this instance, that choice resulted in the GAC issuing consensus advice, which the GAC had every right to do. Nothing in ICANN's Bylaws or Articles, or in the Guidebook, required ICANN to challenge that decision, to ignore that decision, or to change the rules so that the input of the AUC, much less the GAC, would become irrelevant. To the contrary, the AUC's role with respect to the African community is critical, and it was DCA's decision to pursue a path at odds with the AUC that placed its application in jeopardy, not anything that ICANN (or ICANN's Board or the NGPC) did. The NGPC did exactly what it was supposed to do in this circumstance, and ICANN urges this IRP Panel to find as such. Such a finding would allow the countries of Africa to soon provide their citizens with what all parties involved believe to be a very important step for Africa – access to .AFRICA on the internet.

The Panel's Decision

92. The Panel in this IRP, has been asked to determine whether, in the case of the application of DCA Trust for the delegation of the .AFRICA top-level domain name in its 2012 General Top-Level Domains ("gTLD") Internet Expansion Program (the "New gTLD Program"), the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

93. After reviewing the documentation filed in this IRP, reading the Parties' respective written submissions, reading the written statements and listening to the testimony of the three witnesses brought forward, listening to the oral presentations of the Parties' legal representatives at the hearing in Washington, D.C., reading the transcript of the hearing, and deliberating, the Panel is of the unanimous view that certain actions and inactions of the ICANN Board (as described below) with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

94. ICANN is bound by its own Articles of Incorporation to act fairly, neutrally, non-discriminatorily and to enable competition. Article 4 of ICANN's Articles of Incorporation sets this out explicitly:

> 4. The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its Bylaws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations.

95. ICANN is also bound by its own Bylaws to act and make decisions "neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness."

96. These obligations and others are explicitly set out in a number of provisions in ICANN's Bylaws:

> **ARTICLE I: MISSION AND CORE (Council of Registrars) VALUES**
>
> **Section 2. CORE (Council of Registrars) VALUES**
>
> In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers):

1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.

[…]

7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process.

8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected.

10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers)'s effectiveness.

11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations.

These core values are deliberately expressed in very general terms, so that they may provide useful and relevant guidance in the broadest possible range of circumstances. Because they are not narrowly prescriptive, the specific way in which they apply, individually and collectively, to each new situation will necessarily depend on many factors that cannot be fully anticipated or enumerated; and because they are statements of principle rather than practice, situations will inevitably arise in which perfect fidelity to all eleven core values simultaneously is not possible. Any ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) body making a recommendation or decision shall exercise its judgment to determine which core values are most relevant and how they apply to the specific circumstances of the case at hand, and to determine, if necessary, an appropriate and defensible balance among competing values.

ARTICLE II: POWERS

Section 1. GENERAL POWERS

Except as otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws, the powers of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) shall be exercised by, and its property controlled and its business and affairs conducted by or under the direction of, the Board.

Section 3. NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT

ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures, or practices inequitably or single out any particular party for disparate treatment unless justified by

> substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.
>
> **ARTICLE III: TRANSPARENCY**
>
> **Section 1. PURPOSE**
>
> ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) and **its constituent bodies** shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent **with procedures designed to ensure fairness**. [Underlining and bold is that of the Panel]

97. As set out in Article IV (Accountability and Review) of ICANN's Bylaws, in carrying out its mission as set out in its Bylaws, ICANN should be accountable to the community for operating in a manner that is consistent with these Bylaws and with due regard for the core values set forth in Article I of the Bylaws.

98. As set out in Section 3 (Independent Review of Board Actions) of Article IV, "any person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board that he or she asserts is inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws may submit a request for independent review of that decision or action. In order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and casually connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or Articles of Incorporation, and not as a result of third parties acting in line with the Board's action."

99. In this IRP, among the allegations advanced by DCA Trust against ICANN, is that the ICANN Board, and its constituent body, the GAC, breached their obligation to act transparently and in conformity with procedures that ensured fairness. In particular, DCA Trust criticizes the ICANN Board here, for allowing itself to be guided by the GAC, a body "with apparently no distinct rules, limited public records, fluid definitions of membership and quorums" and unfair procedures in dealing with the issues before it.

100. According to DCA Trust, ICANN itself asserts that the GAC is a "constituent body." The exchange between the Panel and counsel for ICANN at the in-person hearing in Washington, D.C. is a living proof of that point.

> **HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:**
>
> Are you saying we should only look at what the Board does? The reason I'm asking is that your -- the Bylaws say that ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate, to the maximum extent feasible, in an open and transparent manner. Does the constituent bodies include, I don't know,

GAC or anything? What is "constituent bodies"?

MR. LEVEE:

Yeah. What I'll talk to you about tomorrow in closing when I lay out what an IRP Panel is supposed to address, the Bylaws are very clear. Independent Review Proceedings are for the purpose of testing conduct or inaction of the ICANN Board. They don't apply to the GAC. They don't apply to supporting organizations. They don't apply to Staff.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

So you think that the situation is a -- we shouldn't be looking at what the constituent -- whatever the constituent bodies are, even though that's part of your Bylaws?

MR. LEVEE:

Well, when I say not -- when you say not looking, part of DCA's claims that the GAC did something wrong and that ICANN knew that.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

So is GAC a constituent body?

MR. LEVEE:

It is a constituent body, to be clear –

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Yeah.

MR. LEVEE:

-- whether -- I don't think an IRP Panel -- if the only thing that happened here was that the GAC did something wrong --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Right.

MR. LEVEE:

-- an IRP Panel would not be -- an Independent Review Proceeding is not supposed to address that, whether the GAC did something wrong.

Now, if ICANN knew -- the Board knew that the GAC did something wrong, and that's how they link it, they say, Look, the GAC did something wrong, and ICANN knew it, the Board -- if the Board actually knew it, then we're dealing with Board conduct.

The Board knew that the GAC did not, in fact, issue consensus advice. That's the allegation. So it's fair to look at the GAC's conduct.

101. The Panel is unanimously of the view that the GAC is a constituent body of ICANN. This is not only clear from the above exchange between the Panel and counsel for ICANN, but also from Article XI (Advisory Committees) of ICANN's Bylaws and the Operating Principles of the GAC. Section 1 (General) of Article XI of ICANN's Bylaws states:

> The Board may create one or more Advisory Committees in addition to those set forth in this Article. Advisory Committee membership may consist of Directors only, Directors and non-directors, or non-directors only, and may also include non-voting or alternate members. Advisory Committees shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), but shall report their findings and recommendations to the Board.

Section 2, under the heading, Specific Advisory Committees states:

> There shall be at least the following Advisory Committees:
>
> 1. Governmental Advisory Committee
>
> a. The Governmental Advisory Committee should consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers)'s policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues. [Underlining is that of the Panel]

Section 6 of the preamble of GAC's Operating Principles is also relevant. That Section reads as follows:

> The GAC commits itself to implement efficient procedures in support of ICANN and to provide thorough and timely advice and analysis on relevant matters of concern with regard to government and public interests.

102. According to DCA Trust, based on the above, and in particular, Article III (Transparency), Section 1 of ICANN's Bylaws, therefore, the GAC was bound to the transparency and fairness obligations of that provision to "operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness", but as ICANN's own witness, Ms. Heather Dryden acknowledged during the hearing, the GAC did not act with transparency or in a manner designed to insure fairness.

> **Mr. ALI:**
>
> Q. But what was the purpose of the discussion at the Prague meeting with respect to AUC? If there really is no difference or distinction between voting/nonvoting, observer or whatever might be the opposite of observer,

or the proper terminology, what was -- what was the point?

THE WITNESS:

A. I didn't say there was no difference. The issue is that there isn't GAC agreement about what are the -- the rights, if you will, of -- of entities like the AUC. And there might be in some limited circumstances, but it's also an extremely sensitive issue. And so not all countries have a shared view about what those -- those entities, like the AUC, should be able to do.

Q. So not all countries share the same view as to what entities, such as the AUC, should be able to do. Is that what you said? I'm sorry. I didn't --

A. Right, because that would only get clarified if there is a circumstance where that link is forced. In our business, we talk about creative ambiguity. We leave things unclear so we don't have conflict.

103. As explained by ICANN in its Closing Presentation at the hearing, ICANN's witness, Ms. Heather Dryden also asserted that the GAC Advice was meaningless until the Board acted upon it. This last point is also clear from examining Article I, Principle 2 and 5 of ICANN GAC's Operating Principles. Principle 2 states that "the GAC is not a decision making body" and Principle 5 states that "the GAC shall have no legal authority to act for ICANN".

MR. ALI:

Q. I would like to know what it is that you, as the GAC Chair, understand to be the consequences of the actions that the GAC will take --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

The GAC will take?

MR. ALI:

Q. -- the GAC will take -- the consequences of the actions taken by the GAC, such as consensus advice?

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

There you go.

THE WITNESS:

That isn't my concern as the Chair. It's really for the Board to interpret the outputs coming from the GAC.

104. Ms. Dryden also stated that the GAC made its decision without providing any rationale and primarily based on politics and not on potential violations of national laws and sensitivities.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

So, basically, you're telling us that the GAC takes a decision to object to an applicant, and no reasons, no rationale, no discussion of the concepts that are in the rules?

THE WITNESS:

I'm telling you the GAC did not provide a rationale. And that was not a requirement for issuing a GAC --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

But you also want to check to see if the countries are following the right -- following the rules, if there are reasons for rejecting this or it falls within the three things that my colleague's talking about.

THE WITNESS:

The practice among governments is that governments can express their view, whatever it may be. And so there's a deference to that.

That's certainly the case here as well.

105. ICANN was bound by its Bylaws to conduct adequate diligence to ensure that it was applying its procedures fairly. Section 1 of Article III of ICANN's Bylaws, require it and its constituent bodies to "operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. The Board must also as per Article IV, Section 3, Paragraph 4 exercise due diligence and care in having a reasonable amount of facts in front of it.

106. In this case, on 4 June 2013, the NGPC accepted the GAC Objection Advice to stop processing DCA Trust's application. On 1 August 2013, the BGC recommended to the NGPC that it deny DCA Trust's Request for Reconsideration of the NGPC's 4 June 2013 decision, and on 13 August 2013, the NGPC accepted the BGC's recommendation (i.e., the NGPC declined to reconsider its own decision) without any further consideration.

107. In this case, ICANN through the BGC was bound to conduct a meaningful review of the NGPC's decision. According to ICANN's Bylaws, Article IV, Section 2, the Board has designated the Board Governance Committee to review and consider any such Reconsideration Requests. The [BGC] shall have the authority to, among other things, conduct whatever factual investigation is deemed appropriate, and request additional written submissions from the affected party, or from others.

108. Finally, the NGPC was not bound by – nor was it required to give deference to – the decision of the BGC.

109. The above, combined with the fact that DCA Trust was never given any notice or an opportunity in Beijing or elsewhere to make its position known or defend its own interests before the GAC reached consensus on the GAC Objection Advice, and that the Board of ICANN did not take any steps to address this issue, leads this Panel to conclude that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were not procedures designed to insure the fairness required by Article III, Sec. 1 above, and are therefore inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

110. The following excerpt of exchanges between the Panel and one of ICANN's witnesses, Ms. Heather Dryden, the then Chair of the GAC, provides a useful background for the decisions reached in this IRP:

> **PRESIDENT BARIN:**
>
> But be specific in this case. Is that what happened in the .AFRICA case?
>
> **THE WITNESS:**
>
> The decision was very quick, and --
>
> **PRESIDENT BARIN:**
>
> But what about the consultations prior? In other words, were -- were you privy to --
>
> **THE WITNESS:**
>
> No. If -- if colleagues are talking among themselves, then that's not something that the GAC, as a whole, is -- is tracking or -- or involved in. It's really those interested countries that are.
>
> **PRESIDENT BARIN:**
>
> Understood. But I assume -- I also heard you say, as the Chair, you never want to be surprised with something that comes up. So you are aware of -- or you were aware of exactly what was happening?
>
> **THE WITNESS:**
>
> No. No. You do want to have a good sense of where the problems are, what's going to come unresolved back to the full GAC meeting, but that's -- that's the extent of it.

And that's the nature of -- of the political process.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Were you surprised when Uganda said, I want to keep this on the calendar?

THE WITNESS:

No.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Because why?

THE WITNESS:

It's -- it's -- I didn't have particular expectation –

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Okay.

THE WITNESS:

-- that question was addressed via having that meeting.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And what's your understanding of what -- what the consequence of that decision is or was when you took it? So what happens from that moment on?

THE WITNESS:

It's conveyed to the Board, so all the results, the agreed language coming out of GAC is conveyed to the Board, as was the case with the communiqué from the Beijing meeting.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And how is that conveyed to the Board?

THE WITNESS:

Well, it's a written document, and usually Support Staff are forwarding it to Board Staff.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

Could you speak a little bit louder? I don't know whether I am tired, but I --

THE WITNESS:

Okay. So as I was saying, the document is conveyed to the Board once it's concluded.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

When you say “the document”, are you referring to the communiqué?

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Okay. And there are no other documents?

THE WITNESS:

The communiqué --

PRESIDENT BARIN:

In relation to .AFRICA. I'm not interested in any other.

THE WITNESS:

Yes, it's the communiqué.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And it's prepared by your staff? You look at it?

THE WITNESS:

Right --

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And then it's sent over to --

THE WITNESS:

-- right, it's agreed by the GAC in full, the contents.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And then sent over to the Board?

THE WITNESS:

And then sent, yes.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And what happens to that communiqué? Does the Board receive that and say, Ms. Dryden, we have some questions for you on this, or --

THE WITNESS:

Not really. If they have questions for clarification, they can certainly ask that in a meeting. But it is for them to receive that and then interpret it and -- and prepare the Board for discussion or decision.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Okay. And in this case, you weren't asked any questions or anything?

THE WITNESS:

I don't believe so. I don't recall.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Any follow-ups, right?

THE WITNESS:

Right.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

And in the subsequent meeting, I guess the issue was tabled. The Board meeting that it was tabled, were you there?

THE WITNESS:

Yes. I don't particularly recall the meeting, but yes.

[…]

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

Can I turn your attention to Paragraph 5 of your declaration?

Here, you basically repeat what is in the ICANN Guidebook literature, whatever. These are the exact words, actually, that you use in your declaration in terms of why there could be an objection to an applicant -- to a specific applicant. And you use three criteria: problematic, potentially violating national law, and raise sensitivities.

Now, I'd like you to, for us -- for our benefit, to explain precisely, as concrete as you can be, what those three concepts -- how those three concepts translate in the DCA case. Because this must have been discussed in order to get this very quick decision that you are mentioning. So I'd like to understand, you know, because these are the criteria -- these are the three criteria; is that correct?

THE WITNESS:

That is what the witness statement says, but the link to the GAC and the role that I played in terms of the GAC discussion did not involve me interpreting those three things. In fact, the GAC did not provide rationale for the consensus objection.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

No.

But, I mean, look, the GAC is taking a decision which -- very quickly -- I'm using your words, "very quickly" -- erases years and years and years of work, a lot of effort that have been put by a single applicant. And the way I understand the rules is that the -- the GAC advice -- consensus advice against that applicant are -- is based on those three criteria. Am I wrong in that analysis?

THE WITNESS:

I'm saying that the GAC did not identify a rationale for those governments that put forward a string or an application for consensus objection. They might have identified their reasons, but there was not GAC agreement about those reasons or -- or -- or -- or rationale for that. We had some discussion earlier about Early Warnings. So Early Warnings were issued by individual countries, and they indicated their rationale. But, again, that's not a GAC view.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

So, basically, you're telling us that the GAC takes a decision to object to an applicant, and no reasons, no rationale, no discussion of the concepts that are in the rules?

THE WITNESS:

I'm telling you the GAC did not provide a rationale. And that was not a requirement for issuing a GAC --

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

But you also want to check to see if the countries are following the right -- following the rules, if there are reasons for rejecting this or it falls within the three things that my colleague's talking about.

THE WITNESS:

The practice among governments is that governments can express their view, whatever it may be. And so there's […] deference to that. That's certainly the case here as well. The -- if a country tells -- tells the GAC or says it has a concern, that's not really something that -- that's evaluated, in the sense you mean, by the other governments. That's not the way governments work with each other.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

So you don't go into the reasons at all with them?

THE WITNESS:

To issue a consensus objection, no.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

Okay. ---

[…]

PRESIDENT BARIN:

I have one question for you. We spent, now, a bit of time or a considerable amount of time talking to you about the process, or the procedure leading to the consensus decision.

Can you tell me what your understanding is of why the GAC consensus objection was made finally?

[…]

But in terms of the .AFRICA, the decision -- the issue came up, the agenda -- the issue came up, and you made a decision, correct?

THE WITNESS:

The GAC made a decision.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

Right. When I say “you”, I mean the GAC.

Do you know -- are you able to express to us what your understanding of the substance behind that decision was? I mean, in other words, we've spent a bit of time dealing with the process.

Can you tell us why the decision happened?

THE WITNESS:

The sum of the GAC’s advice is reflected in its written advice in the communiqué. That is the view to GAC. That's -- that's --

[…]

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

I just want to come back to the point that I was making earlier. To your Paragraph 5, you said -- you answered to me saying that is my declaration, but it was not exactly what's going on. Now, we are here to --

at least the way I understand the Panel's mandate, to make sure that the rules have been obeyed by, basically. I'm synthesizing. So I don't understand how, as the Chair of the GAC, you can tell us that, basically, the rules do not matter -- again, I'm rephrasing what you said, but I'd like to give you another opportunity to explain to us why you are mentioning those criteria in your written declaration, but, now, you're telling us this doesn't matter.

If you want to read again what you wrote, or supposedly wrote, it's Paragraph 5.

THE WITNESS:

I don't need to read again my declaration. Thank you. The header for the GAC's discussions throughout was to refer to strings or applications that were controversial or sensitive. That's very broad. And –

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

I'm sorry. You say the rules say problematic, potentially violate national law, raise sensitivities. These are precise concepts.

THE WITNESS:

Problematic, violate national law -- there are a lot of laws -- and sensitivities does strike me as being quite broad.

[…]

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

Okay. So we are left with what? No rules?

THE WITNESS:

No rationale with the consensus objections.

That's the -- the effect.

ARBITRATOR KESSEDJIAN:

I'm done.

HONORABLE JUDGE CAHILL:

I'm done.

PRESIDENT BARIN:

So am I.

111. The Panel understands that the GAC provides advice to the ICANN Board on matters of public policy, especially in cases where ICANN activities and policies may interact with national laws or international agreements. The Panel also understands that GAC advice is developed through consensus among member nations. Finally, the Panel understands that although the ICANN Board is required to consider GAC advice and recommendations, it is not obligated to follow those recommendations.

112. Paragraph IV of ICANN's Beijing, People's Republic of China 11 April 2013 Communiqué [Exhibit C-43] under the heading "GAC Advice to the ICANN Board" states:

> **IV. GAC Advice to the ICANN Board**
> **1. New gTLDs**
> **a. GAC Objections to the Specific Applications**
> **i. The GAC Advises the ICANN Board that:**
>
> i. The GAC has reached consensus on GAC Objection Advice according to Module 3.1 part I of the Applicant Guidebook on the following applications:
>
> 1. The application for .africa (Application number 1-1165-42560)
>
> […]

Footnote 3 to Paragraph IV.1. (a)(i)(i) above in the original text adds, "Module 3.1: The GAC advises ICANN that it is the consensus of the GAC that a particular application should not proceed. This will create a strong presumption for the ICANN Board that the application should not be approved." A similar statement in this regard can be found in paragraph 5 of Ms. Dryden's 7 February 2014 witness statement.

113. In light of the clear "Transparency" obligation provisions found in ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel would have expected the ICANN Board to, at a minimum, investigate the matter further before rejecting DCA Trust's application.

114. The Panel would have had a similar expectation with respect to the NGPC Response to the GAC Advice regarding .AFRICA which was expressed in ANNEX 1 to NGPC Resolution No. 2013.06.04.NG01 [Exhibit C-45]. In that document, in response to DCA Trust's application, the NGPC stipulated:

> The NGPC accepts this advice. The AGB provides that "if GAC advised ICANN that it is the consensus of the GAC that a particular application should not proceed. This will create a strong presumption for the ICANN Board that the application should not be approved. The NGPC directs staff that pursuant to the GAC advice and Section 3.1 of the Applicant Guidebook, Application number 1-1165-42560 for .africa will not be approved. In accordance with the AGB the applicant may with draw […] or seek relief according to ICANN's accountability mechanisms (see ICANN's Bylaws, Articles IV and V) subject to the appropriate standing and procedural requirements.

115. Based on the foregoing, after having carefully reviewed the Parties' written submissions, listened to the testimony of the three witness, listened to the oral submissions of the Parties in various telephone conference calls and at the in-person hearing of this IRP in Washington, D.C. on 22 and 23 May 2015, and finally after much deliberation, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (c) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel declares that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

116. As indicated above, there are perhaps a number of other instances, including certain decisions made by ICANN, that did not proceed in the manner and spirit in which they should have under the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

117. DCA Trust has criticized ICANN for its various actions and decisions throughout this IRP and ICANN has responded to each of these criticisms in detail. However, the Panel, having carefully considered these criticisms and decided that the above is dispositive of this IRP, it does not find it necessary to determine who was right, to what extent and for what reasons in respect to the other criticisms and other alleged shortcomings of the ICANN Board identified by DCA Trust.

2) Can the IRP Panel recommend a course of action for the Board to follow as a consequence of any declaration that the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook?

118. In the conclusion of its Memorial on the Merits filed with the Panel on 3 November 2014, DCA Trust submitted that ICANN should remove ZACR's application from the process altogether and allow DCA's application to proceed under the rules of the New gTLD Program, allowing DCA up to 18 months to negotiate with African governments

to obtain the necessary endorsements so as to enable the delegation and management of the .AFRICA string.

119. In its Final Request for Relief filed with the Panel on 23 May 2015, DCA Trust requested that this Panel recommend to the ICANN Board that it cease all preparations to delegate the .AFRICA gTLD to ZACR and recommend that ICANN permit DCA's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process and be granted a period of no less than 18 months to obtain Government support as set out in the AGB and interpreted by the Geographic Names Panel, or accept that the requirement is satisfied as a result of the endorsement of DCA Trust's application by UNECA.

120. DCA Trust also requested that this Panel recommend to ICANN that it compensate DCA Trust for the costs it has incurred as a result of ICANN's violations of its Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws and AGB.

121. In its response to DCA Trust's request for the recommendations set out in DCA Trust's Memorial on the Merits, ICANN submitted that this Panel does not have the authority to grant the affirmative relief that DCA Trust had requested.

122. According to ICANN:

> 48. DCA's request should be denied in its entirety, including its request for relief. DCA requests that this IRP Panel issue a declaration requiring ICANN to "rescind its contract with ZACR" and to "permit DCA's application to proceed through the remainder of the application process." Acknowledging that it currently lacks the requisite governmental support for its application, DCA also requests that it receive "18 months to negotiate with African governments to obtain the necessary endorsements." In sum, DCA requests not only that this Panel remove DCA's rival for .AFRICA from contention (requiring ICANN to repudiate its contract with ZACR), but also that it rewrite the Guidebook's rules in DCA's favor.
>
> 49. IRP Panels do not have authority to award affirmative relief. Rather, an IRP Panel is limited to stating its opinion as to "whether an action or inaction of the Board was inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws" and recommending (as this IRP Panel has done previously) that the Board stay any action or decision, or take any interim action until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP Panel. The Board will, of course, give extremely serious consideration to the Panel's recommendations.

123. In its response to DCA Trust's amended request for recommendations filed on 23 May 2015, ICANN argued that because the Panel's authority is limited to declaring whether the Board's conduct was inconsistent with the Articles or the Bylaws, the Panel should limit its declaration to that question and refrain from

recommending how the Board should then proceed in light of the Panel's declaration.

124. In response, DCA Trust submitted that according to ICANN's Bylaws, the Independent Review Process is designed to provide a remedy for "any" person materially affected by a decision or action by the Board. Further, "in order to be materially affected, the person must suffer injury or harm that is directly and causally connected to the Board's alleged violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation.

125. According to ICANN, "indeed, the ICANN New gTLD Program Committee, operating under the delegated authority of the ICANN Board, itself [suggests] that DCA could seek relief through ICANN's accountability mechanisms or, in other words, the Reconsideration process and the Independent Review Process." Furthermore:

> If the IRP mechanism – the mechanism of last resort for gTLD applicants – is intended to provide a remedy for a claimant materially injured or harmed by Board action or inaction, and it serves as the only alternative to litigation, then naturally the IRP Panel may recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress such injury or harm.

126. After considering the Parties' respective submissions in this regard, the Panel is of the view that it does have the power to recommend a course of action for the Board to follow as a consequence of any declaration that the Board acted or failed to act in a manner inconsistent with ICANN's Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws or the Applicant Guidebook.

127. Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN's Bylaws states:

> **ARTICLE IV: ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW**
> **Section 3. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BOARD ACTIONS**
>
> 11. The IRP Panel shall have the authority to:
>
> d. recommend that the Board stay any action or decision or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the opinion of the IRP.

128. The Panel finds that both the language and spirit of the above section gives it authority to recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress injury or harm that is directly related and causally connected to the Board's violation of the Bylaws or the Articles of Incorporation.

129. As DCA Trust correctly points out, with which statement the Panel agrees, "if the IRP mechanism – the mechanism of last resort for

gTLD applicants – is intended to provide a remedy for a claimant materially injured or harmed by Board action or inaction, and it serves as the only alternative to litigation, then naturally the IRP Panel may recommend how the ICANN Board might fashion a remedy to redress such injury or harm."

130. Use of the imperative language in Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN's Bylaws, is clearly supportive of this point. That provision clearly states that the IRP Panel has the authority to recommend a course of action until such time as the Board considers the opinion of the IRP and acts upon it.

131. Furthermore, use of the word "opinion", which means the formal statement by a judicial authority, court, arbitrator or "Panel" of the reasoning and the principles of law used in reaching a decision of a case, is demonstrative of the point that the Panel has the authority to recommend affirmative relief. Otherwise, like in section 7 of the Supplementary Procedures, the last sentence in paragraph 11 would have simply referred to the "declaration of the IRP". Section 7 under the heading "Interim Measures of Protection" says in part, that an "IRP PANEL may recommend that the Board stay any action or decision, or that the Board take any interim action, until such time as the Board reviews and acts upon the IRP declaration."

132. The scope of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN's Bylaws is clearly broader than Section 7 of the Supplementary Procedures.

133. Pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN's Bylaws, therefore, the Panel recommends that ICANN continue to refrain from delegating the .AFRICA gTLD and permit DCA Trust's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process.

3) Who is the prevailing party in this IRP?

134. In its letter of 1 July 2015, ICANN submits that, "ICANN believes that the Panel should and will determine that ICANN is the prevailing party. Even so, ICANN does not seek in this instance the putative effect that would result if DCA were required to reimburse ICANN for all of the costs that ICANN incurred. This IRP was much longer [than] anticipated (in part due to the passing of one of the panelists last summer), and the Panelists' fees were far greater than an ordinary IRP, particularly because the Panel elected to conduct a live hearing."

135. DCA Trust on the other hand, submits that, "should it prevail in this IRP, ICANN should be responsible for all of the costs of this IRP, including the interim measures proceeding." In particular, DCA Trust writes:

> On March 23, 2014, DCA learned via email from a supporter of ZA Central Registry ("ZACR"), DCA's competitor for .AFRICA, that ZACR would sign a registry agreement with ICANN in three days' time (March 26) to be the registry operator for .AFRICA. The very same day, we sent a letter on behalf of DCA to ICANN's counsel asking ICANN to refrain from executing the registry agreement with ZACR in light of the pending IRP proceedings. *See* DCA's Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection, Annex I (28 Mar. 2014). Instead, ICANN entered into the registry agreement with ZACR the very next day—two days ahead of schedule. […] Later that same day, ICANN responded to DCA's request by treating the execution of the contract as a *fait accompli* and, for the first time, informed DCA that it would accept the application of Rule 37 of the 2010 [ICDR Rules], which provides for emergency measures of protection, even though ICANN's Supplementary Procedures for ICANN Independent Review Process expressly provide that Rule 37 does not apply to IRPs. A few days later, on March 28, 2014, DCA filed a Request for Emergency Arbitrator and Interim Measures of Protection with the ICDR. ICANN responded to DCA's request on April 4, 2014. An emergency arbitrator was appointed by the ICDR; however, the following week, the original panel was fully constituted and the parties' respective submissions were submitted to the Panel for its review on April 13, 2014. After a teleconference with the parties on April 22 and a telephonic hearing on May 5, the Panel ruled that "ICANN must immediately refrain from any further processing of any application for .AFRICA" during the pendency of the IRP. Decision on Interim Measures of Protection, ¶ 51 (12 May 2014).

136. A review of the various procedural orders, decisions, and declarations in this IRP clearly indicates that DCA Trust prevailed in many of the questions and issues raised.

137. In its letter of 1 July 2015, DCA Trust refers to several instances in which ICANN was not successful in its position before this Panel. According to DCA Trust, the following are some examples, "ICANN's Request for Partial Reconsideration, ICANN's request for the Panel to rehear the proceedings, and the evidentiary treatment of ICANN's written witness testimony in the event it refused to make its witnesses available for questioning during the merits hearing."

138. The Panel has no doubt, as ICANN writes in its letter of 1 July 2015, that the Parties' respective positions in this IRP "were asserted in good faith." According to ICANN, "although those positions were in many instances diametrically opposed, ICANN does not doubt that DCA believed in the credibility of the positions that it took, and

[ICANN believes] that DCA feels the same about the positions ICANN took."

139. The above said, after reading the Parties' written submissions concerning the issue of costs and deliberation, the Panel is unanimously of the view that DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP.

4) Who is responsible for bearing the costs of this IRP and the cost of the IRP Provider?

140. DCA Trust submits that ICANN should be responsible for *all* costs of this IRP, including the interim measures proceeding. Among other arguments, DCA Trust submits:

> This is consistent with ICANN's Bylaws and Supplementary Procedures, which together provide that in ordinary circumstances, the party not prevailing shall be responsible for all costs of the proceeding. Although ICANN's Supplementary Procedures do not explain what is meant by "all costs of the proceeding," the ICDR Rules that apply to this IRP provide that "costs" include the following:
>
> > (a) the fees and expenses of the arbitrators;
> >
> > (b) the costs of assistance required by the tribunal, including its experts;
> >
> > (c) the fees and expenses of the administrator;
> >
> > (d) the reasonable costs for legal representation of a successful party; and
> >
> > (e) any such costs incurred in connection with an application for interim or emergency relief pursuant to Article 21.
>
> Specifically, these costs include all of the fees and expenses paid and owed to the [ICDR], including the filing fees DCA paid to the ICDR (totaling $4,750), all panelist fees and expenses, including for the emergency arbitrator, incurred between the inception of this IRP and its final resolution, legal costs incurred in the course of the IRP, and all expenses related to conducting the merits hearing (*e.g.*, renting the audiovisual equipment for the hearing, printing hearing materials, shipping hard copies of the exhibits to the members of the Panel).
>
> Although in "extraordinary" circumstances, the Panel may allocate up to half of the costs to the prevailing party, DCA submits that the circumstances of this IRP do not warrant allocating costs to DCA should it prevail. The reasonableness of DCA's positions, as well as the meaningful contribution this IRP has made to the public dialogue about both ICANN's accountability mechanisms and the appropriate deference owed by ICANN to its Governmental Advisory Committee, support a full award of costs to

> DCA.
>
> […]
>
> To the best of DCA's knowledge, this IRP was the first to be commenced against ICANN under the new rules, and as a result there was little guidance as to how these proceedings should be conducted. Indeed, at the very outset there was controversy about the applicable version of the Supplemental Rules as well as the form to be filed to initiate a proceeding. From the very outset, ICANN adopted positions on a variety of procedural issues that have increased the costs of these proceedings. In DCA's respectful submission, ICANN's positions throughout these proceedings are inconsistent with ICANN's obligations of transparency and the overall objectives of the IRP process, which is the only independent accountability mechanism available to parties such as DCA.

141. DCA Trust also submits that ICANN's conduct in this IRP increased the duration and expense of this IRP. For example, ICANN failed to appoint a standing panel, it entered into a registry agreement with DCA's competitor for .AFRICA during the pendency of this IRP, thereby forcing DCA Trust to request for interim measures of protection in order to preserve its right to a meaningful remedy, ICANN attempted to appeal declarations of the Panel on procedural matters where no appeal mechanism was provided for under the applicable procedures and rules, and finally, ICANN refused only a couple of months prior to the merits hearing, to make its witnesses available for viva voce questioning at the hearing.

142. ICANN in response submits that, "both the Bylaws and the Supplementary Procedures provide that, in the ordinary course, costs shall be allocated to the prevailing party. These costs include the Panel's fees and the ICDR's fees, [they] would also include the costs of the transcript."

143. ICANN explains on the other hand that this case was extraordinary and this Panel should exercise its discretion to have each side bear its own costs as this IRP "was in many senses a first of its kind." According to ICANN, among other things:

> This IRP was the first associated with the Board's acceptance of GAC advice that resulted in the blocking of an application for a new gTLD under the new gTLD Program;
>
> This was the first IRP associated with a claim that one or more ICANN Board members had a conflict of interest with a Board vote; and
>
> This was the first (and still only) IRP related to the New gTLD Program that involved a live hearing, with a considerable amount of debate associated with whether to have a hearing.

144. After reading the Parties' written submissions concerning the issue of costs and their allocation, and deliberation, the Panel is unanimous in deciding that DCA Trust is the prevailing party in this IRP and ICANN shall bear, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, Article 11 of Supplementary Procedures and Article 31 of the ICDR Rules, the totality of the costs of this IRP and the totality of the costs of the IRP Provider.

145. As per the last sentence of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, however, DCA Trust and ICANN shall each bear their own expenses, and they shall also each bear their own legal representation fees.

146. For the avoidance of any doubt therefore, the Panel concludes that ICANN shall be responsible for paying the following costs and expenses:

a) the fees and expenses of the panelists;
b) the fees and expenses of the administrator, the ICDR;
c) the fees and expenses of the emergency panelist incurred in connection with the application for interim emergency relief sought pursuant to the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules; and
d) the fees and expenses of the reporter associated with the hearing on 22 and 23 May 2015 in Washington, D.C.

147. The above amounts are easily quantifiable and the Parties are invited to cooperate with one another and the ICDR to deal with this part of this Final Declaration.

V. DECLARATION OF THE PANEL

148. Based on the foregoing, after having carefully reviewed the Parties' written submissions, listened to the testimony of the three witness, listened to the oral submissions of the Parties in various telephone conference calls and at the in-person hearing of this IRP in Washington, D.C. on 22 and 23 May 2015, and finally after much deliberation, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (c) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel declares that both the actions and inactions of the Board with respect to the application of DCA Trust relating to the .AFRICA gTLD were inconsistent with the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of ICANN.

149. Furthermore, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 11 (d) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Panel recommends that ICANN continue to

refrain from delegating the .AFRICA gTLD and permit DCA Trust's application to proceed through the remainder of the new gTLD application process.

150. The Panel declares DCA Trust to be the prevailing party in this IRP and further declares that ICANN is to bear, pursuant to Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, Article 11 of Supplementary Procedures and Article 31 of the ICDR Rules, the totality of the costs of this IRP and the totality of the costs of the IRP Provider as follows:

a) the fees and expenses of the panelists;
b) the fees and expenses of the administrator, the ICDR;
c) the fees and expenses of the emergency panelist incurred in connection with the application for interim emergency relief sought pursuant to the Supplementary Procedures and the ICDR Rules; and
d) the fees and expenses of the reporter associated with the hearing on 22 and 23 May 2015 in Washington, D.C.
e) As a result of the above, the administrative fees of the ICDR totaling US$4,600 and the Panelists' compensation and expenses totaling US$403,467.08 shall be born entirely by ICANN, therefore, ICANN shall reimburse DCA Trust the sum of US$198,046.04

151. As per the last sentence of Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 18 of the Bylaws, DCA Trust and ICANN shall each bear their own expenses. The Parties shall also each bear their own legal representation fees.

The Panel finally would like to take this opportunity to fondly remember its collaboration with the Hon. Richard C. Neal (Ret. and now Deceased) and to congratulate both Parties' legal teams for their hard work, civility and responsiveness during the entire proceedings. The Panel was extremely impressed with the quality of the written work presented to it and oral advocacy skills of the Parties' legal representatives.

This Final Declaration has sixty-three (63) pages.

Date: Thursday, 9 July 2015.

Place of the IRP, Los Angeles, California.

Professor Catherine Kessedjian

Hon. William J. Cahill (Ret.)

Babak Barin, President